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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SECURITY OF THE ENERGY SUPPLY OF THE EU: A BREAKING POINT IN 
INTEGRATION?  
 
 
DENĐZ BAŞKAN 
 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2008 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler Baç 
 
 
Keywords: European Union, energy security, security of supply, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, energy corridor, diversification.    
 
 
Increasing dependency of the EU on imported energy resources has been a major 
challenge for the EU energy security. The crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 
has brought the issue of security of energy supply to the agenda of the EU, which also 
raised questions over the reliability of Russia as the major energy supplier of the EU. 
Upon this background, the EU has developed various mechanisms in line with the 
diversification strategy of the EU energy policy. However, threats to the energy security 
of the Member States have led them to pursue national energy policies undermining the 
efforts for relieving the heavy dependency on the Russian energy resources at the EU 
level. Thus, in line with the theoretical framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, 
national preferences of the Member States rather than the supranational 
entrepreneurship have prevailed in the EU energy security policy. Divergence of the key 
interests of the leading Member States of the EU in the energy security has constituted 
the breaking point in further integration in the energy policy. The Caspian region energy 
resources are considered to be significant in the context of the diversification strategy of 
the EU. Energy strategies that would entail Turkey as an energy corridor between the 
Caspian region and the EU have significant potential to contribute to the security of 
energy supply of the EU.   
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ÖZET 
 
 
AVRUPA BĐRLĐĞĐ’NĐN ENERJĐ ARZ GÜVENLĐĞĐ: ENTEGRASYON 
SÜRECĐNDE BĐR KIRILMA NOKTASI MI?  
 
 
DENĐZ BAŞKAN 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2008 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, enerji güvenliği, arz güvenliği, liberal 
hükümetlerarasıcılık, enerji koridoru, çeşitlendirme.   
 
  
Avrupa Birliği’nin ithal enerjiye olan bağımlılığının giderek artması, Birliğin enerji 
güvenliğini tehdit eden unsurların başında gelmektedir. 2006 yılında Rusya ve Ukrayna 
arasında yaşanan enerji krizi, enerji arz güvenliği konusunu AB’nin gündemine 
getirmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda Rusya’nın AB için güvenilir bir enerji kaynağı olup 
olmadığına ilişkin soru işaretlerini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu sorundan hareketle, 
AB, enerji politikasının çeşitlendirme stratejisi doğrultusunda çeşitli mekanizmalar 
oluşturmuştur. Fakat, üye devletlerin enerji güvenliklerinin tehlikede olması, bu 
devletlerin ulusal enerji stratejileri izlemelerine sebep olmuş ve dolayısıyla AB’nin 
Rusya’nın enerji kaynaklarına olan bağımlılığını azaltmayı amaçlayan çabalarına da 
gölge düşürmüştür. Sonuç olarak, liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık yaklaşımının çerçevesine 
de uygun olarak, AB’nin enerji güvenliği politikasında belirleyici unsuru uluslarüstü 
girişimler yerine üye devletlerin ulusal çıkarları oluşturmuştur. AB’nin ileri gelen 
üyelerinin enerji güvenliği konusundaki temel çıkarlarının çatışması, enerji politikasının 
bütünleşmesindeki kırılma noktasını oluşturmuştur. Hazar Bölgesi enerji kaynakları, 
AB’nin enerji kaynaklarının çeşitlendirmesi stratejisi açısından önemlidir. Hazar 
kaynakları ve AB arasında enerji koridoru olan Türkiye’nin, AB’nin enerji arz 
güvenliğine yapacağı katkı yüksektir. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
       
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
The European Union’s energy policy has its roots in the early years of the 
European integration tying back to two of the three founding treaties of the EU. Treaties 
of Paris, creating the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom were the first 
milestones in the evolution of the EU as well as the first initiatives to regulate the 
energy sector.  Since then, the energy policy evolved in line with the changing 
conditions in energy field. The 1973-74 oil crises had marked a dramatic increase in the 
awareness of how developed countries were vulnerable to external oil shocks, since then 
the energy security started to be regarded as a serious problem. The ambitious 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 has increased the rate of import dependency of the EU. 
In addition, the fifth enlargement of the EU involving both 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
has increased the rate of dependency on Russian energy resources since the acceding 
countries have already had high levels of import dependency on Russian energy 
resources and their energy infrastructures are the remnants of the Soviet design. 
Disruptions in energy supply from Russia to Ukraine in 2006 have raised concerns over 
the energy security in general and over the dependency on Russian energy resources in 
particular in the EU. Russian energy strategy of using its vast energy resources as 
political leverage has exacerbated the concerns of the EU over its security of energy 
supply. Thus, the problem of security of supply is at the heart of the energy policy 
debates in the EU. 
 
The EU is now the world’s leading importer of energy and dependent on 
imported energy by 50%, while the ratio is estimated to reach to 70% in 2030 
(European Commission, 2006a). Dependency of the EU on imported natural gas is 
increasing more rapidly compared to oil, which increases the anxieties about the EU 
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energy security since dependency of the EU on imported natural gas is more 
homogenous compared to oil. Moreover, natural gas is a regional energy resource 
meaning that transportation of natural gas through pipelines is the most common way 
whereas oil can be transported in the tankers through the seaways relatively easily. In 
this thesis, the focus of the analysis in the energy policy of the EU is the problem of 
security of supply of the EU arising from its import dependency. The EU energy policy 
covers wide range of issue areas including the internal market, security of supply, 
environment, climate change, energy efficiency, energy saving, etc. In this study, 
security of supply will be the focus point of analysis. Diversification of the energy 
suppliers and creation of the single energy market are the two main pillars of the EU 
energy security, which will be analyzed throughout the study. In the study, the concept 
of energy resources will refer to two fossil fuels that are oil and natural gas unless 
otherwise stated. Oil and natural gas constitute more than 60% of the energy 
consumption in the EU (European Commission, 2008a). The EU has developed various 
mechanisms ranging from the regional cooperation schemes to international agreements 
to manage the problem of its security of supply and to form a unified energy security 
policy. The main objective of the policies developed at the EU level for the EU energy 
security is diversification. Mechanisms like the Trans-European Networks and the 
INOGATE Programme have been established to encourage the development of 
alternative supply routes. In addition, acknowledging the fact that the EU would remain 
dependent on the Russian energy resources, the EU has also developed the mechanism 
of EU-Russian Energy Dialogue to form a unified front in the energy relations with 
Russia. However, it is not possible to argue that the EU has a unified energy security 
policy, which will be the starting point of the analysis in this study. 
 
There are a number of related questions that will be analyzed in the study. The 
study will attempt to answer the questions of whether the EU energy security policy is 
intergovernmental or supranational, what are the obstacles for the creation of a common 
energy policy to ensure the EU security of supply and lastly what kind of a potential 
role can be envisaged for Turkey to play in the security of EU energy. The methodology 
of the study is position analysis of major players of the decision-making structure of the 
EU. The Commission is the major player in the evolution of the EU energy policy, 
while the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice 
are the minor players. Thus, in the study, the role of the Commission in the 
 3
development of the EU energy policy by creating the rhetoric and drawing the 
framework of the decisions will be analyzed. In the study, energy security decision of 
the leading Member States of the EU will be analyzed to assess whether it is the 
supranational leadership of the Commission or the national interests of the EU Member 
States that prevail in the security of supply policy of the EU. The leading Member 
States, whose positions will be analyzed in the study, are the UK, France, Germany, 
Italy and also the Netherlands since it is a major actor in energy. A comparative position 
analysis will be conducted on the Commission’s diversification policies in the energy 
policy to tackle the challenges of the EU import dependency on Russian resources on 
the one hand and the energy security policies of the Member States on the other hand. 
The study will attempt to distinguish whether the individual or the collective interests 
are prominent in the energy security policy of the EU. The reflection of the convergence 
and divergence points in the interests of the Member States on the energy security 
policy will be analyzed.  
 
 The analytical framework of the study constitutes the dynamics of policy-
making in the EU. The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism developed by Andrew 
Moravcsik will be used to evaluate the dynamics of the security of supply policy of the 
EU. The reason behind choosing liberal intergovernmentalism as the theoretical 
framework is that although the energy policy is partly covered under the supranational 
decision-making of the first pillar for the issues relating to environment and 
competition, it remains as a highly intergovernmental formation. Moreover, liberal 
intergovernmentalism covers the national preference formation stage when analyzing a 
specific issue in the European integration process. Moreover, Moravcsik attributes a 
higher importance to the economic actors rather than the political actors in the national 
preference formation process.  Since national energy companies of the EU Member 
States are the major domestic constituencies in the energy sector, it would be possible to 
assess theoretically the role of the economic actors in the analytical framework of 
liberal intergovernmentalism.     
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on the European integration by 
assessing the hypothesis that further integration is threatened when the key interests of 
the leading Member States diverge in a specific issue area by testing the hypothesis over 
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the energy security of policy of the EU that would draw upon insights for the overall 
European integration process.  
 
In the organization of the study, the dynamics of policy-making in the EU will 
be elaborated upon in the following chapter. Liberal intergovernmentalist theory of 
Moravsik will be analyzed as the analytical framework of the discussion on policy-
making process. An analysis of the institutionalist framework in the scholarly work on 
the European integration will be assessed focusing on the dichotomy between 
supranational versus intergovernmental theoretical perspectives. In this chapter, the 
actors of the decision-making in the European integration process will be described to 
form the background of the analysis in the following chapters. Liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory developed by Moravcsik will be analyzed in details since 
the analysis in the thesis will be based upon Moravcsik’s theoretical framework. 
National preference formation, strategic bargaining between states and delegation of 
state sovereignty to supranational institutions are the essential elements for 
understanding international cooperation in the theory. The hypothesis of liberal 
intergovernmentalism will be framed in this chapter, which will state that the 
divergence of the key interests of the leading Member States of the EU would constitute 
the breaking point in further integration in the energy policy of the EU.  
 
 In the third chapter, the evolution of the EU energy policy will be discussed. 
Responses of the EU to developments in energy issues will be discussed through a 
historical perspective. Developments relating to the energy security will be focused 
upon that are the internal market, the Trans-European Networks and the Energy Charter 
Treaty. The role of the Commission in the evolution of the EU energy policy will also 
be analyzed in this chapter. Although the Commission does not have exclusive 
competence in the energy policy, the policy frameworks and the rhetoric it has created 
have been significant in the development of the EU energy policy. However, it will be 
argued that the implementation of the Commission’s proposals has been constrained by 
the national preferences of the Member States.  
 
In the fourth chapter, an analysis of the security of the energy supply of the EU 
will be provided. The figures of import dependency rates of the EU average in a 
comparative analysis with the energy figures of the leading Member States will be 
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analyzed. Moreover, the impact of the enlargement on the import dependency of the EU 
will be given with a specific emphasis on the dependency on Russian energy resources. 
The implications of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine on the security of the 
energy supply of the EU will be provided. It will be followed by the mechanisms 
developed at the EU level to combat with the challenges of import dependency on few 
suppliers. Regional cooperation schemes that are the Euro-Med Partnership and the 
Black Sea Synergy along with the INOGATE Programme and the EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue will be discussed thoroughly. Main argument of the thesis will be assessed in 
this chapter by explaining the divergence of the Member States’ energy security 
interests that led them to pursue individual interests ignoring the collective interests of 
the EU. The agreement between Germany and Russia on the North European Gas 
Pipeline will be analyzed as the major illustration of the diverging interests of the 
Member States.  
 
In the fifth part, an assessment of the increasing significance of the Caspian 
energy resources for the diversification strategy of the EU will be assessed. Importance 
attributed to the Caspian region by the EU will be analyzed along with the investments 
of the major European companies in the region. The obstacles for the Caspian region to 
relieve the dependency of the EU on Russian energy resources will be discussed, which 
are the Russian interests for maintaining its position in the European market and the 
dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. At this point, possible role of Turkey as 
an energy corridor between the Caspian region and the EU comes into the picture due to 
Turkey’s strategic position between importers and exporters of energy resources. The 
Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline that was opened in 2005 as the first major step 
for Turkey’s role as an energy corridor and the Turkish- Greek Interconnector, which 
has recently become operational will be analyzed along with other factors making 
Turkey a natural energy corridor for the EU. It will be argued that the role of Turkey in 
the EU energy security will be enhanced to a great extent with the completion of the 
Nabucco pipeline. Lastly, the chapter will analyze the role of Turkey in the EU energy 
security in the context of the accession negotiations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
POLICY-MAKING IN THE EU AND THE LIBERAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
Explaining the nature and the dynamics of policy-making in the EU has been a 
major source of scholarly debate. Cleavage between supranational versus 
intergovernmental approaches for explaining the EU policy-making is at the core of the 
theoretical debate. However, the debate derives upon the common view that institutions 
matter in the EU policy-making. Building upon the premise that institutions determine 
political behavior in the EU, supranational institutionalism highlights the role of 
supranational institutions in the policy-making, while rational institutionalism 
(intergovernmentalism) favors states as major actors of the policy-making in the EU. In 
this chapter, firstly, the use of “new institutionalism” perspectives in the EU studies will 
be briefly touched upon. Actors of the EU decision-making process will be described 
briefly to present the background for the analysis of influential actors in the energy 
policy formation. Then, opposition between supranational versus intergovernmental 
theoretical perspectives will be analyzed bearing in mind the theoretical approaches 
have been responsive to the developments in the EU integration process. Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmental account of the EU policy-making will be analyzed with a 
special emphasis, since the goal of the study is to assess the explanatory power of the 
theory on the energy policy of the EU. The central aim of the chapter is to draw upon 
the hypothesis of the liberal intergovernmentalism on the energy policy of the EU. The 
hypothesis would be although the European Commission draws the upon the general 
framework of the decision-making in the energy policy, further integration in energy 
policy would be threaten in case of a convergence in the key interests of the leading 
Member States.   
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2.1. Analysis of Institutionalism in Understanding the EU Policy-Making   
 
 
   
Before elaborating upon the dichotomy of supranational versus rational 
institutionalism, the use of institutional framework in the EU studies will be shortly 
discussed. As Jupille and Caporaso put it (1999), use of institutional analysis in the 
study of the EU has significantly contributed to the EU scholarship. Three important 
strands of institutional analysis that are used in the EU literature are rational 
institutionalism (intergovernmentalism), sociological institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism. The three strands, which are regarded as the “new institutionalism”, 
share the view that institutions are the source of much political behavior rather than 
simply transforming preferences into policies (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999).  Main 
attempt of new institutional perspectives is to understand whether the EU institutions 
are independent from the Member States.  
 
Using institutional analysis is a common feature of international relations 
scholars as well as comparative politics scholars. In international relations theory, main 
function of institutions is to minimize transaction costs, which would have occurred if 
the negotiations were conducted with one another (Rosamond, 2000). According to 
Jupille and Caporaso (1999), using institutional analysis would contribute to erosion of 
boundaries between comparative politics and international relations, thus rejecting the 
view of scholars like Hix (1994), who argue in favor of a comparative politics approach 
to EU studies while asserting the view that comparative politics and international 
relations have different empirical foundations.   
 
Historical institutionalism emphasizes the ongoing character of policy-making, 
where “path-dependency” is the determinant of future policy choices meaning that once 
a decision is made, that decision would facilitate other decisions on the same path 
(Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, focuses 
on the impact of institutions on ideas and norms stating that institutions provide agents 
their identities (Checkel, 2003). Rational institutionalism aims to shed light on the 
reasons why the Member States create supranational institutions. According to rational 
choice institutionalism, institutions are created in order to provide information, 
minimize uncertainty and facilitate policy-making process (Chari and Kritzinger, 2006).     
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As stated above, both supranationalists and intergovernmentalists agree on the 
importance of institutions in the EU decision-making. However, the two theoretical 
perspectives attribute different roles to supranational institutions in the EU policy-
making process. In both views, it is crucial to understand whether policy processes are 
initiated by supranational institutions or national institutions, since “the institutional 
level structures the policy processes while assigning importance, influence and power to 
actors” (Chari and Kritziger, 2006, p.43). Prior to the analysis of the cleavage between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, a brief account of the actors of the EU 
decision-making will be presented to assess the explanatory power of the premises of 
the two theoretical camps over the energy policy of the EU.    
 
 
 
2.2. Actors of the EU Decision-Making 
 
 
 
The EU has a complex decision-making structure to balance the two opposing 
poles which are supranationalists and intergovernmentalists. Two major challenges of 
the EU decision-making have been how the make the decision-making more efficient 
and how to make it more democratic. Ironically, the EU decision-making mechanism is 
not known neither for its efficiency nor its democracy. Treaty revisions through the 
evolution of the EU had come as a response to short-term political needs without 
considering the long-term prospects. 
 
Four important players in the decision-making of the EU are the European 
Commission, Council of the EU, European Parliament and the European Court of 
Justice. Community law/the acquis is formed through two paths in the EU, one of which 
is through the decision of the Court of Justice, and second path being the decision-
making procedure of the EU in which the Commission proposes, Council and the 
European Parliament adopts1. These two paths are valid for the first pillar issues as 
being one of the three pillars of the Maastricht design. Supranational decision-making is 
                                                 
1 Until 1990s the EU was adopting 6,000-7,000 laws every year, but the number has 
fallen to 1,500-1,800 due to the intention of the Commission for the implementation of 
the existing law, rather than creating new ones (McCormick, 2005).   
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processed in the first pillar issue, while in the second and third pillar issues, the 
decision-making structure is intergovernmental.   
 
The Commission is the main executive body of the EU; on the other hand it is 
the sole body that proposes law. It is a highly bureaucratic body, which deals with first 
pillar issues. It is the main engine of integration, and the most supranational body of the 
EU that is composed of Directorate Generals (DGs) undertaking tasks related to specific 
policy areas. Commissioners are appointed by their national governments, but they need 
to swear that they will not act in accordance with their national interest.  The 
appointment of the Commission president is through qualified majority voting in the 
Council. This makes the Commission president a figure who could be accepted by both 
the intergovernmental and supranational groups in the Council, thus decreasing the 
autonomy of the Commission. Commission presidents have the capacity to push for 
European integration, but it depends on the personality of the Commissioner, or more 
directly, it depends on the nature of the election process in the Council, whether they are 
dominated by the federalist or intergovernmental voters. The Commission is so visible 
in the eyes of the European public, since it is the body that oversees the execution of 
laws and policies once they are adopted. The Commission has the right to impose 
sanctions and fines in the cases where it decides that the implementation of the EU law 
fails. Another major role of the Commission is that it represents the EU in international 
arena, and conducts negotiations with countries that want to join the EU. Compared to 
the Council, the Commission is more accessible; however, it is more contested than the 
Council by the European public (McCormick, 2005). The Commission’s role is 
significant for the energy policy of the EU, since it is the main body that draws the 
framework of decision taken in energy policy. The major role of the Commission on the 
energy policy will be dwelled upon in the following chapters.  
 
The Council of Ministers is the main legislator body of the EU by ending the 
legislation process that was initiated by the Commission and shares the legislative 
function with the European Parliament that has become a co-legislator with the 
institutional reforms. Population determines the decision-making power of the countries 
since thanks to the treaty reforms most of the policy issues in the Council is decided by 
qualified majority voting (QMV), a system in which the number of votes is assigned to 
countries in line with their population. Other than qualified majority voting, unanimity 
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and simple majority are still used in the Council, however, in limited policy areas. The 
policy areas in which QMV is used has been extended by the institutional reforms in 
treaties starting from the Single European Act to the Treaty of Nice significantly. The 
Council of Ministers is the institution where national interests are articulated, and where 
the final decisions are made, however, in the eyes of the European public, it is the 
Commission, not the Council, which is criticized for the actions of the EU (McCormick, 
2005).  
 
Communication channel between the Commission and the Council is COREPER 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives) that consists of the ambassadors of each 
country to the EU. COREPER is a highly significant mechanism in the decision-making 
structures of the EU, since without the possible approval of the states, it would be time-
consuming for the Commission to work on a policy proposal that would be rejected by 
the Member States. Although it is not a formal decision-making authority, COREPER 
can be named as a de facto decision-maker, since it makes decisions about which 
proposals should go to the Council and it has a power of “indicative vote” where 
COREPER decides how the proposal would be voted if it was put before the Council of 
Ministers (Lewis, 2002, p.287). One major criticism against COREPER is that it is not 
accountable to any institution, although it is a critical bridge in the decision-making 
mechanism of the EU. Ironically, its name is not mentioned in the discussions on how to 
make the EU more democratic, since there was no reference to COREPER in the 
Intergovernmental Council that was held in 1996 that attempted to find ways to combat 
with the democratic deficit of the EU (Lewis, 2002).    
 
The European Parliament has been transformed from a sole advisory body in the 
Rome Treaty design to a co-legislator, although its power is still questionable when 
compared with other institutions of the EU. First direct elections to the EP were held in 
1979 and the elections are held in every five years, which is an important aspect in the 
debate on the democratic deficit of the EU. Like in the Council, population is the 
determinant of the number of MEPs of each Member State in the European Parliament. 
The EP is the co-legislator in nearly 95% of the first pillar issues, assent of the EP is 
taken in the issues related to external relations, it is consulted in issues related to Social 
Charter, Taxation, Social Security and the cooperation procedure is applied in the issue 
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related to the Euro2. Co-decision and assent procedures are introduced in the Treaty of 
Maastricht that increases the role of the EP to a great extent. The complex decision-
making system that involves the EP in varying degrees in different issue items is the 
result of concern of the Member States to preserve their powers over decision-making in 
the EU (McCormick, 2005). Role of the EP has also extended to cover the issues related 
to the EU budget, since it has the power to control the way budget is spent and it can 
reject the budget with a two-thirds majority.   
 
The Commission is accountable to the European Parliament, however the EP 
does not have the power to selectively act against certain number of Commissioners, 
and it has the right to ask for the complete resignation of the Commission, a process 
which makes the Commission a whole body. The EP has also supervisory functions 
over the Commission by the right to debate the program of the Commission, the right to 
question the Commission and the right to approve the appointment of the 
Commissioners. This increased role of the EP on the control of the Commission is a 
recent institutional change came with the Nice Treaty that was put into force in 2003.   
 
Although the Commission, the Parliament or the Council do not have equivalent 
bodies in national decision-making systems thanks to their unique characteristics, the 
European Court of Justice highly resemble to a constitutional court (McCormick, 2005). 
It is the independent judiciary organ of the EU, which can only decide on the issues 
under the first pillar. Individuals, companies, states, and the institutions of the EU have 
right to apply to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the ECJ has the right to annul 
a Community decision. The task of the Court is to make sure that national law of the 
Member States, the law of the EU and the international treaties that are signed between 
the EU and third parties are consistent with the EU treaties and also the EU law is 
applied equally through the Member States. The Member States appoint the judges to 
the ECJ, one judge for each Member State serve for 6 years in the ECJ.  
 
                                                 
2 In the consultation procedure, the opinion of the EP is non-binding. In the cooperation 
procedure, the Parliament has the right for a second reading, whereas in the co-decision 
procedure, it has the right for a third reading. Assent procedure works in a way to take 
the approval or rejection of an issue by the Parliament by simply a yes or a no vote of 
the EP.  
 12
The discussion on the institutions of the EU would be incomplete without 
making reference to the European Council, which is the meeting of the heads of states 
and governments of the Member States every six months3. Primary function of the EC is 
to give a strategic direction for integration and decide key treaty revisions. One major 
point to underline about the European Council is that it is not accountable to any 
institution of the EU, the European Court of Justice cannot judge the decisions of the 
European Council. Decisions are taken by unanimity in the Council meetings that 
symbolize the dominance of intergovernmental branch in the EU.  
 
However, decision-making structure of the EU would be altered to a significant 
extent with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Following the rejection of the European 
Constitution in two popular votes conducted in France and Holland in 2005, the Treaty 
has been replaced by the Reform Treaty, which was signed in December 2007 in Lisbon 
by 27 Member States of the EU (EU Website). Lisbon Treaty keeps the institutional 
arrangements and the decision-making structure of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe to a great extent. Besides the changes that would be brought by 
the Treaty of Lisbon such as a clearer division of competencies between the Member 
States and the EU, appointment of a new High Representative for the Union in Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into 
the EU law, the Treaty has major modifications over the current decision-making 
structure of the Union (Treaty of Lisbon). 
 
One major institutional arrangement to ensure a more efficient EU is the 
replacement of the term-presidency structure of the Union by the function of President 
of the European Council elected for two and a half years (Treaty of Lisbon). According 
to the Lisbon Treaty design, a smaller Commission would be created and a stronger role 
would be attributed to national parliaments as well as to the European Parliament. 
Major change in the decision-making structure of the Union would be the re-calculation 
of the QMV. While extending the policy areas regulated by the QMV in the Council, 
the Lisbon Treaty modifies the calculation of the QMV system that would be made 
through a double majority system, where at least 55% of the Member States and at least 
                                                 
3Presidents and the vice-presidents of the Commission also attend to these summits that 
are held in June and December every year.   
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65% the Union’s population would be needed for an adoption of legislation by QMV 
from 2014 onwards (Treaty of Lisbon).  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon makes a categorization of areas indicating the policy areas 
under the EU competence. According to the Treaty, energy policy is also considered as 
a policy area under the competence of the EU, which would be analyzed in details in the 
following chapter. Moreover, a solidarity clause that would be used in occasions like 
disruptions in energy supply is also added to the Treaty. The energy policy of the EU 
would be analyzed in accordance with the current decision-making structure of the 
Union, since the ratification process in ongoing at the time of the writing of this study. 
The objective of the European Commission is completing the ratification process before 
January 2009, prior to the European Parliament elections that will be held in June 10, 
2009. Until the completion of this study, Ireland has been the only country that declared 
to have a referendum for the adoption of the Treaty, while the Treaty is already ratified 
by Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, Romania, France, Bulgaria, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, 
Denmark and Poland respectively.  
 
 
 
2.3. Supranational Institutionalism   
 
 
 
In supranational institutionalism, impact of political leadership of supranational 
institutions is key for policy formation in the EU. Supranational institutionalist 
perspective has the components of neo-functionalist thinking. Although neo-
functionalism has turned out to be insufficient to explain the developments in the EU 
integration process, which is also acknowledged by the creators of the theory itself, neo-
functionalist thinking has continued to shape the ideas on European integration. In neo-
functionalist theory, political integration is a process where states shift their loyalties to 
a new centre that has a jurisdiction over national states (Haas, 2003). Although 
supranational institutions are created by agreements among governments, once created, 
the institutions start to act independently. Rule-making authority delegated to 
supranational institutions by national governments start to confine the policies of 
governments. Supranational institutions have the key role in integration process, since 
they facilitate the transfer of loyalties to the European level and they play the role of 
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“honest broker” facilitating the decision-making between governments (Haas, 2003, p. 
524).      
 
Another assumption of neo-functionalism, which attracted significant criticism 
in theoretical discussion, is the notion of spill-over. In functionalist view, political spill-
over is a process in which interests of nation states converge as a result of the activities 
of supranational institutions (Cram, 1996). The process is followed by a shift in 
loyalties from national centre to supranational centre. As the theoretical debate on the 
European integration has flourished, political spill-over assumption was no longer taken 
for granted; and the reasons behind the choices of interest-driven actors were started to 
be discussed (Rosamond, 2000). Instead of taking the spill-over process as an 
assumption, an actor based explanation for the political spill-over by Schmitter (1970) 
was developed. However, all the attempts of revitalizing neo-functionalism could not 
prevent Haas to assess the limits of the theory when applying its basic premises to non-
European issues and to declare the theory ‘obsolescent’ in mid-1970s (Rosamond, 
2000). Nevertheless, despite the fact that students of the European integration reject the 
neo-functionalism theory, “most of them still continue to think in neo-functionalist 
terms” (Puchala, 1999, p.319); since the basic components of the theory are alive in 
supranationalist perspective of the EU integration.  
 
Basic premise of supranational institutionalism is that it is necessary to 
understand the impact of the European institutions in order to understand the EU policy-
making.  In contrast to intergovernmentalist thinking, it is not the Member States’ 
interests and bargaining that shape the integration process, but the dynamics within the 
supranational institutions. Interactions and discourses of the EU institutions 
significantly shape the Member State thinking and preferences (Sandholtz, 1998). The 
reason why the supranational institutions are effective in policy-making is their control 
of information and technical expertise. These two features of supranational institutions 
enable them to have better problem-solving capacity than national governments. Thus, 
the influence of national governments in the EU policy-making process is “analytically 
secondary” (O’Reilly and Sweet, 1998, p.184).  
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2.4. Rational Institutionalism (Intergovernmentalism) 
 
 
 
Neo-functionalist view of the European integration did not remain unchallenged. 
The shared view about the relationship between real events in the EU and the 
integration theories is that empirical developments have shaped theory constructions. 
1970s as a decade had experienced a ‘Eurosclerosis’ where the European integration 
process had slowed down. Revitalization of nationalist elements in Europe was initiated 
by the French president Charles de Gaulle. Double veto of the UK membership in 1963 
and 1967; and boycott to participate in meetings of the EC institutions due to 
disagreements over budgetary and institutional issues, the so-called empty chair crisis, 
were the moves that challenged deepening of integration in Europe. Crisis started with 
De Gaulle’s rejection of the increase in the power of the European Commission, the 
supranational institution whose implication of share of sovereignty disliked by De 
Gaulle. “Luxemburg Compromise4” that ended the French boycott facilitated the use of 
veto by Member States when they perceive a policy at odds with their national interest. 
Empty chair crisis and the Luxemburg compromise had demonstrated the major role of 
national interests in the decision-making process and led the European leaders to remain 
skeptical about further integration. An intergovernmentalist backlash in theoretical 
debates had coincided with the stagnant years of the European integration process. 
Hoffman outlined the limits of the theory of neo-functionalism and argued that the 
nation state is still the main actor in Western integration (Hoffman, 2003). Hoffman’s 
differentiation between high politics (security, foreign policy) and low politics 
(economic issues) had constituted the main ground for his critique of neo-functionalist 
theory. Further integration in issues of low politics would have been suitable with the 
assumptions of neo-functionalism theory; however those assumptions were not valid for 
the issues of high politics. In essence, Hoffman argued that “Member States were more 
obstinate than obsolete in European integration process” (Cram, 1996, p.48).  
                                                 
4 The empty-chair crisis, which was the French rejection of participating to the Council 
proceedings, was resolved after seven months with the signature of the Luxembourg 
Compromise on 30 January 1966 (EU Website). The Luxembourg Compromise 
provided that “Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by majority vote on 
a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more partners are at 
stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach 
solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of the Council while respecting 
their mutual interests and those of the Community" (EU Website).  
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Intergovernmentalism is the state-centric perspective for understanding the 
European integration process. Hoffman (1964) argued that the nature of integration is 
determined by national governments and their national interests, given that they are the 
only institutions with political legitimacy arising from being elected. Rational 
institutionalism is derived from the pluralist paradigm of international relations, where 
non-state actors are also important in policy-making, in addition to the inter-state 
relations. As a combination of realist paradigm and pluralism, rational institutionalism 
comes to the picture as a liberal approach, where intra-state bargaining is analyzed to 
understand inter-state bargaining process.  
 
In a variant of intergovernmentalist camp, Moravcsik (1991) argued for 
‘intergovernmental institutionalism’, where he stressed the role of domestic politics in 
the changing interests of states. Major elements of intergovernmental institutionalism 
were intergovernmentalism, bargaining over the lowest common denominator and strict 
limits on future transfer of sovereignty (Moravcsik, 1991, p.25). Moravcsik later 
developed his theory in ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community’ (1993), 
where he introduced the “liberal intergovernmentalist” approach to the European 
integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism builds upon “intergovernmental 
institutionalism” by improving its theory of interstate bargaining and institutional 
compliance and by adding a liberal theory of national preference formation (Moravcsik, 
1993, p.480). Liberal intergovernmentalist theory will be explained in details below, 
since major attempt of the study is to assess the explanatory power of liberal 
intergovernmentalism on the energy policy of the European Union.    
 
 
  
2.5. Liberal Intergovernmentalism  
 
 
 
Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory aims to explain the 
European integration as a two level game5 consisting of a liberal theory of national 
                                                 
5 Idea of two-level-game was constructed by Putnam (1988), where he uses the two-
level-game metaphor to explain the relationship between policies at national and 
international levels. In Putnam’s argument, executives form coalitions of support at the 
domestic level. At the international level, executives bargain in order to strengthen their 
domestic positions.    
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preference formation and an intergovernmentalist approach on interstate strategic 
bargaining (Rosamond, 2000). In his book The Choice for Europe, he adds a third 
dimension, which is institutional choice to explain the incentives for states to delegate 
sovereignty to a supranational institution (Moravcsik, 1998). For the patterns of national 
preference formation, Moravcsik argues that economic interests rather than political 
interests have been primary. In the second step of integration, the outcome of interstate 
bargaining is explained by the relative power positions of the states, rather than by the 
role of supranational institutions. Relative power of states is the result of asymmetrical 
interdependence. In the third stage, choices to delegate sovereignty to international 
institutions are explained as efforts of governments to constrain and control each other, 
so to enhance the credibility of commitments (Moravcsik, 1998). The alternative 
variables of each stage are shown in Table 2.1 that explains the general framework of 
analysis of Moravcsik. So, economic interests, relative power positions and credible 
commitments explain the major turning points in European integration (Moravcsik, 
1998). 
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Table 2.1: The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework of Analysis 
Stages of National     Interstate   Institutional  
Negotiation Preference     Bargaining   Choice 
 
  What is the source of     What explains  What explains  
  underlying national     the outcomes of  the transfer of  
  preferences?     interstate bargaining?   sovereignty?  
 
Alternative      Economic  Asymmetrical      Federalist ideology                                                                                                            
Independent    interests  interdependence            or   
Variables              or           or                   technocratic 
  Geopolitical  Supranational    management 
                        interests?  entrepreneurship?                     or 
                                              credible   
                                                                                                           commitment? 
Outcomes of      National        → Agreements       →  Choice to                      
 Each Stages    Preferences      delegate in  
                        international 
  institutions 
Source: Moravscik (1998). 
 
In liberal intergovernmentalist theory, states are the main actors in international 
politics. The role of supranational institutions in bargaining between states is not 
rejected; however a secondary role to these institutions for helping states to achieve 
their domestic goals and to facilitate the negotiations is assigned. Rejecting the neo-
functionalist premises of policy-making, Moravcsik (1998, p.4) states that “the 
integration process did not supersede or circumvent the political will of national leaders; 
it reflected their will”. According to Moravcsik, cooperation is possible between states 
when their interests converge. So, there is no need for a sui generis theory to explain the 
European integration, as the supranationalist theory did, since the European integration 
is the normal outcome of rational state behaviour. Rationality of states is a major 
assumption of Moravcsik; however this rationality differs from the rationality as 
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explained in realist theories of international relations, where states have fixed 
preferences. For Moravcsik (1991), states are not black boxes, but entities with 
changing interests over time responsible to their domestic constituencies. In 
Moravcsik’s analysis, domestic forces shape preferences and his emphasis of domestic 
concerns makes the theory liberal intergovernmentalism. According to the theory, “state 
behavior reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic 
societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment” (Moravcsik, 1993, p.474). 
Activities of the supranational institution of the EU, the European Commission, are 
observable in major negotiations including treaty reforms; however, activities of the 
institutions do not mean that they are influential (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999). In 
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective, the Council of Ministers compromising the 
national representatives of the Member States is the most influential organ of the 
European Union.  
 
National preference formation, strategic bargaining between states and 
delegation of state sovereignty to supranational institutions are three stages of 
negotiation in liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Each will be analyzed below.   
 
  
 
2.5.1. National Preference Formation  
 
 
 
The liberal theory of national preference formation is the main element that 
makes the liberal intergovernmentalist theory different within the intergovernmentalist 
perspectives. Moravcsik focuses on the role of state-society relations in foreign policy 
goals of national governments following the liberal path in international relations 
theory. Preferences of governments, which define their positions in international 
negotiations, are determined according to “the identity of important societal groups, the 
nature of their interests, and their relative influence on domestic policy” (Moravsik, 
1993, p.483). The relationship between the national governments and society has the 
nature of principal-agent relationship, where governments need the support of voters, 
parties, interest groups to be able to stay in power. Thus, national governments come to 
the international negotiation table through the process of national preference formation. 
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According to Moravcsik, the main reason why nation states support the 
European integration is the economic interdependence motivation (Moravcsik, 1993). 
Coordination of policies related to flows of goods and services and factors of production 
is more efficient when conducted by multilateral policies. In liberal intergovernmental 
theory, economic interests are more relevant than political interests in the process of 
national preference formation stage. Moravcsik uses the term convergence of interests, 
rather than harmony of interests that motivate nation states to act together in 
international front. When governments are negotiating a specific policy issue at the 
international level, they are both supported and constrained by their important domestic 
societal groups. Societal groups calculate their benefits and losses in the negotiated 
policy area and find ways to constrain the development of negotiations, even though the 
development of negotiations in that policy-area would be beneficial for the society as a 
whole. Moravcsik argues that when various societal groups are divided on a policy 
issue, the national governments are less constrained by interests of the groups, thus 
having more room to maneuver in international negotiations.   
       
 
 
2.5.2 Strategic Bargaining 
 
 
 
In strategic bargaining stage, liberal intergovernmentalist theory has three 
assumptions for the European integration (Moravcsik, 1993). First assumption is that 
states cooperate in a voluntary basis in the EU, thus the decision-making takes place in 
a non-coercive environment. Second assumption is that the environment in which states 
are negotiating is information-rich. And thirdly, transaction costs of these negotiations 
are low. In negotiations, the major determinant is the relative power of states 
(Moravcsik, 1993). In order to examine the applicability of liberal intergovernmentalist 
theory on the energy policy of the European Union, it is crucial to understand the major 
determinants of relative power of states in the theory. Primary determinants of 
bargaining power are unilateral policy alternatives, alternative coalitions (or threats of 
exclusion) and the potential for compromise and issue linkage (Moravcsik, 1993, 
p.499). One very significant implication of the first determinant is that countries with 
least interest in an issue may lower the level that the integration could go if they have 
policy alternatives to the issue at stake, so the decisions would be taken in accordance 
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with the lowest common denominator. If states have the possibility of forming 
alternative coalitions with other states, then their relative bargaining power would be 
greater, but on the other hand, if they face with the threat of exclusion in case they do 
not agree on a decision, then their relative bargaining power would be lesser. 
Nevertheless, interests of states on different issue areas are not always equal, thus issue 
linkage is a mechanism in which a state could compensate its loss in an issue by the 
decision taken in another issue. Issue linkage may contribute to negotiations by offering 
a “package-deal”; however it may have domestic costs (Moravcsik, 1993, p.505). 
Although issue linkage is regarded as the core of neo-functionalist theory in which the 
European integration is sustainable with spill-over, it is a marginal concept in liberal 
intergovernmentalism. Issue linkages that create significant losses to important societal 
actors are not sustainable.  
 
Moreover, Moravcsik (1991, p.25) argues that inter-state bargaining between the 
“leading” member states has been the backbone of the European integration. Although 
inter-state bargaining is the second major pillar in the European integration process, the 
role played by every individual EU Member States is not regarded as being equal with 
other Member States in the liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Negotiation positions of 
the leading member states are crucial for the pace of the European integration. For 
example, Moravcsik (1991) argues that the reason why the EU could further integrated 
with the success of the Single European Act initiative was the convergence of the policy 
preferences of the UK, Germany and France6.    
        
 
 
2.5.3. Institutional Choice  
 
 
 
Third stage of international cooperation is the role of supranational institutions. 
As stated in previous paragraphs, supranational institutions have only a secondary role 
in liberal intergovernmentalist theory. According to the intergovernmentalist 
perspective, supranational institutions are acceptable to nation states as long as they 
                                                 
6 For the sake of better analysis in the study, Italy and Netherlands are also regarded as 
the leading Member States of the EU along with the UK, Germany and France due to 
their active role in international energy relations.   
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strengthen the positions of states at the domestic level. Supranational institutions assist 
to national governments for overcoming their domestic opposition, especially when the 
opinions of domestic actors are weak or divided (Moravcsik, 1993). In liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory, there are two ways for the supranational institutions to 
contribute to the power of national governments. Firstly, the institutions increase the 
efficiency of inter-state bargaining. This point is in line with the regime theory that 
regards the international institutions as instruments to reduce the transaction costs in 
inter-state negotiations, thus contributing to an effective bargaining process (Moravcsik, 
1993). Secondly, the institutions help the national governments to strengthen their 
positions vis-à-vis domestic groups by providing domestic agenda setting power and 
increasing legitimacy and credibility.   
 
As stated above, institutions have the role of increasing the efficiency of 
interstate bargaining by providing negotiation forum, decision-making structures and 
possibility to observe the compliance of other members by the mechanisms of the 
institution. However, this solely answers the question of why states are motivated to 
negotiate in an international institution. It does not attempt to explain why states may 
choose to pool sovereignty to a supranational institution in which some of the decisions 
will be taken by qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. According to 
Moravcsik’s theory, states make a cost-benefit analysis and accept the risk of being 
outvoted on some issues for a more efficient decision-making system as a whole that 
would bring about benefits to that state on more issue areas. National governments are 
challenged to find a balance between a more efficient decision-making environment and 
political risk of uncontrolled issue linkage. States would be more likely to delegate 
sovereignty to supranational institutions when they have more political gains and less 
political risk (Moravcsik, 1993). Moravcsik has argued “…independent actions of by 
the Commission or outcomes that contravene the interests of a single Member State, 
taken in isolation, do not constitute decisive against the intergovernmentalist view that 
the EC is grounded fundamentally in the preferences and power of Member States” 
(1993, p.514). In other words, loss of sovereignty does not undermine the basic 
assumptions of liberal intergovernmentalist thinking (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1999).  
 
Lastly, Moravcsik views the so-called democratic deficit of the EU as the reason 
for its success. Domestic constituency cannot find the opportunity to ratify the decisions 
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taken at the EU level and intergovernmental meetings occur in secrecy. So, the 
governments find the chance to overcome domestic opposition by introducing a specific 
issue at the EU level first, and then present it to the public. Moreover, Moravcsik (2002) 
argues that there is neither a legitimacy problem nor a democratic deficit in the 
European Union. He states that scholars who claim that the EU suffers from legitimacy 
crisis and democratic deficit compare the EU to ideal, utopian types of democracies, 
while the EU is democratic and transparent with its “constitutional checks and balances, 
indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the 
European Parliament” (Moravcsik, 2002, p.605).  
 
 
 
2.6. Hypothesis of Liberal Intergovernmentalism for the EU Energy Policy  
 
 
 
Main hypothesis of the liberal intergovernmentalism is that it is the interests of 
the Member States, rather than the supranational institutions, which shape the decisions 
in the energy policy of the EU. Supranational institution of the EU decision-making, the 
European Commission, has an active role in the formation of the energy policy of the 
EU by drawing the framework of further moves to be taken under the EU energy policy. 
Supranational institutions enhance the efficiency of the inter-state bargaining and help 
the Member States to achieve domestic goals related to the energy policy by carrying 
the issue to the EU level. However nation states choose to delegate power to the 
Commission in occasions of possible political or economic gain. Moreover divergence 
of key interests of the Member States would form a breaking point in further 
integration. Since the general objective of the study is to assess the explanatory power 
of the liberal intergovernmentalism over the energy policy of the EU, the hypothesis 
will be tested in the following chapters of the study. 
  
As a conclusion to the chapter, main cleavage in theoretical debate to explain the 
European policy-making is between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists. Both 
deriving from institutionalist paradigm, they take different actors of policy-making as 
the central figure. Intergovernmentalists reject the supranational view that the European 
integration is constructed by the supranational institutions. Instead, they emphasize the 
central role played by the national governments where European integration deepens 
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when interests of states converge accordingly. Liberal intergovernmentalism has created 
significant influence upon contemporary EU studies (Rosamond, 2000). Combining the 
liberal theory of national preference formation and intergovernmental concept of inter-
state bargaining, Moravcsik argues that states delegate sovereignty to supranational 
institutions as long as the institutions strengthen their power positions. The relative 
power position of the Member States is the major determinant of the outcome of 
negotiations, where decisions are made according to the lowest common denominator. 
According to Puchala (1999), Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist account will not 
solve the debate between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists; however, future 
interpretations of the EU policy-making will be compared with the credibility of his 
ideas.  
 
In the next chapter, a historical account of the evolution of the EU energy policy 
will be presented. The hypothesis of the liberal intergovernmentalism for the energy 
policy of the EU, which states that divergence of key interests of the leading Member 
States of the EU would constitute the breaking point in further integration in the energy 
policy of the EU, will be assessed in the following chapters.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE EU ENERGY POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
SECURITY OF SUPPLY 
 
 
 
 
Energy policy of the EU dates back to two of the three founding treaties of the 
European Community. Energy is one of the oldest policy areas in Europe that is decided 
to be regulated at the Community level. Coal and nuclear power had been the first two 
areas taken under the EC competence. Policies generated at the EC/EU level have 
evolved in accordance with the developments in national, regional and global 
dimensions. In this chapter, the evolution of the EU energy policy will be analyzed. 
Through a historical perspective, the developments that necessitated taking action at the 
EC level will be discussed briefly. The evolution of the EU energy acquis will be 
analyzed mainly focusing on the elements of security of supply. Definitions of the terms 
energy security and security of supply will be provided in order to form the background 
of the analysis of general trends of the EU energy security in the following chapter. 
Energy policy of the EU covers wide-range of issues including the creation of a single 
market in electricity and gas, climate change, environment, energy efficiency and 
renewable energy resources. Although each component of the EU energy policy are 
interrelated, in this study areas relating to the security of energy supply will be 
analyzed, which are the internal market, Trans-European Networks (TEN) and the 
Energy Charter. The ultimate aim of the chapter is to assess the explanatory power of 
liberal intergovernmentalism on the energy policy of the EU and it will be concluded 
that although the role of the Commission in the evolution of the EU energy policy is 
significant, its role has been constrained and shaped by the preferences of the Member 
States. The evolution of the EU energy policy will be analyzed after providing two 
sections as a general introduction for the debate on the EU energy security.     
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3.1.The Challenge of Having an Energy Policy at the EU Level 
  
 
 
Importance of energy for the economic reconstruction of Europe had been 
reflected in two of the three founding treaties of the EC that focus on energy. The 
European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom were the two European communities 
constituted for a common energy policy. However, energy policy was regarded as a 
national concern, which prevented the development of an EC energy policy with the 
initiation of the Commission until mid-1980s (Matlary, 1996). National monopolies and 
divergent national interests prevented the Commission to take action for the 
development of a common policy. Even the OPEC oil crisis could not be enough to 
motivate the Member States for taking significant collective action at the Community 
level. Major policies as the milestones for the EU energy policy were needed to wait for 
“a new thinking” on the energy policy in the EU (Matlary, 1996, p. 258). Thus, the main 
factor that has precipitated the development of energy policy has been the 
transformation of the traditional national paradigms. A major observation about the 
pace of deepening in the energy policy is that the development of the EU energy policy 
has followed a parallel line with the general EU development (Andersen, 2000b). 
Policies for a common energy policy have flourished during the times of speedy 
European integration while there has been lack of motivation for a common energy 
policy during the periods of stagnation of the integration process.  
 
Since energy is the major input for industries of the Member States, it is 
regarded as a “strategic good”, whose procurement is regarded as an issue of national 
security (Matlary, 1996, p.259). Besides the role or energy as an input for industrial 
production, it is also an industrial sector in its own right; and the EC/EU needed to have 
a common approach to the energy policy in order to have a complete economic union 
(El-Agraa and Hun, 1984). However, interests of the Member States in the energy 
sector are clearly defined and the room for maneuver for each Member State is 
extensively limited. Interests of energy producing countries are definitely different than 
the interests of countries that are dependent on imported energy resources. The UK as a 
major oil and gas producer and the Netherlands as the major gas producer would 
naturally have different interests compared to other leading Member States of the EU 
that do not produce their own energy resources. On the other hand, the difference 
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between compositions of energy resources of each Member State is another reason for 
diverging interests. Interests of Germany that still subsidizes its coal industry and 
interests of France that supports policies to promote nuclear power would hardly 
converge. “Cohesion countries”, on the other hand, would opt for a common energy 
policy through which they can receive support for the development of their 
infrastructures (Matlary, 1996, p.270). In case of oil, major reasons that undermine the 
solidarity between the Member States are cooperative attitudes being limited to times of 
growth, differences in energy resources, differences in economic strength, differences in 
relations to oil exporters and different foreign policy choices (El-Agraa and Hu, 1984). 
Moreover, the most ambitious enlargement of the EU in May 2004 contributed to the 
heterogeneity of the Member States in terms of external dependence as well as the 
dependence of the EU on Russian energy resources. A general remark for the rest of the 
chapter is that although two of the Community Treaties were directly related to the 
energy sector, it is possible to argue neither for an internal energy market nor a common 
energy policy. As a general agreement, the contradiction is regarded as the 
Community’s major failure (Padgett, 1992; Andersen, 2000a). Nevertheless, lack of a 
common energy policy has not prevented the EU from taking significant measures in 
energy sector (Matlary, 1997) especially with the leadership role of the Commission, 
which will be discussed in the following sections of the chapter. Before going into the 
details of the evolution of the EU energy policy, definitions of the related terms will be 
provided.    
 
 
 
3.2. Definitions of Energy Security and Security of Supply and an Initial 
Look at the EU Energy Security  
 
 
 
Energy security is defined as “reliable and adequate supply of energy at 
reasonable prices” (Bielecki, 2002, p.237). Threats to energy security covers different 
areas depending on the time horizon it is defined; short-term energy security involves 
risks of disruption of supplies due to technical problems, bad weather conditions or 
political problems, whereas long-term energy security covers cases in which new 
supplies cannot meet the growing demand (Bielecki, 2002). Energy security is a broader 
concept compared to security of supply, since the latter only refers to regular energy 
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needs of a society. Energy security has the meaning of “having access to sufficient 
energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of 
major disruption of services” (security of supply), which needs to be complemented by 
the elements of sufficient level of investments in resource generation capacity and 
infrastructures as well as diversification of supply (Bahgat, 2006, p.965-66). As 
Stanislaw (2006) argues, recent global challenges such as the increase in energy prices, 
massive increase in the energy demand due to economic growth of China and India, 
Russian use of its dominant position in energy for political ends and the instability of 
the Middle East, the definition of energy security has vastly (my emphasis) transformed. 
Broad definition of energy security “encompass security in the political, environmental, 
infrastructure, and even terrorism senses, as well as the new concerns of sustainable 
development and the climate change” (Stanislaw, 2006, p.2). Moreover, threats to 
energy security generally have low probability with high consequences (Lieb-Doczy et 
al, 2003).     
 
As a brief insight to the EU energy security, the first point to underline is that the 
EU-27 is the second largest energy consumer in the world having an energy market with 
approximately 500 million consumers. However, the EU struggles with the problem of 
security of its energy supply stemming from its dependence to third countries for 
primary energy resources. The seriousness of the problem of the security of supply of 
the EU is better understood when the forecasts of the Commission for 2030 are visited. 
It is forecasted that the general level of import dependence will rise to 65% in the EU; 
while dependence for gas would increase from 57% to 84% and dependence for oil 
would increase from 82% to 93% (European Commission, 2007a). The EU aims to 
establish itself an “energy security framework” compromising comprehensive set of 
rules and obligations for the Member States to challenge the growing problem of 
security of supply (Bielecki, 2002, p.240).  
 
When the underlying reasons of the threats to the security of supply of the EU 
are analyzed from a broader perspective, factors other than external dependency come 
into the picture such as network failures, aging oil refineries and power stations, lack of 
investment, poor interconnections between European electricity and gas grids, terrorist 
threats to key energy installations and lack of effective European-wide mechanisms for 
addressing security of supply risks (Helm, 2007, p. 442). Since threats to the security of 
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supply stem from a wide-range of reasons, policies taken at the EU level to combat with 
the problem of security of supply are needed to cover wide range of areas. In the 
following sections, the evolution of the EU energy policy with specific emphasis on 
solutions to the problem of security of supply of the EU will be analyzed.      
 
 
 
3.3. Energy Policy in the Early Years of European Integration 
 
 
 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the Treaty 
of Paris signed in 1951 with the authority of reducing tariffs, abolishing subsidies, 
fixing prices and imposing levies on coal and steel production to create a single market 
for coal and steel. The European Atomic Energy Community created by the Treaty of 
Rome was signed in 1957 with the objective of creating a common market for nuclear 
energy. Although the ECSC could not fully achieve its objective of creating a single 
market for coal and steel and the Euratom limited its work on research, the two 
Communities mark the beginning of European integration on the hand and initiation of 
the European energy policy on the other hand (McCormick, 2005). 
 
In the time period from the signature of the Treaties of Rome until early 1970s, 
energy was not considered as a major issue due to cheap imported oil replacing coal in 
the EC. In accordance with the general trend with the United States and the Soviet 
Union, a “natural” tendency to shift from coal that has rising costs and prices to oil that 
has stable or declining costs and prices had occurred in Western Europe (Lubell, 1961, 
p.400). However, Western Europe did not have the same conditions with the US and the 
USSR since the latter two could maintain their security of supply by the energy 
resources available to them within their borders. Starting from the end of the 1950s, 
abundant and cheap Middle East oil decreased the share of coal in energy consumption 
of the EC, that fell to 21% in 1973 from the share of 75% in 1950 (El-Agraa and Hu, 
1984). In 1971, oil accounted for 60 percent of the energy consumption of the six 
founding members of the EC (Sodupe and Benito, 2001). Moreover, Europe had a 
relaxed attitude towards the security of its oil supply in the early years of integration 
due to the fact that it did not anticipate a concerted political action by Middle East 
producers (Lubell, 1961). Until the 1970s, the EC was completely absent from the 
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international scene as an actor in the energy area (Matlary, 1996). Energy sector was 
seen as key to economic planning by the Member States and “the strategic economic 
importance of the energy sectors meant that policy autonomy was guarded jealously by 
the Member States” (Padgett, 1992, p.55)  
 
In the OPEC oil crisis occurred in 1973-74 security of energy supply had entered 
the agenda of the EC. The crisis had profound damaging effects on the global economy 
as well as on the European economy, “ending the earlier period of rapid growth and 
triggering a period of turbulence and structural adjustments” (Bielecki, 2002, p.238).7 
The crisis revealed the vulnerability of the developed nations in the external 
developments in energy field. Although the Member States were concerned about their 
dependence on imported oil, they could not agree how to tackle the problem of security 
of supply in a way other than bilateral agreements with the OPEC countries. The OPEC 
crisis created the need for a common action at the Community level; however economic 
recession occurred by the energy crisis led Member States having divergent national 
interests to pursue national objectives. Thus, the Commission’s actions in the energy 
field confined to efforts to find objectives where national interests of the Member States 
may converge (Padgett, 1992). Until mid-1980s, energy policy of the EC was confined 
to non-binding policy recommendations reflecting the lowest common denominator 
between Member States interests (Matlary, 1996).  
 
The energy issue was not covered in the Treaty of Rome establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC). The European Community responded to the 
OPEC oil crisis by a Council Resolution concerning a new energy policy strategy for 
the Community where the urgent need for a Community energy policy was emphasized 
(Council of the EC, 1974). In order to guarantee safe and lasting supplies, reduction of 
energy demand by measures of using energy rationally and improving security by 
development of nuclear power production and hydrocarbon resources in the Community 
were stated in the Council Resolution. The need for diversified and reliable external 
supplies was also underlined in the Resolution. Threats to the  energy security arising 
                                                 
7 Upon this background, the OECD countries decided to establish the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in November 1974 in order to reduce dependence on imported oil 
through increased domestic production, energy efficiency measures and substitution of 
oil by other energy resources.   
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from the dependence on imported oil was seen partly as a national problem, although it 
was dealt with measures related to oil stocks and energy efficiency at the EC level. The 
measure taken at the EC level to secure the oil supply has been the obligation of 
Member States to maintain minimum stocks of oil at a level corresponding to at least 90 
days’ average daily consumption in the preceding calendar year by the Council 
Directive amending an older Directive obliging the Member States to establish stocks 
for 65 days (Council Directive 98/93/EC). The Directive also establishes a mechanism 
to promote solidarity between the Member States in the event of an energy crisis. 
Although the EC could not respond the OPEC oil crisis effectively, measures taken to 
reduce consumption and replace oil by alternative energy resources led to a significant 
fall in net oil imports of the EC. “Between 1973 and 1978, the EC net oil imports 
declined from 598.5 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) to 355.7 million toe due to 
reduced consumption and increased North Sea oil production” (El-Agraa and Hu, 1984, 
p.344).  
 
 
 
3.4. Revitalization of Energy Issues at the EU Level  
 
 
 
When the management of the energy issues in the EC is analyzed, it is seen that 
energy becomes the issue of low politics when there is no disruptions in security of 
supply, diplomatic crisis or nuclear accidents. In contrast, in occasions like a major oil 
or gas crisis, the energy issue dominates the agenda in the EC as a matter of high 
politics (Matlary, 1996). As stated above, even the OPEC oil crisis could not motivate 
the Member States to establish a long-lasting mechanism to ensure the security of 
supply. However, with the start of 1980s, perceptions to the energy sector have been 
altered significantly in the EC.  
 
There were a number of factors that triggered such a change in perceptions to the 
energy issues. The major reason has been the UK’s liberalization of its energy sector 
starting from the mid-1980s, which had a profound effect on the transformation of the 
national paradigms of the Member States. UK decided to reform its energy sector 
mainly through privatizations not only in the energy sector but also in other sectors 
previously owned by the government like telecommunications. Reform of the UK’s 
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energy sector initiated a process where other Member States of the EU started to 
consider free market rules for the efficiency of their energy sectors (Matlary, 1996). In 
other words, “there was an emerging ‘paradigm shift’ in thinking about the state’s role 
in the traditionally public sectors of the economy” (Matlary, 1996, p.258). It is 
significant to underline the timing of the paradigm shift; since there was neither a major 
energy crisis nor disruptions in the energy supplies. The time period witnessed low oil 
prices for much of the time and steady economic growth with increase in the oil 
consumption that led the net oil imports to exceed the 1973 levels (Bielecki, 2002). A 
second factor has been the global trend towards liberalization of energy sectors. The 
Energy Charter Treaty, which will be analyzed in details below, has been another reason 
behind the change in the dominant political and economic perspective of the major 
states signing the Treaty that are the OECD members as well as the former Soviet 
Union countries (Andersen, 2000b).  
 
 
 
3.4.1. Initiatives for a Single Market in Energy and the Role of the 
European Commission  
 
 
 
Transformation of the thinking in the Member States led the issue of energy to 
be considered under the single market at the beginning of 1980s. Although the energy 
policy was not under the competence of the European Commission, the role of the 
institution had been crucial especially in liberalization of the energy markets of the 
Member States. The reason why energy market was intended to be included in the 
internal market was the consensus of the Member States that “there could be no real 
internal market in the sense of a ‘level playing field’ unless the energy sector was 
included” (Matlary, 1996, p.263).  
 
The relationship between the establishment of an Internal Energy Market and the 
security of supply is crucial. Once an effectively functioning and competitive single 
market in energy is created, “there would be real incentives for companies to invest in 
new infrastructure, inter-connection capacity and new generation capacity, thereby 
avoiding black-outs and unnecessary price surges; a true single market promotes 
diversity” (European Commission, 2007a, p.6). However, ironically liberalization of the 
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energy markets also brings about challenges to energy security, since roles of the actors 
that would take the lead in case of a disruption are not clearly defined (Bielecki, 2002). 
The problem arises due to the fact that energy security is a public good whose benefits 
are enjoyed by everyone. The issue of security of supply becomes complicated by the 
fact that governments are no longer single actors with responsibilities of regulation in 
liberalized energy markets. Lieb-Doczy et al. (2003) makes the point that in competitive 
energy markets, decisions on investment are not taken considering the overall system 
security but on the basis of profitability, which makes the relationship between 
competitive markets and the security of supply complicated. Thus, a comprehensive 
energy policy framework is needed for security of supply and the establishment of a 
competitive market should be one of the components of the framework (Helm, 2002).  
 
First move to include the energy sector into the internal market was the Council 
Resolution of 1986, which emphasized the necessity of a new “market oriented 
approach” (Padgett, 1992, p.56). The Resolution also emphasized the necessity of 
increased competition as the principal mechanism for securing the Community’s future 
energy security (Council of the EC, 1986). Besides the global trend towards 
liberalization and deregulation, the reason behind the motivation of the EC for a single 
energy market was the Single European Act that was signed in 1985 with the objective 
of completing the internal market. In the European Commission’s report on the internal 
energy market published in 1988, the obstacles to the creation of an internal energy 
market were listed and four major solutions were prescribed, which are developing an 
internal energy market as a part of the single European market by removing technical 
and fiscal barriers, application of the Community principles such as free movement of 
goods, competition, state aid and state monopolies on the energy sector, integration of 
the energy infrastructures and protection of environment (European Commission, 1988). 
 
As the European Commission gained competence to draw the energy sector 
under the rules of the single market, it proposed an energy package to bring 
transparency to electricity and gas prices, to maintain less restrictive rules on transit for 
gas and electricity and to maintain investment transparency. The Directive for price 
transparency was regarded as uncontroversial that was eventually adopted in 1990 
(Directive 90/377/EEC); however, Directive proposals for transit rights for other 
operators in the electricity and gas sectors attracted criticism, nevertheless finally 
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adopted in 1990 (Directive 90/547/EEC) and 1991 (Directive 91/296/EEC)  
respectively. Electricity transit attracted manageable criticism from the Member States, 
while there was greater opposition to transit rights for gas compared to electricity due to 
the fact that gas transmission in Europe has been dominated by few companies that own 
the national pipeline systems (Matlary, 1996). The Member States, except for the UK, 
defended the interests of their national companies, thus the final Directives adopted 
were modified significantly in accordance with the interests of the state interests. On the 
other hand, the proposal aimed to maintain investment transparency could not be 
realized since it was rejected by the Council on the grounds that it was against the 
interests of the Member States.  
 
After the initial modest steps for creating an internal market, the Commission 
further acted to increase the level of liberalization in electricity and gas markets. 
Although the Commission proposed draft Directives for further liberalization of energy 
markets, the issue was discussed by the Member States, which could not reach to any 
agreement until 1995 when the energy liberalization issue turned out to be a “deadlock” 
(Matlary, 1996, p.264). The ironic situation was that although the Member States 
acknowledged the possible benefits of a single energy market as part of the single 
European market, they (especially Germany and France and except for the UK) 
continued to defend the positions of their national companies. In other words, the 
Member States were struggling in order not to lose their control on the energy policy 
despite of the potential gains of liberalization. The Directive on electricity liberalization 
was adopted in 1996 and entered into force in 1997 setting the deadlines of deregulation 
of both production and transport of electricity by the Member States as 1999 (Directive 
96/92/EC). On the other hand, the Directive on gas liberalization was adopted and put 
into force in 1998, in which the Member States were obliged to comply with the 
legislation in 2000 (Directive 98/30/EC). The content of the electricity and gas 
directives were different to a significant extent from the initial proposals of the 
Commission (Andersen, 2000a).  
 
 However, the working paper published by the European Commission revealed 
the fact that although the effects of the market opening had been positive, further 
measures are necessary to complete the internal market and reap its full benefits 
(European Commission, 2001). In the working paper, the Commission entailed 
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quantitative proposals, which are related to the degree of market opening and qualitative 
proposals, which are related to the minimum standards necessary for the completion of 
the internal energy market. In line with the proposals of the Commission, electricity and 
gas directives were amended. Second electricity (Directive 2003/54/EC) and gas 
(Directive 2003/55/EC) directives were adopted in 2003, which also included the rules 
for unbundling8 as major difference from the previous Directives. The Directives laid 
down the rules for businesses to choose their electricity and gas suppliers freely in a 
competitive market by July 2004 and for households by July 2007.  
 
 
 
3.4.1.1. The Role of the Commission 
 
 
 
When the evolution of the attempts for creating a single energy market is 
analyzed, the Commission is seen as the locomotive for further liberalization of the 
energy sector. Besides its major role of initiation of policy proposals, the reports and 
sector inquiries it conducts creates the ground for further action again for the 
Commission itself. In other words there is a reciprocal process reinforced by the 
Commission for the creation of an internal market in energy. The Commission’s 
proposals have drawn the framework of the future steps of the Member States that 
would be taken in the energy policy. Thus, rhetoric of the Commission has been 
determinant in the development of the EU energy policy. Although the Commission did 
not have formal competence to act on energy policy, it has used various instruments for 
a common energy policy, which are its powers stemming from the single market and 
competition policy as well as the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The 
Commission mainly preferred proposing draft directives to the Council rather than the 
“court route” since it had more political legitimacy; however turned to the Court when 
negotiations failed (Matlary, 1996, p.263). ECJ decisions differ from the directive 
approach in the sense that the Court makes a decision on a specific case; however 
decisions constitute precedence for future directives.    
 
                                                 
8 Unbundling means that energy transmission networks are needed to work 
independently from the production and the supply side.  
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One example demonstrating how anti-competitive measures (state aids in this 
example) can distort the functioning of the internal energy market and the role of the 
Commission is the case of France’s energy monopoly Electricité de France (EdF). 
Variations between liberalization levels of energy markets have led the distortion of the 
competitive environment in European markets. France delayed the partial opening of its 
energy markets as well as of the EdF that has been tightly controlled by the government. 
The real trouble began when EdF started to take aggressive action in the markets of 
other Member States, thus distorting its advantageous situation stemming from being 
supported by the government. The Commission launched an investigation for EdF in 
2002 since state-aid policy of France discouraged other Member States to liberalize 
their energy markets. Following the investigation, the French government agreed to end 
its state-aid policy to EdF (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004).    
 
A recent example of the reciprocal process conducted by the Commission 
explained above is the sector inquiry it conducted for the European gas and electricity 
sectors in January 2007, which is followed by a third energy package proposed by the 
Commission in September 2007. In the inquiry, the Commission stated that the 
objectives of market opening have not yet been achieved and defined four actions to be 
taken urgently: achieving effective unbundling, removing the regulatory gaps, 
addressing market concentration and barriers to entry and increasing transparency in 
market operations (European Commission, 2007b). The negotiations for the adoption of 
the third package in energy liberalization are ongoing between the Member States at the 
time of the writing of this study.  
 
 
 
3.4.1.2. Member States Interests as Obstacles for the Completion of the 
Internal Energy Market  
 
 
  
Although the Member States have adopted their national electricity and gas 
markets in line with the Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC respectively, it is not 
yet still possible to state that there is a single European energy market. Shortcomings of 
the current situation have motivated the Commission to issue a third energy 
liberalization package. The Commission has argued that national champions of the 
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Member States, in other words large integrated energy companies of some Member 
States, of Germany and France constitute a major obstacle for a true single European 
energy market. France’s EDF and Germany’s E.ON are the leading vertically integrated 
companies of the two countries, meaning that the companies own energy production, 
supply and transmission units. However, in accordance with the controversial plans of 
the European Commission for unbundling, energy transmission networks of the energy 
giants need to work independently from the production and supply utilities. The 
Commission considers liberalization of energy markets as one of the major conditions 
of an efficient energy sector, thus of an efficient EU economy. The Commission has 
proposed an alternative path for the Member States that do not opt for the option of 
unbundling. According to the alternative scheme of the Commission, the firms may 
continue to maintain transmission assets; however they need to establish an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) for taking decisions relating to investments and commercial 
activities (Euractiv, 27/11/2007)9. However, some countries of the EU, mainly France 
and Germany, opposed the plans of the Commission arguing that unbundling is not the 
only alternative for ensuring competitive energy markets in the EU. Nine Member 
States of the EU, led by France and Germany, have issued a letter to the Commission 
stating that they reject the Commission’s proposal of unbundling (Euractiv, 
27/11/2007). The opposing countries whose energy sectors are not yet fully liberalized 
are led by France and Germany that are Austria, Bulgaria, Southern Cyprus, Greece, 
Latvia, Luxemburg and Slovakia. Opposing countries’ votes constitute a blocking 
minority in the Council. The UK and Netherlands, on the other hand, are among the 
leading supporters of unbundling. Thus, interests of the Member States are diverged 
depending upon whether they have national giant energy companies or not, which in 
turn led them to take different positions in the issue of unbundling.  
 
Difference between electricity and gas sector organizations of the Member 
States of the EU is the major reason of the divergence of their interests. When gas and 
electricity markets of France, Germany and the UK are analyzed, the difference between 
                                                 
9 Although the Commission has proposed an alternative to ownership unbundling, 
ownership unbundling is the preferred option of the Commission. The Commission 
thinks that ownership unbundling is necessary “to guarantee non-discriminatory access 
to energy grids of smaller firms wishing to compete in markets dominated by vertically 
integrated energy giants, such as EDF in France and E.ON in Germany” (Euractiv, 
27/11/2007).   
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their market structures is observed that leads them to take different stances on 
liberalization and single market debate. French gas industry is dominated by Gaz de 
France (GdF), majority of whose is owned by the French government. Although GdF 
had monopoly on the production, distribution, transportation and importation of natural 
gas in France, as well as on the domestic pipeline system, recent reforms perpetuated by 
the EU Directives initiated the liberalization process in GdF that replaced the 
monopolistic structure (EIA, 2007). When French electricity market is analyzed, it is 
seen that France has the second largest electricity sector in the EU after Germany. As 
discussed above, EdF’s monopoly on electricity generation and distribution has started 
to be challenged by the EU Directives on electricity, which led the EdF to privatize and 
open the electricity market to other companies (EIA, 2007). When it is looked at the 
German case, liberalization of the natural gas sector has started with the transposition of 
the EU Directives on natural gas to Germany’s national legislation, whereas E.ON is 
still the largest wholesale distribution company that also controls most of the natural gas 
transport network of Germany (EIA, 2006a). Germany liberalized its energy sector in 
1998 with the legislation of the Energy Industry Act that is compatible with the EU 
Directives. However, reluctance of Germany to establish a regulatory agency for its 
electricity and gas markets attracted criticism from the Commission. Criticism of the 
Commission led Germany to give the authority of regulation of its natural gas and 
electricity industry to an already existing agency (EIA, 2006a). The UK, on the other 
hand, started to liberalize its energy sector far before the EU Directives and has a 
privatized electricity and gas sector. As a conclusion to this section, the Member States 
agreed to the Commission’s proposals for a single energy market as a result of the 
convergence of their interests with the realization that the single European market 
would be incomplete without a single energy market. However, further integration in 
the single energy market is challenged when the key interests of the leading Member 
States diverge. Disagreement on the unbundling issue and the efforts of the Member 
States like France and Germany to preserve the interests of their national energy 
companies jeopardize the creation of single European energy market in a complete 
sense.               
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3.4.2. Efforts to Take the Energy Policy under the EU Competence  
 
 
 
As stated above, the energy policy has not been under the formal competence of 
the EU; since neither the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community nor 
the Single European Act contain a section for the energy policy. This created problems 
mainly for the Commission, which proposed to create a legal basis for a common 
energy policy in early 1990s. However a legal basis for the energy policy could not be 
realized due to the interests of the Member States that did not want to lose power in 
their national energy sectors. The issue was mainly discussed in the negotiations of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU). Besides the Member States that traditionally 
criticized taking further action for a common energy policy, the UK which had 
supported actions of the Commission especially in the efforts for the creation of a single 
energy market, also rejected the proposal. The reason behind the rejection of the UK 
was its hesitation to transfer more powers to the EU level, thus supporting an 
intergovernmental rather than a supranational trend for the European integration 
process. The Commission has used the external “windows of opportunity” to enhance 
its competence in the energy policy (Matlary, 1996, p.267). The Commission proposed 
to represent the EU in the Internal Energy Agency, which would lead the EU to speak 
with one voice in international scene at the time of the turbulence in the oil markets 
after the first Gulf War. Another proposal that came in the same time period was the 
Commission’s intention for gaining the authority to decide when to use the emergency 
stocks. Both proposals were rejected by the Member States, whose preferences were at 
odds with the willingness of the Commission to enhance its powers in the energy policy.  
  
Nevertheless, energy found a place in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) indirectly 
as a part of the Trans-European Networks (TEN) clause. Energy is regarded as one of 
the activity areas of the Community in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU, Article 3t). In 
addition, in its article 129b, the Treaty lays the ground for the establishment and the 
development of trans-European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunication 
and energy (my emphasis) infrastructures in order to fully benefit from the setting up of 
an area without internal frontiers. The same article states that the Community aims to 
promote the interconnection and inter-operability of national networks as well as access 
to these networks. Moreover the Treaty states that the Council can take action 
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unanimously for the protection of the environment on “measures significantly affecting 
a Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of 
its energy policy” (TEU, Article 130s).  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon would also bring about important changes for the energy 
policy when would be adopted by the Member States.  As stated in the previous chapter, 
the Treaty of Lisbon lays down a clear share of competences between the EU and the 
Member States to prevent confusion in the functioning of the EU. According to the 
Treaty, energy is one of the areas where the competence is shared between the Member 
States and the EU. More importantly, the Treaty establishes “a solidarity clause” where 
the Council may take appropriate decisions if severe difficulties arise in the supply of 
energy products (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 87). Solidarity clause of the Treaty of Lisbon 
has great significance for the EU due to its problems in security of supply arising from 
the import dependency on oil and gas, which will be analyzed in more details in the 
following chapter. In the Treaty, in addition to making reference to functioning of the 
internal market and protection of environment, the aims of the Union policy on energy 
are stated as ensuring the functioning of the of the energy market, ensuring the security 
of energy supply in the Union, promoting energy efficiency, saving energy and 
developing new renewable forms of energy and promoting the interconnection of 
energy networks (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 176 A). According to the Treaty, these 
measures could be taken in a manner that would not affect the right of the Member 
States to determine the choices of their energy sources and structure of their energy 
supplies. When adopted, the stated articles of the Lisbon Treaty would create a legal 
ground for the actions of the EU, especially of the European Commission, which 
currently coordinates the energy policy through secondary legislation.  
 
 
 
3.4.2.1. Trans-European Networks 
 
 
 
Trans-European Networks (TEN) is one of the major components of the EU 
energy policy with the ultimate objective of reinforcing the security of supply and 
increasing competitiveness in the electricity and gas markets. The objective of the EU 
by financing projects under the TEN is to maintain the effective operation of the 
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internal market in general and the operation of the internal energy market in particular.  
Many projects of the Member States as well as of third countries are financed by the 
TEN budget of the Community, Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Loans of the 
European Investment Bank have also been used to finance projects that are evaluated 
under the TEN schemes in addition to the financial support of the EU Programmes like 
PHARE10 and TACIS11.  
 
External dimension of the TEN is significant primarily for the security of energy 
supply of the EU in the sense that it allows access to energy resources of external 
countries meaning the diversification of energy supply. Advantages of the third 
countries arising from taking part in the TEN are improved operation of their energy 
networks, access to energy resources of the EU, more political stability and economic 
reforms and revenues from exporting energy products and services (European 
Commission, 1997b). The Commission underlined the necessity of the participation of 
the third countries to the TEN by pointing out the increasing external dependence of the 
EU for natural gas (European Commission, 1997a). The Commission stated that future 
development of gas networks is necessary for maintaining a high level of diversification 
of external gas supplies. It also pointed out the emergence of Caspian as a new resource 
for oil and gas whose export potential to the EU must be considered, which will be 
analyzed in the fifth chapter. The Commission also stated that “providing that 
technical/economic feasibility and environmental issues are respected, new East-West 
transmission networks might be developed between the Caspian Sea area and Europe” 
(European Commission, 1997a, p.6). In the case of electricity, on the other hand, 
establishment of Trans-European Networks with third countries in Europe, mainly with 
Eastern European countries and Balkans as well as with the Mediterranean countries 
would contribute to supplying the Community with electricity. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Programme of Community aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
11 Programme to promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce 
democracy and the rule of law in the partner states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
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3.4.3. The European Energy Charter 
 
 
 
  Foreign policy has been another policy area which is exploited by the European 
Commission for the creation of a common energy policy (Andersen, 2000a). Political 
entrepreneurship of the Commission has been significant for the creation of a common 
energy policy using foreign policy initiatives. Definitely, formation of the internal 
energy market and establishing the Trans-European Networks within the EU and with 
third countries are not sufficient for sustaining the security of energy supply of the EU. 
The European Energy Charter has been developed with the ultimate aim of creating the 
ground for European investments in oil and gas resources of the Former Soviet Union 
countries. The idea giving birth to the development of the Charter was proposed by the 
Dutch government that wanted to make investments in the Russian energy sector. 
Russian gas infrastructure had important problems such as leakages in the pipelines 
transmitting gas to the Western European markets (Andersen, 2000a). Motivating 
Russia for introducing market rules to its oil and gas sectors, which are major economic 
sectors with export potential, would lead to transformations in other sectors of the 
economy as well. Common rules for exploration, production and transport of energy 
resources were agreed by the countries in the Charter that was signed the Charter in 
1991, without having legally binding powers. The Charter was conceived to reform the 
energy sector of the former Soviet countries and thereby contribute to the energy 
security of the EU.  
 
According to Andersen (2000a), the negotiations of the European Energy 
Charter had witnessed a convergence of the interests of the Member States and the 
Commission, which was not the case for other fields of the energy policy. The legally 
binding Charter Treaty was signed in 1994 by 51 countries including European and 
former Soviet Union countries as well as Turkey, Australia, Japan and Mongolia that 
was put into force in 1998. Key objectives of the Treaty are facilitating East-West 
energy cooperation, enhancing the security of energy supply, maintaining energy 
efficiency and protection of the environment (Bielecki, 2002). According to the Treaty, 
European companies can make financial contributions for the restoration of production 
and transportation capacity of energy rich countries of the former Soviet Union (Sodupe 
and Benito, 2001).  
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The effects of the Treaty would be felt more in the long-term since 
modernization of the energy infrastructure of the former Soviet Union countries 
necessitates long-term projects. The Charter Treaty is very much related with the Trans-
European Networks policy of the EU. Motivation for establishing the TEN for energy 
was the idea that security of supply of the EU is linked with the modernization of the 
energy transport systems of the former Soviet Union countries and construction of new 
gas and oil pipelines (European Commission, 1997a). Thus, the Energy Charter Treaty 
is a framework that complements the objectives of the TEN. The dilemma posed by the 
Energy Charter Treaty is that “if the Treaty is applied in its entirety, this will lead to 
closer energy relations, particularly where gas is concerned, and to an increase in the 
present rates of dependence of the EU on Russia” (Sodupe and Benito, 2001, p.172). 
Moreover, Sodupe and Benito (2001) concludes that although the Treaty is a valuable 
tool for the Member States in terms of gaining access to the abundant energy resources 
of former Soviet Union countries, it is far from having the effect of elimination of the 
EU dependence on politically unstable countries of the Middle East. Although Russia is 
one of the signatories of the Energy Charter Treaty, it has not ratified the Treaty yet.   
 
 
 
    3.4.4. A Multi-Dimensional Approach for the Energy Policy 
 
 
 
Besides the increased consciousness for the necessity of a common energy 
policy at the European level, a multi-dimensional perspective for the EU energy policy 
has developed starting from the early 1990s. The White Paper entitled “An Energy 
Policy for the European Union” emphasized that a common energy policy will reinforce 
the economic integration within the EU and would contribute to the realization of a 
single European market (European Commission, 1995). Main components of the energy 
policy of the EU are defined as competitiveness, security of supplies and protection of 
the environment. Moreover, an energy policy for the EU is thought to complement other 
goals of the EU such as sustainable development, consumer protection, economic and 
social cohesion and job creation (European Commission, 1995). 
      
The White Paper published in 1995 is followed by other Commission initiatives, 
thus opening the way for the Commission for establishing the general framework of a 
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common EU energy policy with a broad perspective. The European Commission 
published a Green Paper where it draws the attention of the Member States to the 
problem of increasing energy dependence of the EU and clearly underlines the lack of a 
political consensus on the energy policy that limits the activities of the Commission for 
fighting with the ever increasing energy dependence (European Commission, 2000). 
The long-term strategy for enhancing the security of supply has three components in the 
Green Paper, which are balancing demand and supply by controlling the growth of 
demand and promoting new renewable energy resources, assessing the contribution to 
be made by nuclear energy in the medium term and providing a stronger mechanism for 
strategic stocks and securing new routes for imports of oil and gas. The call of the 
Commission for dealing with the problem of security of supply has led new legislative 
initiatives in energy efficiency and renewable energy resources and reinforced the 
process of liberalization of electricity and gas markets. However, no further action has 
been taken for giving more authority to the Commission either for controlling the 
emergency stocks or for promoting the use of nuclear power as a source of energy. 
 
The milestone for the development of a common energy policy of the EU has 
been the publication of the Green Paper entitled “A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy” (European Commission, 2006a). The Commission 
noted that although work on the previous Green Paper published in 2000 are in 
progress, recent developments created the necessity for a “new European impetus” 
(European Commission, 2006a, p.4). The Green Paper provides an overview of the 
reasons why an urgent action is needed for the formation of a common energy policy in 
the EU, and lists six priorities for developing a common European strategy which are 
completing the internal electricity and gas markets, guaranteeing the security of supply 
through solidarity between Member States, establishing a more sustainable, efficient 
and diverse energy mix, developing an integrated approach for tackling climate change, 
encouraging innovation by a strategic European energy technology plan and finally 
creating a coherent external energy policy (European Commission, 2006a). The 
Commission has emphasized the urgency of the necessary actions depending on the 
reason that innovations in the energy sector cannot be realized overnight.    
  
The Commission again used the external windows of opportunity to push for a 
common energy policy for the EU. The gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine has led 
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to the creation of a new European impetus for a common energy policy, since the crisis 
seriously threatened the security of gas supply of the EU given that most of the gas 
supply reaching Europe flows through Ukraine. The Green Paper has initiated a 
European wide debate on the energy policy. In other words, The Commission has 
achieved its objective of bringing the issue of energy on the agenda of the EU. 
However, red lines of the Member States persisted that come to the surface when 
sensitive issues such as increasing the share of nuclear power in energy mix has been 
discussed. Energy mix has been regarded as an issue under the sole competence of the 
Member States.   
 
Following the publication of the Green Paper, the Commission set out an action 
plan by taking into consideration the results of the consultation period and by 
consolidating the objectives previously set on energy. The action plan was presented in 
the Communication published by the Commission in January 2007 entitled “An Energy 
Policy for Europe”. The Commission has proposed an EU commitment to reduce 
greenhouse gases by 20% by 2020 noting that 80% of greenhouse gases stem from 
energy consumption. Other proposals of the Commission are reducing primary energy 
use by 20% by 2020 through energy efficiency, increasing the share of renewable 
energy resources in total energy mix to 20 % by 2020 and increasing the share of bio-
fuels to 10 % in transport by 2020 (European Commission, 2007a). The stated 
objectives are regarded as the roadmap of “the new global industrial revolution” 
(European Commission, 2007a, p.21). The EU Member States have set a binding target 
for increasing the share of renewable energy resources in energy mix and increasing the 
share of bio-fuels, whereas the goals of the EU for energy efficiency and greenhouse 
gases are non-binding.   
    
The general framework of the EU energy policy drawn by the Commission and 
the objectives has been debated by the Member States mainly at the meetings of the 
European Council. In the summit convened on March 8/9 2007, the Member States 
reaffirmed the objectives of the Energy Policy for Europe as increasing the security of 
supply, competitiveness and sustainability (Council of the EU, 2007). Although the 
Council has confirmed the objectives of the EU energy policy, it added the condition of 
“fully respecting the Member States’ choices of energy mix and sovereignty over 
primary energy resources” (Council of the EU, 2007, p.11). The European Council has 
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also adopted a comprehensive energy Action Plan based on the action plan proposed by 
the Commission. From the view of the Council, the Action Plan has formed the 
“milestone” in the creation of an Energy Policy for Europe (Council of the EU, 2007, 
p.13). While endorsing the three main objectives of the energy policy that are increasing 
the security of supply, competitiveness and environmental sustainability, the Action 
Plan also reaffirmed the objectives set out by the Commission on energy efficiency, 
renewable energy resources and bio-fuels, while reminding the possible contribution of 
nuclear energy for the security of supply and protection of the environment.    
 
 
 
3.5. Assessing the Explanatory Power of Liberal Intergovernmentalism    
 
 
 
In this section, an analysis of the explanatory power of liberal 
intergovernmentalism over the evolution of the energy policy of the EU will be 
presented. Since the details of negotiations conducted for each step taken in the energy 
policy could not be provided in this study, in this section the evolution of the EU energy 
policy and the areas relating to energy security analyzed throughout the chapter will be 
assessed in this section. When the steps taken on the way of a common energy policy 
are revisited, it is seen that the role of the Commission has been crucial for the 
development of an energy policy at the EU level. The Commission’s role is significant 
in the sense that it establishes the rhetoric of the energy policy by the legislation 
packages it proposes. The legislation packages draw the framework for the activities pf 
the Member States that are necessary for the development of a common energy policy. 
However, it is also seen that a new thinking in the energy policy or a paradigm shift has 
created the ground for the Commission to take further steps in the policy. While the 
Commission was generally having coordination activities on the basis of lowest 
common denominator of the Member States until early 1980s, the situation changed 
with the emergence of a new thinking in energy policy that involved the loosening 
government control and development of an energy policy at the European level. 
Developments in the energy policy until 1980s are in line with the premises of liberal 
intergovernmentalism where the activities of the Commission were confined to lowest 
common denominator of the Member States. Revitalization of the issues related to 
energy at the EU level from 1980s and the increasing role of the Commission can also 
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be explained with hypothesis of liberal intergovernmentalism, since the Commission is 
empowered by the Member States to act in the energy policy after the initiation of a 
new thinking. In liberal intergovernmentalist theory, the European integration reflects 
the will of the Member States rather than replacing their will, which has also been the 
case in the EU energy policy. The Commission, knowing that preferences of the 
Member States will say the last word in negotiations, has used external windows of 
opportunity such as oil crisis, political instability in Russia or in the Middle East (major 
energy suppliers of the EU) in order to create a new impetus for a common energy 
policy. In liberal intergovernmental theory, preferences are exogenous to international 
environment (Moravcsik, 1998). Upon this fact, the Commission has exploited the 
developments in the international environment to create the background suitable for a 
fruitful energy policy at the EU level.       
 
The developments in the energy policy can be characterized as convergence of 
national policies for a common good rather than a common energy policy (El-Agraa and 
Hu, 1984). Convergence of interests has been facilitated during the times of abundant 
energy supply, while the relation between the Member States is characterized as a zero-
sum game during the times of the energy supply crisis, where gain of a Member State 
was meant the loss of another. Thus, in line with the premises of liberal 
intergovernmental thinking, the development of the energy policy of the EU has been 
the story of convergence of interests of the Member States in energy. Besides lack of 
converging interests at the times of the supply problems, the bad mood in the EU 
integration process has also effected the developments in the energy policy negatively. 
For example, lack of enthusiasm for further European integration during the times of the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty had a negative effect on the process of formation of 
a common energy policy in the EU (Andersen, 2000b).   
       
The role of the Commission is most visible in the creation of a single market in 
energy. However, the initial single market directives for electricity and gas were not 
adopted as they were proposed; directive proposals of the Commission were modified to 
a significant extent to meet the interests of the Member States in the Council, which 
constitutes the demonstration of the primacy of the Member States despite the 
significant role of the Commission. In line with the principles of the liberal 
intergovernmentalism, intergovernmental bargaining determined the pace of 
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negotiations for the creation of a single energy market (Padgett, 1992). The Member 
States agreed on the gradual opening of their electricity and gas markets in order to 
create an efficient ground for enjoying the full benefits of the single European market. 
Thus, liberal intergovenmentalism has explanatory power for creation of the internal 
market as well as the internal energy market. However, as seen in the discussion above, 
the EU is still far from having a single energy market yet. Although legislation for 
liberalization of electricity and gas markets of the EU Member States are initiated by 
the Commission and adopted by the Council and the European Parliament, transposition 
of the single market rules for the energy sector is not wholly implemented by the 
Member States. The inquiries conducted by the Commission has concluded that 
liberalization of the internal electricity and gas markets of the Member States is not 
complete and the Commission proposes further measures for ensuring a single energy 
market. Divergence of interests between the Member States of the EU led them to take 
different positions towards the proposals of the Commission related to unbundling in 
the third liberalization package. Member States with national energy giants such as 
France and Germany have opposed to unbundling whereas the UK and Netherlands, 
which have further liberalized their energy markets compared to France and Germany, 
strongly favors unbundling. France and Germany, on the other hand, still want to 
preserve the interests of their national champions. Liberal intergovernmentalism theory 
proposes that the bargaining positions of the Member States come into being after the 
process of national preference formation. In national preference formation process, 
economic actors play a more significant role compared to the political actors. Thus, 
giant energy companies of the Member States such as EDF of France and E.ON of 
Germany play a significant role in the process of national preference formation of the 
Member States, which in turn confines the room for maneuver for the Member States 
when faced with the ambitious goals of the Commission for the single energy market.       
     
Entrepreneurship of the Commission and its efforts not only for the creation of a 
single energy market but also in other fields of the energy policy cannot be 
underestimated. Energy policy is regarded as one of the leading policy areas where the 
Commission has significant powers ranging from initiation and monitoring to 
regulation. However, in liberal intergovernmentalism, activities of the supranational 
institutions do not mean that their power supersede the power of the Member States. 
Moreover, Moravcsik argues that independent actions of the Commission do not 
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constitute counter evidence to the view that the EU is grounded on the preferences of 
the Member States. Although the Green Paper published by the Commission in 2006 
sets the background for further development of the EU energy policy, the Member 
States do regard many areas of energy policy under their national sovereignty, 
especially in the decisions relating to their energy mix. Primacy of the Member States is 
reflected by the lack of a legal background for the energy policy in the founding 
Treaties of the EU as well as in treaty revisions. Only exception is the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which is on the process of ratification by the Member States; yet even the Treaty of 
Lisbon makes clear reference to the member state interests in the section on energy 
policy.   
 
After analyzing the evolution of the energy policy and looking closely to the 
components of the energy policy relating to the security of supply, the following chapter 
will build upon the discussions above by examining the divergence of the interests of 
the EU Member States in energy security policies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
TRENDS OF SECURITY OF SUPPLY OF THE EU AND DIVERGING 
INTERESTS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the energy outlook of the EU will be provided with specific 
emphasis on the dependence of the EU for its security of energy supplies to third 
countries, mainly to Russia. Enlargement of the EU in 2004 embracing ten new 
members, eight of which are post-Soviet countries has increased the level of import 
dependency of the EU on Russia, since the new comers were already dependent to 
Russia for almost all of their energy supplies as the remnants of the Soviet era.  Energy 
supply crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 has pushed the issue of energy 
security into the agenda of the EU that led to the formation of various instruments at the 
EU level for diversification of its energy supplies. However, when key interests like 
security of energy supply were at stake, the policy frameworks proposed by the 
Commission could not lead to a common policy between the Member States. Thus, in 
this chapter, the main argument of the thesis will be stated, which is the divergence of 
interests in security of supplies of individual Member States has been the breaking point 
in the process of integration in energy policy. Thus, member state preferences rather 
than the supranational framework of the Commission have prevailed in the issue of 
security of energy supplies of the Member States.     
 
 
 
4.1. A General Look to Global Energy Market 
 
 
 
Before analyzing the energy situation of the EU, the global trends in energy will 
be discussed briefly. Rising energy prices and increase in the economic growth of China 
and India that lead to an increase in their energy demand are the two major challenges 
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of the global energy market. Rise in global energy demand poses a major threat to 
world’s energy security (IEA, 2006). Moreover, consuming countries’ excessive 
reliance on imports of oil and natural gas from a small number of producing countries 
increase the probability of energy security risks. On the supply side, on the other hand, 
development of the Caspian Sea energy resources is a relatively new phenomenon that 
attracted the interests of the main actors of the world energy. In terms of types of energy 
resources, share of natural gas in overall energy consumption is increasing due to its 
clean nature and development in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) technologies. Although 
it is estimated that fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas) will remain as the dominant 
sources of primary energy, shares of coal and natural gas would increase while share of 
oil would decrease (IEA, 2007). India and China are expected to account for most of the 
increase in coal demand. For natural gas, increasingly usage of gas for power generation 
is the major reason behind the increase in the demand for natural gas.  When the pattern 
of world energy consumption is analyzed, it is seen that oil constituted 35% of total 
primary energy supply in 2004, while gas accounted for 21%. When projections for 
2030 of the same figures are analyzed, share of oil consumption would decrease to 33%, 
while share of gas will increase to 23% (IEA, 2006).  In other words, the old “oil game” 
is being transformed to “oil and gas game” (Stanislaw, 2006).   
 
The EU is a key actor in global energy market as the second largest consumer of 
energy following the US. According to 2006 figures, the US accounted for 21.3% of 
world’s energy consumption, followed by the EU-25 with a share of 15.8% (BP, 2007). 
Table 4.1 shows the consumption amounts and shares of the world’s major energy 
consumers. 
 
Table 4.1 World Energy Consumption Figures (2005) 
 
State/Region US EU-27 China** Russia  India  Japan  Canada  Others World 
Consumption 
(Mtoe)* 
2,340 1,816 1,735 647 537 530 272 3,557 11,434 
Share (%) 20.5% 15.9% 15.2% 5.7% 4.7% 4.6% 2.4% 31.1% 100.0% 
* Million tons of oil equivalent. 
** Including Hong Kong.   
Source: European Commission, (2008a). Energy and Transport in Figures.  
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4.2. General Trends of the Security of Supply of the EU 
 
 
 
 The EU is a major actor in the world energy market with approximately 500 
million consumers. As seen in the table above, the EU is the second largest consumer of 
world’s energy resources. Distribution of the energy consumption of the EU in terms of 
energy resources are shown in Figure 4.1. Although oil has the greatest share in the EU 
energy consumption, when the projections of EU energy consumptions are analyzed, it 
is seen that in 2030 the share of oil is projected to decrease to 35%, while a 6 % 
increase is expected in the share of natural gas that would make its share 30% (IEA, 
2006). In other words, in line with the global trend, the share of natural gas in energy 
mix would increase in the EU. Table 4.2 shows the projections of the changes in the EU 
energy mix up to 2030. The projection of a significant increase in the share of natural 
gas is important in the context of the problem of import dependency of the EU, mainly 
on Russian natural gas, which will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
Figure 4.1. EU-25 Energy Mix (2005) 
 
 
Source: European Commission, (2008a). Energy and Transport in Figures. 
 
 
 
 
 53
Table 4.2. Share of Energy Resources in Total Primary Energy 
% 1990 2000 2005 2010 
 
2020 2030 
Solid Fuels 27.3 18.8 17.7 17.2 17.4 16.7 
Oil 37.9 38.0 36.7 36.4 35.7 35.3 
Gas 17.9 23.0 24.6 24.9 25.7 25.7 
Nuclear 12.3 14.2 14.2 13.2 11.3 10.3 
Renewables 4.5 5.9 6.8 8.2 10.0 11.8 
   Source: European Commission, (2008b). European Energy and Transport, Trends to   
2030.  
 
As it is seen in the graph above, energy mix of the EU is mostly composed of 
fossil fuels. Limited capacity of indigenous energy production of the EU makes it 
dependent to third countries for imports of energy. The EU Member States possess 
0.6% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 2% of the world’s proven natural gas 
reserves (EIA, 2006b). The reserves are mainly concentrated in the North Sea. Although 
oil and natural gas were discovered in the North Sea in 1960s, production did not start 
until 1980s due to high production costs. Oil production in the North Sea has peaked in 
1990s, which is followed by the decline of the resource generation. Although there are 
efforts to increase the oil production by large investments and advances in recovery 
technologies, oil production from the North Sea is expected to decrease significantly, 
while natural gas production is projected to increase (Bahgat, 2006). Natural gas 
reserves of the North Sea lead Norway, Netherlands and the United Kingdom to possess 
most of the proven natural gas reserves of the EU. Since 1994, the EU has a legislation 
that aims to create a motivation for developing own resources for the EU. According to 
the Directive 94/22/EC on the conditions for granting and using authorizations for the 
prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, the Member States should 
refrain from discriminating between entities that would exercise activities related to 
hydrocarbons in any EU member state. However, the EU does not aim to maximize its 
self-sufficiency in energy since this would not possible, but it tries to reduce the risks 
stemming from import dependency.        
 
The EU imports nearly 50% of its total energy supply. According to 2005 
figures, the EU-25 has imported 82.8% of its oil and 58.3% of its natural gas (European 
Commission, 2008a). Main origins of the natural gas supplies of the EU are Russia, 
Norway and Algeria with shares of 45.1%, 24.1% and 20.6% of the EU’s gas imports 
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respectively. In case of oil, major exporters to the EU are Russia (29.9%), Norway 
(15.5%), Saudi Arabia (9.7%), Libya (8.0%) and Iran (5.6%). These figures are 
calculated on the basis of oil and natural gas imports of the EU-27 realized in 2005 
(European Commission, 2008a). Thus, when the picture of oil and natural gas imports 
to the EU are analyzed, it is seen that Russia, Norway, the Middle East and North Africa 
are the major suppliers of the EU energy. However, share of Russian energy resources 
in the EU-27 that accounts for approximately 45% for natural gas and 30 % for oil is a 
major challenge to security of supply of the EU. Moreover, the energy outlook of the 
EU suggests that dependence of the EU will steadily increase in the upcoming decades. 
The figures are expected to increase significantly in 2030 when dependency on 
imported oil is expected to rise to 95%. As stated above, demand for natural gas is 
expected to increase more rapidly compared to oil, which will lead an increase in import 
dependency on natural gas up to 84% (Figure 4.2). Since Russia has 22 % of world 
natural gas production according to 2006 data (IEA, 2007), gradual increase in import 
dependency of the EU on natural gas would make it more dependent to Russian supplies 
given that the production capacity of Russia permits.  
 
Although import dependency on both oil and natural gas is the major challenge 
to the EU security of supply, the IEA studies indicate that for natural gas “supply 
sources become more remote, transport routes more risky, and gas infrastructure less 
flexible than that for oil” (Bielecki, 2002, p.248). As demand for natural gas is 
increasing significantly due to the fact that it is relatively a clean fossil fuel and 
increasingly used in electricity generation in the EU, the EU needs to diversify the 
supply sources and means of transport. Unlike oil that can be traded relatively easily 
compared to natural gas in tankers through the sea, there are two ways of transporting 
natural gas, which are pipelines and LNG. LNG is more advantageous compared to 
pipelines since it provides more flexibility for security of supply, however it is more 
costly compared to pipelines due to the necessity of investments. Thus, unlike oil, 
natural gas is a regional energy source that necessitates regional cooperation (Helm, 
2007). Since majority of natural gas imported to the EU are supplied through pipelines 
which flow from few routes, if one piece in the chain is blocked, whole system is 
affected and the system becomes inflexible (Weisser, 2007). According to the estimates, 
since share of natural gas in the EU energy mix will increase significantly, “an 
additional 320 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year of natural gas has to be supplied to 
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Europe in 2020 compared with the consumption in 2000”(Cayrade, 2004, p.3). Thus, 
extensions of the major energy routes and new connections of natural gas would be 
needed to meet the increasing demand for natural gas and also for making the system of 
natural gas supply more flexible.      
 
Figure 4.2 Import Dependence of the EU 
 
Source: European Commission, (2008b). European Energy and Transport, Trends to 
2030.  
 
 
 
4.3. General Trends of the Security of Supply of the Member States  
 
 
 
 The problem of excessive dependence for imported oil and gas vary between the 
Member States. Energy dependency figures of the Member States range from net 
exporters like Denmark with – 51.6% energy dependency to net importers like Malta 
with 100% energy dependence (Eurostat, 2005). As argued in the previous chapters, 
leading players of the European integration will be analyzed in regards to their energy 
policy decisions to test the general argument of the thesis states the divergence of the 
key interests of the Member States in a specific issue area constitutes a breaking point in 
the process of integration. Thus, in this section energy dependency of the leading 
Member States of the EU will be analyzed, namely the UK, France, Germany, Italy and 
also the Netherlands since it is a major player in energy sector. In Table 4.3, the 
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asymmetry between energy production and consumption figures of the major countries 
of the EU are presented along with the percentages of energy dependency.  
 
Table 4.3 Production, Consumption and Import of Energy (2005) 
Primary 
Energy 
Production 
Net Energy 
Imports 
Energy 
Dependency** 
  
(1000 toe*) 
Gross Inland 
Energy 
Consumption 
(1000 toe) (1000 toe) (%) 
 
EU-27 
    
890,026      
 
1,811,317     
    
974,699      52.3 
 
France  
    
135,232      
    
275,438      
    
143,600      51.6 
 
Germany  
    
134,858      
    
345,451      
    
214,372      61.6 
 
Italy  
      
27,597      
    
186,766      
    
160,475      84.4 
 
Netherlands  
      
61,834      
      
80,963      
      
36,912      37.8 
 
UK  
    
201,037      
    
232,259      
      
32,641      13.9 
* tonne of oil equivalent  
** Net Energy Imports/ Gross Consumption  
Source: Eurostat, (2005). Energy Yearly Statistics.  
 
As seen in the table above, general energy trends of the leading Member States 
are far from being homogenous. Energy dependence of the Member States are not 
unified, where energy dependency of the UK is 13.9%, which is lower than the EU 
average and the same figure for Italy is 84.4%, a rate that is much higher than the EU 
average. When the Table 4.3 is analyzed, key differences between the productions of 
the leading Member States also come into the picture. The United Kingdom, for 
example produces 67.3% of total oil production and 41.9% of total gas production of 
the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2005). The Netherlands, on the other hand, produces 
approximately 30% of overall EU natural gas production and is a net exporter of natural 
gas, which exported 54 660 Mm3 of natural gas in 2006 (IEA, 2007). Moreover, the 
difference between the Member States’ choices of energy resources is another source of 
heterogeneity as energy consumption trends of the leading Member States of the EU is 
shown in Table 4.4. As seen in the table below, consumption trends of the leading 
Member States vary to a significant extent. France places a higher share to nuclear 
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energy compared to Germany and the UK while Italy has completely ignored the 
nuclear option and nuclear energy accounted for a minor percentage in the Dutch case.   
 
Table 4.4. Consumption by Fuel (2006) 
 
(Mtoe) Oil 
Natural 
Gas Coal 
Nuclear 
Energy 
Hydro-
electricity TOTAL 
 
EU-25 7706.3 420.6 3305.0 219.5 71.4 1,722.8 
 
France  992.8 40.6 113.1 102.1 13.9 262.6 
 
Germany  1123.5 78.5 882.4 37.9 6.3 328.5 
 
Italy  885.7 69.4 117.4 — 9.7 182.2 
 
Netherlands  449.6 34.5 77.5 0.8 † 92.3 
 
UK  882.2 81.7 443.8 17.0 1.9 226.6 
† Less than 0.05.  
Source: BP, (2007). BP Statistical Review of World Energy.    
 
Since energy outlook of the Member States as well as third countries such as 
Russia are heterogeneous, the definition of energy security also vary from one state to 
another. For the major EU member states that are heavily dependent for imported 
energy resources such as Italy and Germany, energy security is related to managing the 
dependence on imports, while for the UK it is related to ensuring a fully competitive 
European single energy market. For Russia, on the other hand, energy security is related 
to “security of demand” for its exports and  “to reassert state control over ‘strategic 
resources’ and gain primacy over the main pipelines and market channels through 
which it ships its hydrocarbons to international markets” (Yergin, 2006, p. 70). Thus the 
challenge of speaking with one voice in EU energy policy is being complicated by the 
fact that definition of energy security is different for the Member States. Moreover, 
different interests of the EU Member States and Russia prepare the ground for both 
cooperation (like Energy Charter Treaty or the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue that will be 
discussed below) and disputes that arise from Russian intentions of using the energy 
issue as a political leverage in its “near abroad”.    
 
 
 
 
 58
4.4. The Issue of Security of Energy Supply on the EU Agenda 
 
 
 
Challenges of being dependent to few numbers of countries for energy imports 
have already been acknowledged by the EU. The European Commission, with the 
intention of opening up an EU-wide debate on the issue, has initiated major policy 
instruments like the White Paper of 1995 and the Green Paper of 2006. The 
Commission has drawn the framework of the possible actions of the Member States to 
tackle the challenges of import dependency. However, energy disputes between Russia 
and Ukraine in January 2006 that was followed by the energy dispute between Russia 
and Belarus have been “awakening calls” for the EU. Two events have showed the 
extent to which the EU energy security has been vulnerable to external events.    
     
 
 
4.4.1. Russian-Ukrainian Dispute and the Vulnerability of the EU Energy 
Security 
 
 
 
Dependency of the EU on imported energy resources has already been regarded 
as a significant problem that is needed to be encountered by appropriate measures, 
which led to the publication of the Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, in 2006 that is analyzed in the previous chapter. 
Internal developments in the EU such as declining European energy production and still 
fragmented internal energy market in spite of the measures of the Commission for a 
single energy market have also raised questions related to future energy supplies of the 
EU. Moreover, global challenges in energy situation have exacerbated the problem of 
security of supply for the EU. Increasing energy prices, enduring instability in Iraq since 
the US intervention, Iran’s insistence for its nuclear program and the dramatic increase 
in the energy demand caused by Chain and India have motivated the European leaders 
to develop measures to ensure the security of supply of the EU. However, the energy 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006 due to disagreements over gas 
prices followed by Russian cutting of supplies has highlighted the vulnerability of the 
EU energy security.  
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High share of Russian natural gas in the gas imports of the EU, which is 45% for 
the EU-27, has led the EU Member States to worry about their security of energy 
supplies, since 80% of natural gas coming to the EU is passing through Ukraine 
(Umbach, 2006). The dispute between Russia and Ukraine stemmed from the intentions 
of Gazprom, which is the Russian state monopoly for natural gas, to revise the gas deals 
of Russia with former Soviet Union countries. Gazprom holds approximately one thirds 
of world’s natural gas reserves, produces 90% of Russian natural gas and operates 
Russian natural gas pipeline system (Bahgat, 2005). Russia increased the price of 
natural gas to approximately $230 per 1,000 cubic meters in 2006 that was $50 per 
1,000 cubic meters in 2005 (Bahgat, 2006). The Ukrainian rejection of paying higher 
prices for Russian natural gas was followed by Russian response of cutting off the 
supplies to Ukraine, which decreased the pipeline pressures of Austria, Italy, Poland and 
Germany for 30% (Belkin, 2007). Russia and Ukraine agreed for a new price for natural 
gas where they set $130 per 1,000 cubic meters and the flow of natural gas from Russia 
to Ukraine has re-started. Even though the dispute only lasted for few days, it has been 
more than enough for the EU to assess the vulnerability of its energy supplies.      
 
Although the energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine seems like a problem 
arising from economic tensions, the dispute is regarded as being politically motivated. 
Russia as the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest exporter of 
oil after Saudi Arabia has determined its energy policy basing not solely on economic 
interests but also geopolitical, foreign policy and security considerations (Weisser, 
2007). Russia has been using its oil and natural gas resources as a mean to strengthen its 
foreign and security policy objectives12. Another widely shared view is that Moscow is 
using its vast energy resources as a political weapon in its “near abroad” (Smith, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the reason behind the Russian revision of its energy strategy towards 
Ukraine has been interpreted as a punishment for Ukraine that elected a pro-Western 
President Victor Yushchenko with the “orange revolution” in Kiev in the fall of 2004 
and defeated the pro-Moscow candidate Yanukovich. Under its new president, Ukraine 
has attempted to make a decisive move towards the EU and NATO and move away 
from the Russian political influence, which led Ukraine to face with Russian political 
pressure.    
                                                 
12 Putin himself wrote pieces on the role of energy sources for re-establishing prestige 
of Russia in the international scene (Helm, 2006).   
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A similar supply crisis has occurred in the beginning of 2007 between Russia 
and Belarus contributing the anxiety in Europe over being too much dependent on 
Russian energy resources. The reason of the dispute between Belarus and Russia was 
the intention of Russia to double the gas prices it sold to Belarus and to control half of 
the pipeline infrastructure of Belarus despite the close political relations between the 
two countries. When Belarus reacted to unfriendly steps of Russia by announcing a duty 
of $45 per ton of Russian oil transported through Belarus, Russian response has been 
firm (Smith, 2007). Russian oil operator Transneft, which is the state-owned pipeline 
monopoly of Russia with exclusive jurisdiction over oil imports, shut down the Druzhba 
pipeline for three days. The dispute especially affected German oil imports since 
Germany received 20% of its oil imports through Druzhba pipeline (Belkin, 2007). 
Druzhba is the largest oil export pipeline of Russia to Europe which splits into two 
sections, first running through Belarus, Poland and Germany; and the second section 
flowing through Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Bahgat, 
2006). Although not related with the energy security of the EU, Russia has also cut gas 
and electricity supplies to Georgia in 2006 by arguing that the latter supported 
terrorism. The incidents that caused disruptions in the energy resources transported to 
the EU have led the EU and the Member States to question the reliability of Russia as 
an energy supplier. In addition to raising questions on Russian reliability, the crisis, 
especially the one between Russia and Ukraine, has demonstrated the failure of the 
Commission to play any significant role using the institutions of the EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue and the EU-Ukraine summits (Honoré and Stern, 2007).        
 
 
 
4.4.2. The Fifth Enlargement of the EU and Import Dependency on Russian 
Energy   
 
 
 
The fifth enlargement of the EU in 2004 and the second part of the fifth 
enlargement in 2007 increased the overall import dependency levels of the EU. Most of 
the new members of the EU have already established strategic energy relations with 
Russia as remnants of the Soviet era. Countries like Estonia that acceded to the EU in 
2004 and Bulgaria that acceded in 2007 are 100% dependent for imported Russian 
natural gas. While the new Member States acceded into the EU account for only one-
 61
tenth of the GDP of the EU, their import dependency is far greater than the EU average 
(Kalyuzhnova, 2005). When share of the Russian natural gas in total natural gas imports 
of the EU-25 and the EU-27 are analyzed, it is seen that the figures are 32.2% and 
33.6% respectively (Eurostat, 2005). Thus, Russian natural gas accounts for a higher 
percentage of the natural gas imports of the EU with the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007. Moreover, enlargement of the EU has increased the energy demand 
of the EU. Energy demand of the EU would increase faster compared to the pre-
enlargement era, since the growth of the energy demand of the accession countries are 
faster than the EU-15. Another reason why the enlargement process of the EU is 
contributing to the increase in import dependency rates of the EU is that new member 
states mostly have energy-intensive industries. In addition to these, dependency on 
Russian gas is expected to increase with the closure of nuclear power plants that 
produce electricity in several new members. However, there are potential benefits of the 
enlargement process in terms of contributing to the energy security of the EU. Positive 
aspect of the enlargement of the EU in regards to the security of supply is that major 
transit routes for energy from Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East have been 
included under the EU territory. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the import dependency rates of the selected EU member states 
on Russian natural gas. The UK and the Netherlands are not included in the table since 
they do not import natural gas from Russia. It is seen in the table that the rate of the 
dependence on Russian gas varies between the EU Member States ranging from 19.5% 
(France) to 41.7% (Germany) and to 100% (Estonia, Finland). Differences in the level 
of the dependency on the Russian gas have been the underlying reason of the 
divergence of the energy security policies of the leading Member States, which 
undermines the creation of a sound energy policy of the EU.    
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Table 4.5. Dependence of Selected EU Member States on Russian Natural 
Gas 
Country 
Dependence on 
Russian Natural Gas* 
Austria  70.0% 
Czech Republic  76.0% 
Estonia  100.0% 
EU-27 33.6% 
Finland  100.0% 
France  19.5% 
Germany  41.7% 
Italy  31.7% 
Poland  65.9% 
   * Imports from Russia / Total Imports  
    Source: Eurostat, (2005).  
 
 
 
4.5. External Energy Policy Mechanisms of Diversification of EU Energy 
Suppliers 
 
 
 
A coherent external energy policy of the EU would enhance the security of 
supply. The EU aims to play an effective role as an international actor in international 
energy relations. However, speaking with common voice is the most important criterion 
for the EU to be a major player in the international scene. Besides internal efforts for the 
formation of a single energy market, the management of energy demand through energy 
efficiency and energy saving measures and obligation of minimum stocks; external 
mechanisms would complement efforts for security of energy supplies. On the previous 
chapter, Trans-European Networks and the European Energy Charter were presented as 
measures for securing supplies. Faced with the challenges of the vulnerability of import 
dependency on few energy resources and suppliers, the EU aims to diversify its energy 
resources and its energy suppliers. As an attempt to diversify its energy resources, the 
EU has announced the target of increasing the share of renewable energy resources up 
to a minimum of 20% in the 8-9 March 2007 European Council decisions, which was 
analyzed in the previous chapter (Council of the EU, 2007). In this chapter, main focus 
will be on the attempts of the EU for diversification of its energy suppliers.   
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Diversification of energy suppliers has been stated as one of the priorities of the 
EU energy policy in Green Paper published in 2006 presenting “A European Strategy 
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”. Necessity of new oil and gas 
pipelines as well as new LNG terminals is stated in the document by adding that 
possible origins of supply could be the Caspian region, North Africa and the Middle 
East (European Commission, 2006a). Moreover developing partnerships with producers 
and transit countries as well as developing dialogue with major energy suppliers are also 
regarded as a priority of the energy policy of the EU. Another energy policy objective is 
defined as developing a pan-European Energy Community to bring the neighbors of the 
EU closer to the internal energy market. The Green Paper also makes the point that 
“creating a ‘common regulatory space’13 around Europe would imply progressively 
developing common trade, transit and environmental rules, market harmonization and 
integration” (European Commission, 2006a, p.16). Priorities of the external energy 
policy of the EU that are stated throughout this section are also reiterated in the 
Communication of the Commission for the period 2007-2010 (European Commission, 
2007a).  
 
In another Commission Paper, the guidelines of “An External Policy to Serve 
Europe’s Energy Interests” were stated, in which diversification has been considered to 
be one of the two building blocks of energy security along with functioning markets 
(European Commission, 2006b). Diversification of geographical origin and transit 
routes is considered to be vital for energy security of the EU which faces with the great 
risk arising from increasing dependence on imports from producers that uses energy as a 
political lever. Although the Commission paper does not reveal the name of the country, 
it is obvious that it refers to the energy security risks related to import dependency on 
Russian sources. In the paper, diversification of especially natural gas suppliers is 
deemed to be necessary, where new gas projects that would supply resources from 
North Africa, the Middle East, the Caspian region, Russia and Norway are regarded as 
                                                 
13 Energy Community Treaty is the major mechanism of the EU to create a common 
regulatory space for energy. It was signed in October 2005 by the European Community 
and nine Contracting Parties from South East Europe that entered into force in July 
2006. Contracting parties, which are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Kosovo, are committed to 
implement major parts of the related EU acquis with the ultimate aim of creation of a 
single energy market, operating networks and a stable ground for investment.     
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means for increasing the security of energy supplies of the EU (European Commission, 
2006b). In the paper, there is a special emphasis to possible oil and natural gas projects 
that would transfer Caspian resources to the EU, an issue that will be discussed in more 
details in the following chapter. Regional cooperation schemes for enhancing the EU 
energy security that have been created for the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Russia will 
be discussed below along with the INOGATE Programme of the EU.           
 
 
 
4.5.1. Energy in the Context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership  
 
 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was initiated in 1995 between the EU-15 
and 12 Mediterranean countries of North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean with the 
ultimate aim of creating an area of peace, stability, shared prosperity and developing a 
Free Trade Area by 2010. With the enlargement of the EU, the number of the countries 
that are members of the Euro-Med Partnership has increased to 37, which now includes 
the EU-27 and 10 Mediterranean Partners (MPs).14 Energy issues constitute one of the 
major pillars of the Partnership, where the objective of the EU is creating a stable 
environment for energy investments and facilities to access the energy resources of the 
region. The Euro- Mediterranean Energy Forum has been launched in Brussels in 1997, 
where countries participating in the Partnership agreed on an action plan with three 
major objectives that are security of supply, competitiveness of the energy sector and 
environmental protection (Kagiannas et al., 2003). 
 
When all the MPs are considered together, a net energy exporter region comes to 
the picture. However, energy situation of individual MPs vary significantly where 
Algeria, Egypt and Syria are net energy exporters having rich hydrocarbon resources 
and others being net energy importers of which Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine do not 
have proven local energy resources. According to Kagiannas et al. (2003), Turkey is a 
distinct case compared to other MPs, although it is not a major energy producer, it is a 
major player in international energy relations due to its location at the crossroads 
between the energy thirsty EU and energy producers that are the Middle East, Central 
                                                 
14 Mediterranean Partner countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.    
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Asia and to some extent Russia. From the EU perspective, besides the energy resources 
of the MPs, geographical proximity is a major motivation for energy partnership with 
Mediterranean countries, since the countries play the role of transit for energy resources 
of the Gulf and the Caucasus (Kagiannas et al., 2003). Given the increasing demand for 
energy in MPs, the region is expected to turn into a net importer of energy in 2020 
(Kagiannas et al., 2003). Thus, possibility of the Euro-Med partnership in terms of 
ensuring the security of energy supply of the EU seems to be unrealistic given the 
increasing energy demand of the region. However, “development of energy production 
and transmission interconnections is a priority in terms of the security of supply” 
(Kagiannas et al., 2003, p.2682). Members of the Euro-Med Partnership has agreed on a 
six-year Action Plan for energy issues with the ultimate aim of creating a common 
Euro-Mediterranean energy market (Euractiv, 19/12/2007). 37 members of the 
partnership has agreed to create a common energy market on the grounds of free 
competition and reciprocal access to energy markets of each other through improving 
gas and electricity interconnections. Diversification of energy resources and 
harmonization of energy policies were also decided by the ministers of the Euro-Med 
Partners, thus constituting a major step in energy relations in the context of the Euro-
Med Partnership (Euractiv, 19/12/2007).   
 
 
 
4.5.2. Cooperation with the Black Sea Region for the Security of Energy 
Supply       
 
 
  
Significant potential of the Black Sea region as an energy production and 
transmission area motivated the EU for establishing a new regional cooperation 
initiative with the region. Energy security is not the sole area of motivation behind 
establishing an initiative with the region. Other cooperation areas covered by the Black 
Sea Synergy- A New Regional Cooperation Initiative are democracy, respect for human 
rights and good governance, managing movement and improving security, finding 
solutions to frozen conflicts of the region, transport, environment, maritime policy, 
fisheries, trade, research and education networks, science and technology, employment 
and social affairs and finally regional development (European Commission, 2007c). 
According to the perspective of the EU, the Black Sea region provides significant 
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potential for energy supply diversification. Developing relations with the Black Sea 
region to enhance energy security of the EU is very much related with other EU 
initiatives such as the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue, which will be analyzed below.  
 
In the context of energy relations between the EU and the Black Sea countries15, 
the EU  helps the countries to conduct measures for energy saving, energy efficiency 
and developing alternative energy resources in order to contribute to overall energy 
security of the region. More importantly, the EU aims to diversify its energy resources 
and to ensure energy security “through upgrading of existing and the construction of 
new infrastructure” (European Commission, 2007c). The Commission is already 
working on several technical projects to bring natural gas from the Caspian region to the 
EU through the Black Sea region.  
 
Black Sea Synergy is one of the initiatives proposed by the Commission in order 
to strengthen the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). ENP is a mechanism 
developed by the EU for establishing closer ties with the neighbors of the EU without 
providing a membership perspective. ENP covers policies to promote economic 
development, stability and good governance in the countries in the countries that are 
neighbors of the EU. In the Commission document establishing the framework for 
strengthening the ENP instruments, energy security is regarded as an area in which 
there is growing interdependence between the EU and its neighbors (European 
Commission, 2007d). The Commission states that “the ENP brings together producer, 
consumer and transit countries, which have to gain from closer cooperation and 
integration” (European Commission, 2007d, p.7). Energy cooperation activities 
conducted under the Euro-Med are also integral parts of the ENP since the Euro-Med 
Partnership already involves countries that are southern neighbors of the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Black Sea countries involved in the cooperation scheme are Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.            
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4.5.3. The INOGATE Programme  
 
 
 
INOGATE, which stands for Interstate Oil and Gas Transfer to Europe, is a 
major instrument of the EU for diversification its energy suppliers and enhancing the 
security of its energy supply. Participating countries of the Programme are mainly 
countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia that are involved in a dynamic 
relationship to ensure energy supply of all parties concerned. 21 participating countries 
of the Programme16 have signed the Umbrella Agreement, where an institutional and a 
legal framework to facilitate the establishment of oil and gas pipelines are stated along 
with the mechanisms to attract necessary investment for the construction and operation 
of the pipelines (Bahgat, 2006). The INOGATE Programme is significant for 
transporting natural gas since it is generally transported via pipelines and the LNG 
option for transporting natural gas is more capital-intensive than pipelines. Moreover, 
although transportation of oil is also possible with relatively small costs and the EU 
prefers importing oil mainly through sea way, this trend is projected to change due to 
security of supply and environmental risks arising from transporting oil through the 
seaway. The Commission has strengthened the measures taken for maritime safety after 
the accident of “Erika” ship in the Atlantic coast in 1999 that spilled oil and caused 
serious environmental damage. Thus, importance of pipelines would increase to a major 
extent due to both new pipeline projects for diversification of energy suppliers and also 
the environmental reasons. The INOGATE Programme is one of the key facilitator for 
investments in new pipeline projects, thus a major mechanism for diversification of the 
EU energy supplies.  
 
Although the establishment of pipeline infrastructures has been the sole aim of 
the INOGATE Programme when it was launched in 1995, the mandate of the 
Programme has now been expanded to cover electricity, renewable energy resources 
and energy efficiency along with oil and natural gas (The INOGATE Website). Most 
significant contribution of the INOGATE Programme for the security of energy supply 
of the EU is that it aims to develop new alternative transit routes for transporting the 
                                                 
16 Participating countries of the INOGATE Programme are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia. 
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Caspian energy resources to the EU. Institutionalization of the energy partnership 
between the EU and the Caspian region is significant in the sense that the Caspian 
resources are becoming increasingly important for the EU energy security due to its 
potential for reducing the import dependency of the EU on Russian oil and natural gas. 
The possible role of the Caspian region in enhancing the security of energy supply of 
the EU will be the subject of the next chapter, where the importance of Turkey as a 
transit route between the EU and the Caspian region will also be analyzed.        
 
 
 
4.5.4. The EU- Russia Energy Dialogue  
 
 
 
Although diversification of energy supply has been one of the main pillars of the 
EU energy policy, the EU acknowledges the fact that the EU and Russia would remain 
interdependent in the energy sector. It established a mechanism, the EU-Russian Energy 
Dialogue, where the EU aims to manage its dependency especially on Russian natural 
gas. In the Commission’s point of view, establishing a unified front against Russian 
policies would contribute to enhancement of supply security. From Russian point of 
view, developing relations with the EU would secure foreign investment as well as 
access to the EU energy market and sustain the energy demand in the EU for Russian 
energy resources. Interdependence between the EU and Russia in issues related to 
energy has motivated the initiation of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000 to 
cooperate in the areas where the two parties have common interests.   According to 
Bahgat (2006, p.16), “the EU-Russia dialogue is based on a simple bargain; Europe’s 
investment in return for Russia’s oil and gas”. Major objectives of the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue have been to secure both energy demand and supply, facilitating 
investments and developing relations between producer and consumer countries.     
 
Russian reluctance for the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty makes the 
energy relationship between the EU and Russia complicated. The EU firms face with 
difficulties in accessing to the energy resources and investments in Russia, while 
Russian firms, mainly Gazprom, enjoy the benefits of the measures of the EU taken for 
liberalization of energy markets in electricity and gas. To combat with the challenges of 
Russian’s single-sided enjoyment of access and investment rights, the Commission has 
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proposed a legal instrument for ensuring reciprocity with third countries, a move that is 
usually referred as “the Gazprom clause”. The reciprocity clause has been one of the 
proposals contained in the third legislation package of the EU for energy liberalization, 
which was analyzed in the previous chapter. Reciprocity clause foresees that third 
country firms that want to enjoy the benefits of unbundling of the EU firms need to play 
the same rules in their home country. The proposed legislation by the Commission 
states that “…in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire a 
significant interest of even control over an EU network, they will have to demonstrate 
and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as EU companies” 
(EC Memo/07/361, 2007). 
 
Attracting European investment is also in the interest of Russia that wants to 
secure the EU demand for Russian natural gas and oil. According to the figures of the 
IEA (2003), Russian energy sector will need a total of $328 billion investment per year 
in 2001-2030 period, most of which ($308 billion) will be necessary for exploration and 
development activities. For natural gas, study of the IEA (2003) shows that necessary 
investment is projected to be $333 billion per year, which will be allocated as 
investments for exploration and development ($187 billion), transmission and storage 
($109 billion), LNG ($5 billion) and distribution ($32 billion). The UK has been the 
largest investor in Russia. British trade and investment official Andrew Cahn, in an 
interview he gave to Russian state news agency RIA Novosti, has underlined the steady 
increase in the British investment to Russian economy, mainly to oil and gas sectors 
(RIA Novosti, 16/04/2008). According to latest figures provided by Cahn, British 
investment has risen to $26.3 billion with the grant investments of the energy 
companies like BP and Shell in Russia.   
 
Bahgat (2005) argues that there are several factors which will shape the future of 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. One major factor will be the capability of Russia for 
maintaining its oil and gas production and increasing its export capacity. Second 
important determining factor in future EU-Russia energy relations would be the 
willingness of Russia to reform its energy sector. Finally, attempts of the EU for 
diversifying its energy suppliers through transit routes by-passing Russia would 
constitute a challenge for the relations between the sides. Until now, main achievements 
of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue can be stated as the establishment of the EU-Russia 
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Technology Center in 2002, signing and ratification of Kyoto Protocol by Russia in 
2005 and improvement of the measures for maritime safety by Russia. North European 
Gas Pipeline (NEGP) is also considered to be one of the successful outcomes of the EU-
Russian Energy Dialogue (Bahgat, 2006), which will link Russia and Germany via 
Baltic Sea bypassing new members of the EU when completed in 2011 (Nord Stream 
Website). However, agreement between Germany and Russia for building the NEGP, 
which would increase import dependency of Germany thus of the EU for Russian 
natural gas, has not been reacted without criticism. Moreover it is regarded as the 
breaking point for European integration in energy policy. The following sections of the 
chapter discuss the failure of the EU in speaking with a common voice in the issues 
relating to security of supply and the implications of this failure for the overall 
European integration.             
 
 
 
4.6. Energy Security Decisions of the Member States as the Breaking Point 
in the EU Energy Policy   
 
 
 
The EU has been developing various mechanisms for the security of energy 
supply, most important of which are being the single energy market and diversification 
of energy suppliers. However, when energy security interests of the Member States are 
at stake, speaking with common voice in energy issues has been difficult. Relations of 
the Member States with Russia have been the breaking point on the way to common 
energy policy. As discussed throughout the chapter, import dependency on Russian 
energy resources, mainly on natural gas, has been a major challenge for the European 
energy security. The EU has established various mechanisms to diversify the transport 
routes of energy reaching to the EU through the Trans-European Networks, the 
INOGATE Programme and the Energy Charter Treaty. In addition, coordination 
mechanisms with the Mediterranean countries through the Euro-Med Partnership, with 
the Black Sea region states through the Black Sea Synergy as well as other policy 
instruments to enhance energy cooperation with the Middle East and Africa have been 
major attempts of the EU to create the ground for diversification of energy supplies. 
Moreover, the EU has attempted to manage its energy interdependency with Russia 
through mechanisms like the EU – Russian Energy Dialogue with the ultimate aim of 
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creating a unified front against Russia. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs has 
underlined the necessity of single-minded policies to face the challenges of energy 
dependency (Speech/08/96, 2008). While reminding that the EU needs more diversity 
for its natural gas supply, the Commissioner states that the EU needs a common voice in 
energy policy to be a major player in international collaboration. However, the Member 
States have been reluctant to transfer powers to the EU level for a strategically 
important issue like security of energy supply and have preferred to have bilateral 
relations with Russia undermining the joint policy efforts of the EU. The “special 
relationship” between Germany and Russia has been the most important illustration of 
this trend (Helm, 2006) enhanced by the decision of the two countries building the 
NEGP, along with other bilateral deals of different EU Member States with Russia.  
 
 
 
4.6.1. North European Gas Pipeline  
 
 
 
The EU has realized the vulnerability of its energy security with energy crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Belarus. However the major incident that 
has illustrated the need for a common action in energy security strategy of the EU has 
been the decision of Germany to sign a bilateral agreement with Russia for a natural gas 
pipeline that would transport natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Baltic Sea 
bypassing Accession countries. Route of the pipeline is presented in Map 4.1 Russia has 
been interested in making Germany as the energy hub for its natural gas exports to the 
EU, which makes Germany the key country for the Russian energy strategy (Smith, 
2007). Although Germany has stated that the NEGP would contribute to German and 
European energy security, various Member States like Poland and Lithuania that will be 
by-passed by the project have opposed to the pipeline. Opposing countries also state 
that they were not asked to participate to the negotiations of the pipeline project and the 
failure of Germany to coordinate with other EU Member States in negotiations with 
Russia poses a major threat to European energy security (Belkin, 2007). Poland and 
Lithuania are also worried about the threat posed to their gas supply since Russia would 
be able to export directly to Western Europe by-passing the Eastern Europe (Dw-World, 
10/12/2005). The North European Gas Pipeline, which is also called Nord Stream, has 
the length of 1220 km and is projected to be completed in 2012 with an estimated 
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investment of €7.4 billion (Nord Stream Website). Bearing in mind the fact that EU 
demand for natural gas is increasing rapidly, the Nord Stream is expected to meet a 
quarter of the additional natural gas demand of the EU (Nord Stream Website). Nord 
Stream Company, which is established in 2005 for the construction of the Nord Stream 
pipeline, is a joint venture, in which Gazprom has 51% share and BASF/Wintershall 
and E.ON Ruhrgas having an equal share of 24.5%.   
   
Map 4.1. The Nord Stream through the Baltic Sea 
 
Source: Nord Stream (2006). Project Information Document: Offshore Pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea.   
 
Debates on energy security have been limited to dispute between proponents and 
opponents of nuclear energy in Germany whereas possible outcomes of dependency on 
Russian energy resources have been discussed to a lesser extent (Umbach, 2006). When 
the decision of Germany to totally abandon nuclear energy by 2021 is taken into 
account, German demand for natural gas for electricity generation would increase 
significantly in the near future. As shown in Table 4.5, Russia accounts for 41.7% of 
Germany’s gas imports and “those figures are threatening to rise to a level ranging 
between 60 and 70 percent” (Umbach, 2006, p.67). Smith (2007), on the other hand, 
states that dependency of Germany on Russian natural gas is projected to increase to 80 
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percent from its current rate of 41.7 percent with the completion of NEGP project.  
Decision of constructing the Nord Stream would increase import dependency levels of 
Germany, thus increasing the vulnerability of Germany to possible disruptions of supply 
risks. Umbach (2006) argues that decision of building a pipeline passing under the 
Baltic Sea has been made in order to avoid transiting through Ukraine, the Baltic 
countries and Poland in accordance with geopolitical considerations, which eventually 
led a project that is two or three times more expensive compared to a land-based 
pipeline. Thus by making a bilateral deal with Russia for the NEGP, Germany increased 
its energy dependency on Russia that has the potential of using its energy resources as a 
mean for foreign and security objectives and made a decision illustrating the failure of 
the common energy security policy of the EU.  
 
   Disagreement between the EU Member States on how to manage the issue of 
energy security has come into the surface with the debates on the “special relationship” 
between Germany and Russia in energy. Along with the warnings of the European 
Commission, France and the UK have also criticized Germany for its actions that lead 
to increasing dependency on Russian energy exports (Umbach, 2006). As Table 4.5 
illustrates, France has a much lower dependency on Russian natural gas with at a level 
of 19.5% compared to Germany’s 41.7% dependency level. The position of the UK has 
been described as the EU needs a common energy policy for enhancing its energy 
security; however without necessarily by transferring more powers to the Commission 
or by adding a chapter on energy into the EU Treaties (House of Lords, Fourteenth 
Report, 12/02/2002). The UK also argues that the liberalization of energy markets 
should be the priority for securing the energy supplies of the EU, rather than seeking for 
long-term contracts with producer countries.     
 
 
 
4.6.2. Bilateral Agreements of the Major Member States with Gazprom   
 
 
 
Russia has been pursuing its “divide-and-rule” tactics on the EU by negotiating 
separate deals with major EU Member States (Smith, 2007, p.2). Thus Nord Stream has 
not been the unique example for bilateral relations between Russia and the Member 
States. For the case of natural gas, Gazprom seeks for bilateral contracts in the EU for 
 74
directly reaching the European market with the ultimate aim of increasing its market 
share in the EU Member States (Umbach, 2006).Since demand for natural gas is 
increasing rapidly, the EU Member States are also seeking for bilateral long-term 
contracts with Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom, ignoring the diversification 
objectives of the European Commission. Moreover, The EU Member States have been 
more interested in helping their national companies to gain investment access in Russia 
compared to conducting a common energy security policy (Smith, 2007). Leading 
Member States of the EU have sought for bilateral deals with Russia to secure their 
energy supplies. According to Correlje and Linde (2006, p.541), “if security of energy 
supply becomes uncertain for (some of) the member states, the urge to implement 
national energy policy may become stronger”. This has been the case for the EU 
Member States, since they urged to sign deals with Gazprom undermining the common 
EU efforts for diversification. 
 
The Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom has signed a long-term gas contract 
with German E.ON Ruhrgas AG, extending agreement between the two companies until 
2030 (Gazprom Website). Ruhrgas is the leader in German energy market and one of 
the leading natural gas companies of the EU. Moreover, E.ON Ruhrgas AG and 
Gazprom signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June 2004 to enhance the 
cooperation between the two companies by conducting joint projects on gas deliveries 
as well as production, transmission, marketing and power industry (Miccinilli, 2007). 
The bilateral agreement between Germany and Russia has constituted examples for 
other EU members to pursue similar objectives. Italian ENI, the largest oil and gas 
company in Italy, has been another European company that has been negotiating long-
term natural gas deal with Gazprom, a move that would increase the dependency of 
Italy on Russian gas exports. Agreement that was signed between Gazprom and ENI in 
2006 creates the ground for the increase in the rate of Russian natural gas exports to 
Italy since it allows Gazprom to directly sell gas in the Italian market (International 
Herald Tribune, 14/11/2006). Moreover, the agreement foresees that Gazprom would 
start selling natural gas to Italy in 2007 and increase its sales gradually that would reach 
to 3 billion cubic meters in 2010. Another issue on which Gazprom and ENI has 
reached to an agreement is the commitment of Gazprom to supply gas to Italy until 
2035 instead of the previous deadline of 2017 (International Herald Tribune, 
14/11/2006).  
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Although not as ambitious as the deals of German E.ON Ruhrgas and Italian 
ENI, Gaz de France, which is the largest distributor of natural gas in France, has also 
renewed the term of its natural gas contract with Gazprom. In an agreement signed 
between Gaz de France and Gazprom in December 2006, the two companies have 
decided to renew the natural gas contacts until 2030 that currently supplies 2.5 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas to France (Gaz de France Website, 19/12/2006). Moreover, 
the natural gas contract signed between Gaz de France and Gazprom is expected to 
cover 2.5 billion cubic meters of additional natural gas per year from the year 2010 that 
would be carried through the Nord Stream Pipeline. Common feature of the agreements 
signed between German, Italian and French companies with Gazprom is that they are 
bilateral and are signed for long time periods, deadlines of which are ranging from 2030 
to 2035. The long-term natural gas contracts signed between the Member States of the 
EU and Gazprom do not involve a second Member State in the agreement undermining 
the efforts of the Commission for creating a single front against Gazprom’s monopoly. 
Besides securing its relations with the largest Member States of the EU with bilateral 
deals, Gazprom has also announced its intentions to enter the UK energy market. 
Gazprom declared that it intends to acquire 15% of the UK gas market by 2011, which 
is ten times greater than Gazprom’s current share in the UK gas market (Euractiv, 
30/01/2008). 
 
 
4.6.3. Positions of the Central European and Baltic States     
 
As seen in the previous section, the largest EU Member States Germany, France 
and Italy have been more willing to support their national companies having long-term 
energy deals with Russia, rather than working in coordination to tackle with the 
challenges of dependency on Russian energy exports. Agreement on building the Nord 
Stream natural gas pipeline has been regarded as the major breaking point on the way to 
a common EU energy policy since it not only enhances dependency of Germany, thus 
the EU on Russian natural gas, also completely ignores the energy and security interests 
of the new Member States of the EU that are bypassed by the Nord Stream project. 
What is more, the Nord Stream has been considered as one of the Trans-European 
Networks, thus considered as one of the official transport routes of energy resources 
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supported by the EU. In other words, the significance of the Nord Stream pipeline has 
also been acknowledged by the EU. By directly connecting Russia and Germany, the 
European Commission has argued that the pipeline is projected to diversify the natural 
gas supplies of the EU. It is also considered as one of the milestones of the EU-Russian 
Energy Dialogue. Energy Commissioner Piebalgs stated his views on the Nord Stream 
as “Nord Stream is definitely a project of European interest and it would enhance the 
EU’s security of supply bringing additional gas through a new route” (EUobserver, 
30/01/2008). Support of the NEGP by the European Commission which has been 
negotiated without the participation of Baltic, Central and Eastern European countries 
has raised the question of whether the common EU energy policy is limited to the 
interests of the Old Europe (Smith, 2007). Poland, as one of the major opponents of the 
project, has started working on an alternative plan that would transport natural gas from 
Russia to Germany. Polish government announced that they are preparing a report on 
transport of gas via a land route, which is simpler, less expensive and more secure 
(EUobserver, 30/01/2008). The alternative plan suggested by Poland foresees a 
construction of a land-based pipeline passing through Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland. However, the alternative plan does not likely to attract interest neither from 
Russia nor from Germany. Another illustration of the Commission’s disregard the 
interests of the new members of the EU has been the Commission’s rejection of the 
Polish proposal suggesting that the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia 
should be a condition for the new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement17 
(Smith, 2007). Leaders of the Central European and Baltic states have made a 
declaration together for greater diversification of EU energy supplies and a united EU 
foreign policy towards Russia (EUobserver, 12/10/2007). The leaders have emphasized 
the threat stemming from the intentions of Russia to use its massive energy resources as 
a political weapon and urged the EU leaders to act in the way expected from members 
of a “Union”. 
 
 
                                                 
17 The current EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1997 
and expired in December 2007 with the completion of the initial ten year period. 
Negotiations for the renewal of the agreement s ongoing between the Member States at 
the writing of this study, which is delayed by the oppositions of Poland and Lithuania.  
 77
4.6.4. Energy Security Interests as the Breaking Point of the Common EU 
Energy Policy 
 
The failure of the EU for presenting a coherent and credible European energy 
strategy towards Russia would not matter much, if Russia had the intention of 
liberalizing its energy market (Helm, 2006). However, reluctance of Russia for ratifying 
the Energy Charter Treaty and its unwillingness for opening up the pipelines of its gas 
monopoly company Gazprom make the interdependent relations between Russia and the 
EU complicated. Bilateral natural gas contracts between the leading energy companies 
of the EU like EON, ENI and Gaz De France with Gazprom encourage Russia to 
continue its single-sided policy towards the EU, which enjoys the benefits of 
liberalization of the EU energy market; however without providing the same conditions 
for the EU companies that wants access to Russian energy market. Thus, lack of a 
unified front against Russian monopolistic energy market is making difficult to pressure 
Russia for giving up its monopolistic behaviors. The IEA warned the EU by making a 
direct connection between Gazprom monopoly and European energy security. The IEA 
warned especially the EU Member States, which have long-term energy contracts with 
Gazprom stating that “the IEA is worried about the increasingly monopolistic status of 
state-controlled Gazprom. Europeans cannot import gas from Russia unless Gazprom 
agrees. This restriction undermines European energy security” (Honoré and Stern, 2007, 
p.238). Moreover, the IEA also warns that the Member States can face a gradually 
increasing supply shortfall in few years time unless necessary investments to new fields 
in Russia are made (Honoré and Stern, 2007). The necessity in the EU for taking further 
steps to manage its dependency on Russian energy imports is obvious. However, in 
order to achieve the objective of decreasing import dependency on Russian energy 
resources, the necessary steps are needed to be harmonized and coordinated among the 
Member States. Urgency to establish a common front against Russian energy policy has 
three major motivations (Helm, 2006). A common external policy towards Russia in 
energy issues would constitute solidarity between the EU-15 and the Accession 
countries, since the latter would directly experience the benefits of the EU membership 
on their position vis-à-vis Russia. Secondly, solidarity among the Member States would 
constitute a real bargaining power to Russia to relax its control on its monopolistic 
energy market and leave aside its divide-and-rule policy towards the EU Member 
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States. Lastly, in case of conducting a unified energy policy among the Member States, 
the significant role played by the Commission would be appreciated by the Member 
States (Helm, 2006).  
Besides undermining the common energy policy of the EU, separate deals of the 
EU Member States with Russia raise doubts on the objectives of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the EU as well. High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy Javier Solana stated that the EU has a long way to go for a credible 
external energy policy and clearly stated that the EU does not have one yet  (Euractiv, 
06/02/2008). Solana continued his comments on the energy policy of the EU by stating 
that "in Europe, we have seen real progress on tackling climate change; some progress 
on the internal energy side; but rather less progress on the external side. Too often, we 
see mixed messages and the defence of narrow, national interests at the expense of 
broader, European interests" (Euractiv, 06/02/2008). Solana also touches upon the 
bilateral deals of the EU Member States stating that fragmented negotiations with 
external parties damages the cooperation among the Member States and urged the 
Member States to behave with “more discipline and loyalty” in their bilateral relations 
with third countries on energy issues (Euractiv, 06/02/2008).     
Divergence of the key interests of the Member States in energy security has 
undermined further integration towards a common energy policy. In accordance with 
the hypothesis of liberal intergovernmentalist theory, integration of the EU energy 
policy has moved further until the stage where the energy security interests of the 
leading Member States have diverged. Taking action in the issues relating to the internal 
market has been more successful since the Member States have supported liberalization 
policies and internal market rules for their energy sectors in principle. However, as the 
previous chapter has concluded, although the Member States have agreed upon 
Directives on electricity and gas markets, it is not yet possible to argue that there is 
single energy market in the EU. Moreover, although the Third Liberalization Package 
for the EU energy sector has been proposed by the Commission, the Member States like 
France and Germany are reacting to the unbundling requirements of the package in 
order to protect the interests of their national championship.  
 Divergence of the key interests of the Member States as an obstacle for the 
formation of the common energy policy is more obvio
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of the Member States. Separate energy deals of the Member States with Russia and the 
agreement on the Nord Stream despite the fact that the pipeline threatened security of 
the new Member States have been major breaking points of the integration in energy 
policy. Although collective interests of the EU have necessitated diversification of the 
energy supplies of the EU, individual interests pursued by the Member States have 
undermined the collective interests of the EU. The theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism also predicts that the decisions would be taken in accordance with 
the lowest common denominator in the EU given that the Member States have policy 
alternatives to the issue at stake. In line with this premise, the EU Member States have 
preferred having bilateral energy deals with Russia as policy alternatives to a unified 
policy towards Russia. In addition, energy security policy of the EU is developed on the 
lowest common denominator of the Member States, thus lacked any binding power.   
Bargaining between the leading Member States of the EU has determined the 
pace of policy formation in the EU rather than the supranational leadership as argued by 
the supranational institutionalism. In Moravcsik’s theory, key interests of the Member 
States are developed through the process of national preference formation in which 
economic interests are more important than the political ones. National championships 
of the Member States in energy, in other words the leading energy companies of the 
largest Member States, have been influential actors in national preference formation 
process. Bargaining of the Member States to preserve the interests of their national 
energy companies against the Commission’s policy proposals were most visible in the 
limitations to formation of a single energy market.  
In liberal intergovernmentalist theory, national preference formation is followed 
by the strategic bargaining stage in which relative power positions of the Member States 
are the main determinants of the negotiation outcomes. Intergovernmentalist theory 
states that small states support the supranational authority to gain more power and 
competence in the EU integration process, since the small states would enhance their 
relative power positions in an environment where supranational authority rather than the 
intergovernmental bargaining is the major determinant of the policy outcome. However 
the role of the small Member States of the EU would be minor in the policy-making 
arising from their minor power positions.  Hypothesis of Moravcsik’s theory, which 
foresees the relative power positions of the Member States would determine the policy 
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outcome, is supported in the analysis of the energy policy of the EU, since the interests 
of the small states have been ignored to a major extent. The most important case 
illustrating the minor role of the new Member States has been the Commission’s 
support for the Nord Stream pipeline, despite the fact that the pipeline project has 
seriously threatened the energy security and foreign policy objectives of the new 
Member States. Scholars looking at the EU integration process through the lens liberal 
intergovernmentalist have preferred the term “convergence of interests”, rather than 
“harmony of interests”. Differences of the Member States in their energy mix, import 
dependency levels and external energy relations have been the major reasons underlying 
the divergence of the interests of the Member States, which led them, pursue different 
energy security policies. The general argument of the study, which states that further 
integration in a specific policy area in the EU fails when key interests of the leading 
Member States diverge despite the supranational leadership, is verified when applied to 
energy security policy of the EU. A general lesson for further integration in energy 
policy is that a successful common energy policy needs to take into account the 
differences between the energy realities of the Member States.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
THE CASPIAN REGION FOR THE DIVERSIFICATION OF THE EU ENERGY 
SUPPLY AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY ON THE EU ENERGY SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
Faced with the challenges of import dependency for its major energy resources, 
the EU has been taking actions for the diversification of its energy supplies. The 
Caspian region has been a major alternative to the EU for securing its supplies from a 
region different than Russia and the Middle East. Construction of new oil and natural 
gas pipelines would facilitate importation of the energy resources of the Caspian region, 
thus improving security of supply by diversifying geographical origins of supply. 
Turkey, as being located between the major energy producers and the major energy 
consumers, has significant potential to play role the transit role for carrying the Caspian 
energy resources to the EU. In this chapter, after providing the figures for oil and 
natural gas reserves of the Caspian region, the importance attributed to the region by the 
EU in the context of its diversification policy will be presented. Secondly, transport 
routes of Caspian energy resources to the EU will be discussed, where the disagreement 
related to the legal status of the Caspian and Russian interests in the region will be 
analyzed as the two major obstacles for the Caspian region to realize its full potentials. 
Then, Turkey’s role as the major energy corridor between the consumers and producers 
of energy will be analyzed with specific emphasis on the Nabucco gas pipeline project. 
Lastly, it will be argued that the opening of the Trans-European Network chapter in the 
accession negotiations of Turkey is an indication of the importance attributed to Turkey 
for the EU energy security and membership of Turkey to the EU would enhance the EU 
energy security.  
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5.1. The Caspian Region Energy Resources 
 
 
  
Interest of the EU Member States and the Western companies for the energy 
resources of the Caspian region is increasing. Although the Caspian region is unlikely to 
be another “Middle East” in terms of its energy supplies, the region is expected to 
contribute to the EU Member States diversification of their energy suppliers, thus 
enhancing the energy security of the EU. According to the report published by the 
International Energy Agency in 1998, countries that have significant oil and natural gas 
resources in the Caspian region are listed as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan. The report notes that the break-up the Soviet Union had created a fruitful 
ground for foreign investments in oil and gas sectors of the countries (IEA, 1998). 
According to the estimates of the report, proven oil reserves in the Caspian region vary 
between 15 and 40 billion barrels and about 70 to 150 billion barrels are estimated as 
additional possible reserves of the region (IEA, 1998). For the natural gas resources of 
the region, proven reserves of natural gas are between 6.7 and 9.2 trillion cubic meters 
and additional 8 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves are possible (IEA, 1998). 
When the figures of oil and natural gas of the region are compared with other regions of 
the world, it is estimated that the share of Caspian region in the world’s proven oil 
reserves is between 1.5% and 4%, while it has 6% of the world’s proven natural gas 
reserves. The IEA report concludes that the figures may increase to a significant extent 
due to the increase in exploration activities in the region. When the figures of the IEA 
are compared with the figures of the BP Statistical Figure of World Energy (2007), the 
energy reserves of the region are seen to be compatible in the two sources. BP (2007) 
states that proved oil and natural gas reserves of the four countries are equal to 47.9 
billion barrels and 9.08 trillion cubic meters respectively at the end of the year 2006.  
 
   Oil production in the Caspian region has been 2.37 million barrels per day in 
2006 where Kazakhstan has the highest share compared to other three major energy 
producing countries of the region, with a 1.7% share in world oil production (BP, 2007). 
When natural gas production figures of the Caspian region are analyzed, the four 
countries have produced 147.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2006, where 
Turkmenistan has the highest share with 62.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 
with a share of 2.2% in world’s natural gas production (BP, 2007). If investments made 
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to the Caspian region is continued at its current pace, the IEA (1998) estimates that oil 
production of the region would be 3.9 million barrels per day in 2010, while natural gas 
production would reach to 201 billion cubic meters in 2010 depending on various 
factors such as the level domestic consumption in the region, new export pipeline 
constructions and accessibility to Russian pipelines that are currently under the control 
of Gazprom (IEA, 1998). Energy resources of the Caspian region are estimated to have 
the same magnitude with the energy resources of the North Sea region (IEA, 1998). 
However, the Caspian region faces with major obstacles to enhance the security of 
energy supply of the EU. First obstacle is related to the export transport routes of the 
region, almost all of which pass through Russia as inherited from the Soviet era. Second 
major obstacle is the disagreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea between the 
littoral states of the Caspian Sea, which are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. The two problems will be discussed briefly. Before analyzing these 
problem areas, importance attributed to the Caspian region by the EU for the 
enhancement of its energy security will be discussed. 
 
 
 
5.2. Importance of the Caspian Region for the Diversification of the EU 
Energy 
 
 
 
Although there are significant problems regarding the issue of transportation of 
the Caspian oil and natural gas to the EU, the region has been regarded as a major 
source of energy that would reduce the dependence of the EU on Russian energy 
resources to some extent. Major policy of the EU to develop secure energy transport 
routes from the Caspian region has been the INOGATE Programme, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. The aim of the INOGATE is to secure energy 
supplies from the Caspian region accompanied by enhancing investments of the EU in 
the region for the region to develop its energy resources as well as the transportation 
infrastructure. In the Green Paper published in 2006 that lays down “A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”, the Caspian region is 
referred as a priority region for securing and diversifying energy supplies of the EU 
(European Commission, 2006a). The region is considered to be significant for both oil 
and natural gas supplies to the EU. The Green Paper emphasizes the need for the 
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construction of independent gas pipelines supplying the Caspian energy and also for the 
construction of Central European pipelines that would transport oil from the region to 
the EU through Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria (European Commission, 2006a). Role 
of the Caspian region is also underlined as the component of “An External Policy to 
Serve Europe’s Energy Interests”, which is a paper published by the Commission in 
order to point out the possible role of the external policy of the EU to ensure reliable 
flows of energy to the EU (European Commission, 2006b). Besides the need for 
developing bilateral energy cooperation relations with the energy producer and transit 
countries of the Caspian region, significance of creating new energy corridors from the 
Caspian region have been emphasized in the document.  
 
The EU developed an energy cooperation mechanism called the “Baku 
Initiative” with the countries of the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea regions in November 
2006 (EC Press Release IP/06/1657, 2006). The participants18 of the Baku Initiative 
have agreed on a new Energy Road Map to facilitate the gradual integration of the 
energy markets of the participating countries and to ensure the transportation of oil and 
natural gas resources of the Caspian region to the EU enhancing its energy security. The 
participants have identified four priority areas for the common energy strategy they 
develop, which are “converging of energy markets, enhancing energy security, 
supporting sustainable energy development including energy efficiency, renewable 
energy resources and demand side management, and finally attracting investments 
towards energy projects of common interests” (EC Press Release IP/06/1657, 2006). In 
addition, transportation of the Caspian energy resources to the EU is one of the 
priorities of the EU International Energy Policy that would be implemented for the 
years 2007-2010, published in the Communication of the Commission laying down the 
action plan to achieve the objectives of the EU Energy Policy (European Commission, 
2007a). The action plan sets the priorities regarding the Caspian region as fully 
implementing the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) signed with Azerbaijan and 
                                                 
18 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (observer).  
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Kazakhstan19 and moving to establish cooperation schemes with the Central Asian 
energy producer countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (European Commission, 
2007a). External Relations Commissioner of the EU Ferrero-Waldner underlined the 
increasing importance of Central Asia as an energy partner of the European bloc and 
argued that the EU sees “huge scope of cooperation” with Central Asia (Euractiv, 
11/04/2008). Bearing in mind the fact that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
have some of the world’s biggest oil and gas resources, the Commissioner stated that 
Central Asia is a key partner in diversifying supply routes of the EU (Euractiv, 
11/04/2008).      
 
 
 
5.2.1. Investments of the EU Companies in the Caspian Region  
 
 
 
Activities of European energy giants in the Caspian region have been the major 
indication of the importance attributed to the region for enhancing the EU energy 
security. Major EU companies are involved in transport projects for carrying oil and 
natural gas resources of the region to the EU and as well as in extraction activities 
(Kalyuzhnova, 2005). Main investors in the region are Britain (BP), Italy (Agip-Eni), 
the Netherlands (Shell) and France (Total). When the allocation of the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the Caspian region by sectors is analyzed, it is seen that energy 
sector has major share amongst other sectors. For example, approximately 90% of the 
European FDI in Kazakhstan is allocated to the energy sector (Warkotsch, 2006). Eni is 
the operator of Agip KCO consortium project along with Shell and Total as partners and 
the aim of the project is extracting oil resources of the Kashagan field in Kazakhstan 
(Kashagan Project, Eni Website). Eni is also the co-operator of Karachaganak oil, gas 
and condensate field in Kazakhstan along with British Gas, which has a share of 32.5% 
in the project (Karachaganak Project, Eni Website). 
  
                                                 
19 Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan was signed in November 2006 with 
the objective of developing energy partnership between the parties. Enhancing the EU 
energy security thanks to the energy supplies of the Caspian basin has been the major 
point of the cooperation with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan also signed a MOU with the EU 
at the same time with Azerbaijan. Objective of the MOU signed with Kazakhstan is 
setting the framework of the energy relations between the two parties. 
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Azerbaijan is another major destination of the European energy companies in 
two major projects, first of which being the project for developing oil in the Azeri-
Chirag-Guneshli (AGC) fields and second one being the Shah Deniz project for 
extracting natural gas from the field. AGC oil field is the largest oil field under 
development located about 120 kilometers off the coast of Azerbaijan that is operated 
by a consortium led by BP along with nine partners (BP, 2003). AGC oil field is 
developed by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), which was set 
up as the part of the Production Sharing Agreement with the objective of exploiting the 
richest oil reserves of Azerbaijan. The Agreement is mostly referred as the “Contract of 
the Century” due to its groundbreaking nature (Aras and Foster, 1999). Besides 
developing the offshore AGC oil fields of Azerbaijan, AIOC also coordinates the oil 
export pipeline projects originating in Azerbaijan (IEA, 1998). BP has a share of 34.1% 
as the operator of the AIOC with Unocal (USA) having 10.3% share, State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) having 10% share, Inpex (Japan) with 10%, Statoil 
(Norway) with 8.6%, ExxonMobil (US) with 8%, TPAO (Turkey) with 6.8%, Devon 
(USA) with 5.6%, Itochu (Japan) with 3.9% and lastly AmeradaHess (USA) with 2.7% 
(BP, 2003). The Shah Deniz, on the other hand, is the natural gas field located in the 
South Caspian Sea, development contract of which was signed in 1996 (Mavrakis et al, 
2006). Involved companies for the development of the field are BP (25.5%), Statoil 
(Norway) (25.5%), State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) (10%), 
NICO (Iran) (10%), TotalFinaElf (10%), LUKAGIP (10%) and TPAO (9%) (Mavrakis 
et al, 2006). Investments of the energy giants of the EU to the Caspian region signify 
the growing interests of the EU Member States in the region that seek alternative energy 
suppliers to lessen the gravity of the problem of dependency on few energy suppliers. 
 
 
 
5.2.2. The EU Energy Outlook and the Caspian Region   
 
 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, energy demand of the EU is increasing due to 
decreasing domestic production and enlargement of the EU compromising new 
members with energy intensive economies. Increase in the energy demand for natural 
gas would be higher than the demand for oil, due to increasing share of natural gas for 
electricity generation replacing coal and to its more environment-friendly nature. 
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Therefore, it can be argued that developing energy relations with the Caspian region 
would matter more for the security of natural gas supply of the EU compared to oil. 
Moreover, since dependence on Russian natural gas is a major challenge for the EU 
energy security, the EU attributes high importance to diversification of its natural gas 
suppliers. According to Cayrade (2004), in the scenario which foresees an increase in 
the share of natural gas in the energy mix upto 33% in 2020, the EU would need 
additional 320 billion cubic meters (bcm) natural gas per year in 2020 compared to the 
energy consumption of 2000. This means that an increase in the import flows to the EU, 
basing on the estimation that domestic production of the EU would be limited to 196 
bcm and Norwegian exports of natural gas would reach to 100 bcm in 2020. Since the 
EU demand is projected to be 819 bcm, the difference would be needed to be 
compensated with import flows (Cayrade, 2004). Although Russia would remain the 
major supplier of natural gas to the EU, additional new supplies from the Caspian 
region that equals to the amount 80 bcm would be needed. Cayrade (2004) adds that 
400 bcm of 525 bcm natural gas has not been contracted yet, which means that new 
pipeline connections for transporting the Caspian oil along with the natural gas to the 
EU would be necessary. Bearing in mind the great distance between the Caspian region 
and the European markets, long pipelines would be necessary that would pass through 
several states. Since existing pipeline infrastructure in the Central Asia was designed to 
supply the internal market of the Soviet Union, export of oil and natural gas from the 
Caspian region requires construction of new export systems (Degermenci, 2001). The 
pipelines of the former Soviet Union are technically limited and unsuitable for 
accommodating additional export volumes (Degermenci, 2001). However, the issue of 
transporting oil and natural gas from the Caspian region to the EU has lead to intensive 
pipeline diplomacy mainly between Russia and Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran. In 
this chapter, the focus would be on the rivalry between Turkey and Russia, since the 
argument of the chapter is that Turkey has a strategic role to play in the EU energy 
security to lessen the dependence of the EU on Russian energy exports. Before going 
into the analysis of the transportation routes of the Caspian energy resources to the EU, 
the major obstacle for both production and transportation of the resources, which is the 
dispute on the legal status of the Caspian will be presented briefly.  
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5.3. Dispute on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea 
 
 
 
Littoral states of the Caspian Sea that are Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Turkmenistan disagree on the definition of the Caspian whether it is a sea or a lake. 
Disagreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea makes the agreement between the 
parties on how to share the energy resources under the Caspian Sea impossible. 
Disagreement stems from the fact that potential oil and natural gas reserves are 
distributed unevenly under the Caspian that are at least in six different locations beneath 
the Caspian Sea. Agreeing on the legal status as a sea or a lake would determine the 
rules on how to share the resources beneath the Caspian Sea. If it is defined as a sea, the 
rules of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would apply 
according to which, littoral states would claim 12 miles from the shore of the sea as 
their territorial waters and 200 miles exclusive economic zones. Agreement on the 
Caspian body of water as a sea would divide the sea and energy resources under the sea 
as equally to national sectors (Bahgat, 2006). However, if the Caspian body of water is 
defined as a lake, then the energy resources of the region would be developed jointly in 
accordance with the approach referred as “the condominium approach” (Bahgat, 2006, 
p.971).  
 
Russia has sided with the lake classification which foresees that a communal 
division of the resources of the water body. Iran also sided with Russia in its former 
stance for the lake classification. Taking the same stance with Russia on the issue of 
Caspian’s legal status has been an incentive for Iran to align its regional policy with the 
interests of Russia (Aras and Foster, 1999). Iran then changed its position and argued 
that the Caspian Sea resources should be shared in a equitable manner, where each 
littoral state would have a 20% share of the surface waters and the seabed (Bolukbaşi, 
2004). Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has refused the classification supported by Iran 
and Russia and opted for sharing the resources beneath the Caspian Sea territorially 
rather than communally. Azerbaijan is the country, which would gain or lose most 
depending on the decision of the legal status of the Caspian. “From the perspective of 
Azerbaijan, something approaching an equal distribution of the Caspian’s resources 
would mean giving up its ambitions of becoming a player in world energy markets…” 
(Aras and Foster, 1999, p.244). Despite the ongoing debate on the issue, according to 
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the IEA (1998) report, the disagreement over the legal status of the Caspian Sea has not 
significantly slowed the investments in the region. The reason why the uncertainty 
about the legal status of the Caspian Sea has not discouraged the companies involved in 
the region is that the companies are confident that the agreements will be honored since 
they are signed by a large number of companies coming from variety of states (IEA, 
1998).   
 
 
 
5.4. Export Transportation Routes from the Caspian Region 
 
 
 
Existing oil and natural gas pipelines were constructed to transport energy 
resources from energy producer states of the Soviet Union to energy consuming ones. 
Thus, energy transportation routes from the Caspian Sea area go either to Russia or 
through Russia to the EU and most of the energy routes terminate at the Russian port of 
Novorosiisk in the Black Sea. Land-locked countries of the region have needed 
resources to export their oil and natural gas resources. Since oil and natural gas 
pipelines of the region had been transferred through the Russian pipelines, Russia has 
the market power to determine the price of oil and natural gas it pays to the Caspian 
region states and to set transit fees for the energy resources passing through its pipelines 
(Belkin, 2007). Russian monopoly on the pipelines prevents the Caspian region 
countries to be viable alternative energy suppliers for the EU. One major illustration of 
the situation is the issue of transportation of natural gas resources of Turkmenistan. 
Russia buys the Turkmen gas for low prices and sells it to Turkey and the EU with 
higher prices, thus enjoying the benefits of 44% share of Gazprom in Turkmenneftgaz, 
which is the state-owed company of Turkmenistan. Thus, Turkmen gas becomes the 
Russian gas after entering into the Russian borders. Besides its dictation of the price it 
pays for the energy resources originating from the Caspian region, market power of 
Russia also enables it to decide whether to transport the region’s energy sources or not. 
This has been evident in the rejection of Transneft, the Russian monopoly on oil, the oil 
supplies of Kazakhstan to be shipped through its pipeline system to Lithuania for 
refining (Belkin, 2007). Thus, along with the EU, the countries in the region also have 
significant incentives to construct alternative transport routes to Russian routes in order 
to directly export their energy resources to the EU. However, Russian interests in the 
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region are clearly defined. Caspian energy resources are vital for Russian natural gas 
monopoly Gazprom to maintain its “global presence strategy” for the global oil and gas 
market, which is defined as the activities of Gazprom in hydrocarbon exploration, 
extraction, transmission and marketing projects in third countries (Gazprom 
Development Strategy, 2008). Utilizing natural gas originating in the Central Asian 
countries by adding the resources of the region to Gazprom’s resource portfolio is one 
of the main pillars of Gazprom’s business strategy. In other words, Russia has a dual 
interest in the Caspian region energy resources both for transporting the oil and natural 
gas originating from the region and also for conducting a strategic relationship with the 
countries of the region to secure the supplies it is transporting to the European markets. 
Thus, in accordance with its strategic interests in the Caspian region, Russia 
continuously rejects and tries to undermine any alternative projects for transporting the 
energy resources of the Caspian region to the EU bypassing Russia. 
 
The Caspian region countries have four alternatives to transport their energy 
resources to the world markets. Two of which are headed to the Pacific through China 
and to Indian Ocean through Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. The two routes for the 
Caspian region states to export their energy resources to the EU market is either through 
Russia from the north of the Caspian Sea or through Turkey to Mediterranean from the 
south of the Caspian Sea. Turkey and Russia have been advocating the route passing 
through their respective territories for the transport of the Caspian energy resources to 
the European markets.  Turkey, as an alternative energy transportation route to the EU, 
has a strategic role for the EU that wants to reduce its dependence on Russian energy 
resources and on Russian transport routes. Role of Turkey for enhancing the security of 
supply of the EU will be the topic of following sections of this chapter. Competition 
between the neighboring countries of the Caspian region to transport the energy 
resources of the region, which is referred as the “pipeline diplomacy”, has been the 
major development in international relations of the region. The power struggle for 
having control over the Caspian hydrocarbon resources has been called the “New Great 
Game” referring the great game between the British Empire and the Russian Empire for 
superiority in Central Asia (Moradi, 2006, p.174). “To advocate for particular routes on 
the basis of a policy that excludes some players and includes others in the so-called 
great game has ensued in the wake of the oil and gas rush in the Caspian 
basin…”(Amirahmadi, 2000, p.163).  The underlying motivation for the neighboring 
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states to compete for being the energy transport route is the fact that the state through 
which the pipelines originating from the region runs would have significant economic 
and political benefits, “including access to oil or natural gas for domestic needs; foreign 
investment and jobs; substantial transit fees; and political leverage over the flow of oil 
and gas” (Bahgat, 2006, p.972). Amirahmadi (2000) argues that pipelines offer more 
than economic benefits since “they form the strategic cores of power along which 
communications, transportation, and other infrastructure corridors develop” (p.164). 
Thus, the underlying motivation of the rivalry between Turkey and Russia for being the 
territory through which the Main Export Pipeline (MEP) transporting the Caspian 
energy resources would pass through is more than solely economic benefits. 
 
 
 
5.5. Turkey as an Energy Corridor  
 
 
 
 Located between the energy producers of the Caspian region and the 
energy-thirsty Member States of the EU, Turkey is a viable alternative energy transport 
route. Turkey is a major transit route through which the additional volume of natural gas 
that would be needed by the EU in the upcoming decades would pass through (Cayrade, 
2004). Since its geographical location provides the opportunity to bypass Russia when 
transporting the non-Russian energy resources to the EU, Turkey has a strategic 
importance for the EU energy security. Pipelines passing through Turkey can be 
classified in two groups, which are on the east-west energy corridor and on the north-
south energy corridor (Fink, 2006). In the north-south corridor the Russian energy 
resources, while on the east-west route the Caspian and Persian Gulf energy resources 
are carried. Thus, Turkey’s role as the east-west energy corridor is more significant for 
the EU. Turkey has a significant role for the EU energy security which is challenged by 
the increasing dependency on Russian energy resources. According to the forecasts, if 
all pipeline connections that will be discussed in the following sections would be 
operational, 10% of world’s oil and 15% of world’s natural gas will be passing through 
Turkey to the EU (Kara, 2005). The figures are more than enough for demonstrating the 
role of Turkey for the EU energy security. One of the main routes for the security of the 
EU energy supply would be the route supplying gas from the Caspian region through 
Turkey (Cayrade, 2004). In this section, pipelines which are operational along with the 
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pipelines that are under consideration will be presented to demonstrate the role of 
Turkey for enhancing the EU energy security. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil 
pipeline is the first direct connection between the land-locked states of the Caspian 
region and the Mediterranean. In other words, the BTC is the milestone of Turkey’s 
ambition for being an energy corridor. Nevertheless, the main project which would 
contribute more to the EU energy security would be the Nabucco natural gas pipeline 
project, which will be analyzed in details in the following sections.  
 
 
 
5.5.1. Turkey as the Corridor for the Caspian Oil: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Oil Pipeline  
 
 
 
 The pipeline, which is 1,770 kilometers long with the potential of carrying 
approximately a billion barrels of oil a day, has become operational in May 2006. The 
BTC pipeline would carry the oil produced in the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) fields 
of Azerbaijan to Georgia and finally to Mediterranean through the Turkish port of 
Ceyhan. The route of the pipeline can be seen in the Map 5.1. In the future, Kazakhstan 
may also provide oil to the BTC pipeline. Although the leaders of Kazakhstan voiced 
interest for supplying Kazakhstan’s oil resources to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the 
country did not commit specific volumes to the project (Roberts, 2004). The project has 
been realized with the $ 3.6 billion investment of the BTC Pipeline Company, in which 
BP has played the leading role with a share of 30.1%. Shares in the BTC Pipeline 
Company are distributed as the following; SOCAR with 25%, Unocal with 8.9%, Statoil 
with 8.71%, TPAO with 6.53%, ENI with 5%, TotalFinaElf with 5%, Itochu with 3.4%, 
ConocoPhillips (USA) with 2.5%, Inpex with 2.5% and finally Amerada Hess with 
2.4% shares (BP, 2003).  
 
The pipeline has strategic importance for Turkey as well as the energy security 
of the EU. Decision on the most viable route for transporting the Caspian region’s oil 
resources to the European market depends on main economic elements ranging from 
cost, available financing and security. In addition to economic factors, political and 
environmental considerations are also evaluated (Aras and Foster, 1999). The BTC 
pipeline has been decided as the optimum route depending on various reasons. First 
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reason is that the route of the BTC would prevent increasing oil traffic through the 
Turkish Straits. Although the Straits is protected with high-tech navigation systems and 
appropriate safety measures, oil tankers that maneuvers in the Bosphorus pose a great 
challenge to Istanbul’s security since no technology can completely eliminate the risk of 
oil spill (Barysch, 2007). The EU favors pipelines rather than tankers transporting oil 
through the seaway due to environmental reasons as well as for the energy security 
reasons. In the “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply” Green 
Paper, the reason for preferring the pipelines is stated as the following:  
 
“The way in which energy is transported is of fundamental 
importance for the security of supply. For instance, the European 
Union imports 90% of its oil by sea. Consequently, it is 
committed to strengthening the rules and regulations on ships 
(ban on single hull) and should restore its supply balance by 
shifting the emphasis towards oil pipelines” (European 
Commission, 2000).  
 
Thus, the BTC pipeline is in line with the framework drawn by the Commission 
for oil transportation. The IEA (1998) also states that the increase in the export potential 
of the Caspian oil would lead to an increase in the tanker traffic of the Straits, thereby 
raising the risk of serious accidents, which would pose great danger to human and 
marine life in the region. Thus, the IEA (1998) underlines the necessity of constructing 
alternative oil pipelines originating from the Caspian region that bypass the Turkish 
Straits. In other words, the BTC is also compatible with the concerns of the IEA.    
 
Before choosing for the route of the BTC oil pipeline as the MEP of Azerbaijani 
oil resources, reviving the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline that transports the Azerbaijani 
oil to the international markets through the northern route since 1997 was considered. 
The second pipeline carrying the Azerbaijani oil is the Baku-Supsa pipeline that runs 
from Georgia. However, at the end the BTC was chosen as the main route since it 
would carry the Caspian oil directly to an open-water port without any need for tankers 
to pass through the Bosphorus (Roberts, 2004). There is already a major pipeline that 
carries the Caspian oil to Novorossiysk. The pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) transports oil resources in the Tengiz filed of Kazakhstan to the 
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, from where the oil is carried by tankers 
passing through the Bosphorus Straits. CPC was formed in 1996 with the aim of 
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constructing the pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiysk. CPC pipeline system is the 
largest investment project with foreign participation on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union20 (CPC Website). The pipeline, which is 1,510 kilometers long, carries 650,000 
barrels of oil per day. The CPC aims to expand the capacity of the pipeline system by 
adding new pump stations, storage tanks, loading system and replacing some pipeline 
connections, which would increase the amount of oil carried by the pipeline to 1.4 
million barrels per day that would generate over $2 billion a year (CPC Website).   
 
Second factor that makes the BTC oil pipeline strategically important is the fact 
that it bypasses Russia when carrying the oil resources of Azerbaijan and possibly of 
Kazakhstan to the international markets. By taking the exports routes of the Caspian oil 
away from Russia as well as from Iran, the BTC oil pipeline has gained the support of 
the US from the beginning. “The United States, which wants to encourage the 
independence of former Soviet republics, provided the diplomatic leverage and 
commitment for the project” (Fink, 2006, p.2). Since the late 1990s, the US has 
supported the construction of the BTC oil pipeline as the major export pipeline (MEP) 
(Bahgat, 2006). The BTC oil pipeline is also strategically important for the EU, since it 
provides the opportunity to diversify the suppliers and energy transport routes of the 
Member States with non-OPEC and non-Russian oil resources. The BTC is the major 
component of the east-west energy corridor, which connects the resources of the Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia with the European energy market through Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 According to Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s website, shareholders of the CPC is 
Russia (24%), Kazakhstan (19%), Oman (7%), Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium 
Co. (15%), LOKARCO B.V. (12.5%), Mobil Caspian Pipeline Co. (7.5%), Rosneft-
Shell Caspian Ventures Ltd. (7.5%), Agip International (N.A.) N.V. (2%), Oryx 
Caspian Pipeline LLC (1.75%), BG Overseas Holdings Ltd. (2%) and Kazakhstan 
Pipeline Ventures LLC (1.75%). Within these shareholders, Agip, BG, BP (LUKArco) 
and Shell are the EU companies.     
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Turkey wants to strengthen its role in the energy security of the EU by 
constructing pipelines that pass through its territories but also bypassing the Bosphorus. 
Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline, which is also called the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, would 
transport oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean as an alternative for transporting 
the oil resources of Russia and Kazakhstan through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The 
pipeline, which would be 560 kilometers long is expected to decrease the tanker traffic 
in the Straits by 50% when completed (Fink, 2006). Ceyhan’s role as en energy center, 
which is already enhanced by the BTC oil pipeline, would be strengthened when the 
Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline is completed in 2010 (Turkish Daily News, 19/04/2008). 
Ceyhan is pointed as the “new Rotterdam”, which is a Dutch municipality being the 
largest port of the EU (Kara, 2005). However, Russia is also developing projects 
bypassing the Straits with the objective of undermining the importance of the Samsun-
Ceyhan pipeline. Russia has already signed agreements with Bulgaria and Greece for 
the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline, which would run from the Black Sea coast of 
Bulgaria to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean cost to transport Russian 
and Caspian oil bypassing the Turkish straits.  
 
 
 
5.5.2. Turkey as the Gas Corridor  
 
 
 
    As stated throughout the study, the share of natural gas in the energy mix of the 
EU is increasing more rapidly compared to the demand for oil. Dependency of the EU 
on imported natural gas is projected to increase to 84% in 2030. If the EU does not take 
appropriate measures for the diversification of its natural gas imports, the EU would be 
dependent on the Russian gas to a major extent, which currently has a share of 45% in 
total gas imports of the EU. Thus, it can be argued that Turkey’s role as an energy 
corridor in the EU energy security is greater for transiting natural gas compared to oil. 
Turkey is already a major gas corridor due to the Blue Stream Pipeline pumping 
Russian gas to Turkey since 2003, which is scheduled to reach its full capacity of 16 
billion cubic meters of gas in 2010 (Barysch, 2007). However, since diversification is 
one of the major pillars of the EU energy policy, Turkey’s role in the energy security of 
the EU would be strengthened more by transporting non-Russian gas supplies to the 
EU. The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) or the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline (BTE) 
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has been constructed parallel to the BTC oil pipeline that carries gas from the Shah 
Deniz field of Azerbaijan to Turkey. BP has the leading role in the operation of the SCP 
(BP, 2003). If the planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) is constructed, which will be 
discussed below, the SCP pipeline would also be supplied with the natural gas produced 
in Turkmenistan (Mavrakis et al, 2006). Gas deliveries through the SCP have started 
with a minimum of 2 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, which would gradually 
increase to 6.6 bcm. However, Mavrakis et al. (2006) argue that there are concerns 
about the absorption capacity of Turkey unless the proposed energy corridors to the EU 
are operational, referring to Turkey-Greece-Italy Gas Pipeline and Nabucco pipelines. 
Before analyzing the situation of these pipelines, the prospects of the Trans-Caspian 
Gas Pipeline will be discussed. The TCP is projected to be an alternative route for 
Turkmenistan to export its natural gas bypassing Russia. The proposed project is the 
1640 km long pipeline that would transport gas from Turkmenistan under the Caspian 
Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia and finally to Turkey (Mavrakis et al, 2006). Turkey and 
Turkmenistan signed an agreement for gas sales from Turkmenistan in 1999 for the 
Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would deliver 16 bcm of natural gas per year starting in 
2002 (Bolukbaşi, 2004). However, while negotiations were on track between the two 
countries, Turkmenistan has signed a separate deal with Russia in 2000 raising doubts 
about the feasibility of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline since Turkmen gas reserves would 
not be enough for fulfilling the two commitments at the same time (Bolukbaşi, 2004). 
Disagreement over the legal status of the Caspian Sea is another challenge for 
constructing a TCP that would run under the Caspian Sea. Russia insists that it would 
not be possible to construct a TCP as long as the disagreement between the littoral states 
on how to share resources under the Caspian seabed is resolved (Barysch, 2007). 
 
 Turkey-Greece Interconnector pipeline is significant in the sense that it is the 
first pipeline that would deliver Caspian gas to the EU without crossing Russian 
territories (Barysch, 2007). Turkey-Greece Interconnector will be linked with Italy, 
when the construction of the pipeline between Greece and Italy that would connect the 
two countries under the Adriatic is completed. Turkey-Greece-Italy Pipeline Project is 
the first step for the realization of the South European Gas Ring Project with aims 
transporting natural gas from the energy producers of the Caspian region as well as 
from the Middle East to Greece and Italy via Turkey. First protocol of the Turkey-
Greece Interconnector and the Umbrella Agreement was signed in 2000 under the 
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framework of the INOGATE Programme (INOGATE Website).  Feasibility studies of 
the Turkey-Greece Interconnector were financed by the EU funds allocated to the 
projects conducted under the Trans-European Network (EC Memo/07/219, 2007). 
Turkey-Greece Pipeline, which is approximately 300 kilometers long, was opened in 
November 2007 (Euractiv, 19/11/2007). The initial delivery of the pipeline would be 
750 million cubic meters per year; however the capacity of the pipeline would increase 
to 12 billion cubic meters per year in 2012, 8 billion cubic meters per year of which 
would go to Italy when the inter-connection with Italy would be completed (Secretariat 
General for EU Affairs, Screening Chapter 21, 2006). Turkey-Greece-Italy 
Interconnector is significant for the EU energy security in the sense that it would partly 
relieve the heavy dependence of the EU on the Russian natural gas supplies. The Map 
5.2 illustrates the natural gas projects that are conceived as in the interests of the EU21. 
The blue arrows follow the route that is identified as the priority axes for the gas 
projects that would supply gas to the EU. As seen in the map, half of the priority axes 
pass through Turkey illustrating the central role of Turkey for the EU energy security. 
When it is considered that the projects of Pan-European Interest have been projected in 
2003, it is seen that Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnection and the BTE pipeline that are 
shown as the priority axes have already been realized. The EU also prioritizes natural  
gas resources of Turkmenistan for its diversification strategy, which would be carried to 
the EU via Turkey. Another priority axis in accordance with the EU interests is the 
Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria Gas Pipeline, the Nabucco pipeline, which 
will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The map does not illustrate the detailed technical routing of the pipelines.  
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5.5.2.1. The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project as the Milestone of the EU 
Diversification Strategy    
 
 
 
The second pipeline that Turkey plans to transport the Caspian gas resources to 
the EU following the realization of the Turkey-Greece Interconnector is the Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline Project. Turkey-Greece Interconnector is the initial step for the EU 
accessing Central Asian and the Caspian energy bypassing Russia; however Nabucco 
project would make a bigger difference to the energy security of the EU by diminishing 
Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and to Turkey’s role as an energy hub (Barysch, 
2007). It is projected that Turkey-Greece Interconnector would not be sufficient to 
transport the additional natural gas resources originating from the Caspian region, thus 
another route reaching to the European market would be needed in the near future 
(Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Screening Chapter 21, 2006). Nabucco is projected 
to transport natural gas from the Caspian region through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary to Austria. The Cooperation Agreement was signed between the five countries 
in October 2002. The consortium, Nabucco Gas Pipeline International, was founded in 
2004 with the objective of constructing a new pipeline connecting the Caspian region, 
the Middle East and Egypt as a new supply route for Europe (Nabucco Pipeline 
Website). The investment for the pipeline, which has the length of approximately 3,300 
kilometers, would be around €5 billion in 2004 prices. Potential suppliers of the pipeline 
are the Caspian states that are Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and also Turkmenistan, Iran 
if possible as well as the Middle Eastern countries of Egypt and Iraq. Major supplier for 
the initial stage of the Nabucco pipeline is Shah Deniz fields of Azerbaijan. The 
pipeline is projected to be completed in two stages. The first stage, in which a new route 
from the Turkish borders (Turkish borders with Georgia and/or Iran) would be 
constructed to Baumgarten, Austria will start in 2010 and operation of the pipeline is 
expected to start in 2013 carrying 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually 
(Nabucco Pipeline Website). Since Austria is already the center of distribution of 
energy, natural gas reached to Baumgarten would further be transported to other states 
in Central and Western Europe. The route of the pipeline can be seen in Map 5.3 below. 
The second stage of the Nabucco pipeline project would be completed in 2018 that 
covers activities for further increasing the capacity of the pipeline to a maximum of 31 
billion cubic meters of natural gas per year (Nabucco Pipeline Website). Partners of the 
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Nabucco Pipeline International are Austria’s OMV, Hungary’s MOL, Romania’s 
Transgaz, Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz and Turkey’s Botas. The five companies are the 
founding shareholders of the consortium. In February 2008, Germany’s largest energy 
company RWE joined the consortium, increasing the credibility of the project even 
further (Energy Business Review, 07/02/2008). Six shareholders of the Nabucco 
Pipeline Consortium have equal share in the project, each holding 16.67%. Along with 
the RWE, Gaz de France has also wanted to join the consortium; however it faced with 
the Turkish opposition due to the stance of France on the so-called Armenian genocide 
and the French objection to Turkey’s bid to join the EU. However, Gaz de France has 
achieved to enter the consortium through the green light of Romania, which announced 
that Romanian government would offer Gaz de France a share in the Romanian section 
of the consortium (Socor, 2008). Thus, France has gained an opportunity to join the 
consortium indirectly. Although Sarkozy opposes to Turkey’s membership to the EU, 
France is keen to join into a project that would greatly enhance the significance of 
Turkey for the EU energy security illustrating how material interests rather than 
political considerations shape the decisions of France in the Nabucco case.    
    
Nabucco pipeline has been supported by the EU since it would relieve heavy 
dependence of the EU on Russian gas by transporting non-Russian gas to the EU 
through non-Russian territories. Energy Commissioner Piebalgs underlines the 
importance of the progress made in the Nabucco project and states that there is a need 
for coordinating political, regulatory, legal and economic aspects sensitively to move 
forward in the project, which is a unique opportunity for the diversification strategy of 
the EU (Speech/08/96, 2008). The Nabucco pipeline would enable Turkey to become 
the “fourth artery” of the EU for natural gas supply (Speech/07/368, 2007) after Russia, 
Norway and the North Africa. Further EU action for the development of the Nabucco 
pipeline has also been stated as necessary in the Action Plan that outlines the priorities 
of the EU energy policy in the period 2007-2010 (European Commission, 2007a). The 
Nabucco pipeline is one of the mechanisms of strengthening the European 
Neighborhood Policy as well (European Commission, 2007d). Half of the funding 
necessary for the feasibility study of the project is financed by TEN program of the EU 
(Secretariat General for EU Affairs, Screening Chapter 21, 2006). The EU has 
appointed a special coordinator for the Nabucco gas pipeline project, former Dutch 
Foreign Minister Jozias van Aarsten, who considers the Nabucco project as a “stepping 
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stone” towards Turkey’s EU membership (Kyiv Post, 18/02/2008). The Nabucco 
pipeline is conceived to supply 10 – 15% of the gas supplies of the EU by 2025 (EC 
Press Release IP/06/842, 2006). Dependence of the EU on Russian gas supplies would 
diminish considerably given the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian Pipeline projects are 
completed along with the increasing capacity of the South Caucasus Pipeline. Turkey is 
the major transit country for the three projects, making it a major actor in the energy 
relations of the region. However, increasing strategic importance of Turkey as the 
energy corridor is not progressing without problems. Russia wants to keep the lucrative 
European energy market by undermining alternative projects mainly through attempts 
of developing alternatives to the Nabucco pipeline project. 
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5.6. Turkey as an Energy Corridor versus Russian Interests in the Region 
 
 
 
Russian interest in the Caspian region is to maintain its monopoly on the 
transportation of the Caspian energy resources to the EU, which regards the Caspian 
region as its “area of strategic interest” (Malek, 2006). One of the policies of Russia to 
challenge the feasibility of the Nabucco pipeline is signing separate deals with 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to control the transportation of their energy resources to 
the EU, thus to decrease the amount that would be carried by the Nabucco pipeline. 
Gazprom aims to pressure the Caspian region states to agree to gas supply and transit 
agreements that would provide the opportunity to Russia for keeping its lucrative 
European market. The strategy of Gazprom is clear since “Gazprom has indicated that it 
does not want Central Asian gas to compete with Russian gas in the lucrative European 
market” (IEA, 1998, p.36). Gazprom already signed an agreement for 25 years with 
Turkmenistan, which is a key country for Gazprom to maintain its gas monopoly, for 
much of its natural gas supply (Belkin, 2007). Moreover, Russia agreed to give in to the 
demands of Turkmenistan by paying higher prices for Turkmen gas, which would pay 
$130 per 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas in the first half of 2008 and $150 in the 
second half (International Herald Tribune, 20/11/2007). The strategy of Russia is to 
undermine the role of Turkmenistan as one of the major suppliers of the Nabucco. 
Moreover, Turkmenistan’s agreement with China for a pipeline that would supply 30 
billion cubic meters gas per year to China raises the question whether there would be 
enough gas left for the Nabucco pipeline after supplying Turkmen gas to Russia and 
China.  Another Russian move to prevent the natural gas supplies of Turkmenistan to be 
transported to the European markets bypassing Russian territories is the preliminary 
agreement it signed with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for a new pipeline that would 
run from Turkmenistan to Russia through Kazakhstan (Barysch, 2007). Besides Russian 
policies for undermining the feasibility of the Nabucco pipeline, another obstacle faced 
in the Nabucco project is the uncertainty over the suppliers of the pipeline. Azerbaijan 
will be the supplier for the first stage from its Shah Deniz gas fields; however the 
country has been involved in a dispute with Gazprom over the increasing price of the 
Russian gas delivered to Azerbaijan. Thus, Azerbaijan would need the gas it produced 
from the Shah-Deniz pipeline for its domestic use, thereby decreasing the amount of gas 
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it would provide to Nabucco pipeline. The dispute over the gas prices with Gazprom 
can be regarded as indirect move from Russia to undermine the Nabucco project. 
However, the biggest blow to the Nabucco pipeline has been the South Stream project 
developed by Russia and supported by the transit countries of the Nabucco pipeline as 
well as the European energy companies.  
 
The Memorandum of Understanding on the execution of the South Stream 
pipeline project was signed between Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and Italian ENI in 
June 2007 (Gazprom Website). The South Stream pipeline is planned to be constructed 
under the Black Sea to Italy through Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Croatia bypassing 
Ukraine that would cost approximately $14.8 billion with the capacity to supply 30 
billion cubic meters of natural gas per year (Los Angeles Times, 23/11/2007). South 
Stream is projected to supply natural gas to the markets that are already potential 
markets of Nabucco, thus challenging the commercial viability of the Nabucco pipeline 
(Barysch, 2007). In other words, Russia pursues two interrelated strategies to undermine 
the viability of the Nabucco pipeline project firstly by signing separate deals with the 
energy producer countries to decrease the amount that would be allocated to Nabucco 
and secondly by conducting agreements with the transit countries of Nabucco to 
decrease the demand for the gas that would be supplied by Nabucco. Although the 
special coordinator for the Nabucco Pipeline of the EU Van Aartsen stated that he did 
not regard the South Stream as an alternative to Nabucco but another mean for 
diversification, Russian separate deals with Bulgaria and Serbia, former of which is 
already a shareholder in the Nabucco pipeline, raises doubts about the future of the 
Nabucco (Kyiv Post, 18/02/2008). The most recent development in the South Stream 
gas pipeline has been the agreement between Kostas Karamanlis, the Greek Prime 
Minister, and Russia to initiate the construction of the South Stream pipeline (Euractiv, 
30/04/2008).            
 
5.7. Role of Turkey in the EU Energy Security in the Context of the Accession 
Negotiations 
 
 
 
Accession negotiations with Turkey has started in October 3rd 2005, however 
negotiations are continuing with a slow pace since only six out of 33 chapters have been 
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opened to negotiations. Within the chapters opened to negotiations that are Science and 
Research, Statistics, Enterprise and Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, 
Consumer and Health Protection and Financial Control, only Science and Research 
chapter has been provisionally closed (Secretariat General for EU Affairs Website). 
Trans-European Networks is one of the chapters on which negotiations with the EU has 
started in December 19, 2007 along with the chapter on Consumer and Heath 
Protection. The EU aims to establish Trans-European Networks within its territories as 
well as in its neighborhood in order to have integrated energy and transport networks. 
By creating Trans-European Networks of energy, the EU aims to increase 
competitiveness in the electricity and gas markets, enhance security of supply and 
protect the environment (European Commission, 1997b). It can be argued that having 
Trans-European Networks of energy within the EU as well as with the candidate 
countries is compatible with the overall objectives of the EU energy policy. As 
discussed in the previous sections, Turkey-Greece Interconnector and the Nabucco 
pipeline are regarded as priority projects for the EU and both of the projects are partly 
financed by the TEN Programme22.  It can be argued that the decision of the EU for 
starting negotiations in the TEN chapter with Turkey is a major illustration of the 
intention of the EU to deepen cooperation with Turkey in energy area. In addition, in its 
report on Turkey’s 2007 Progress Report, the European Parliament suggested that 
opening of negotiations in the energy chapter by pointing out Turkey’s contribution to 
the energy security of the EU (European Parliament, 2008).    
 
The EU has underlined the importance of Turkey for the EU energy security in 
various occasions. In the document published by the Commission covering the “Issues 
Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective”, energy is stated as a prominent area 
to which Turkey’s accession would contribute in a significant extent (European 
Commission, 2004). The document states that the EU would have access to better 
energy supply routes with Turkey’s accession. From the Commission’s perspective, the 
impact of the accession of Turkey to the energy security of the EU is described as the 
following:  
                                                 
22 The Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project has received 1.682.700 € from the TEN budget 
whereas the TEN financed 4.330.000 € for the technical and environmental studies of 
the Turkey-Greece Gas Interconnector (TEN-Energy Website).    
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            “Turkey would have a major role to play in the security of energy supply 
of the enlarged EU, since it would have on its borders the most energy-
rich regions on the planet. Turkish accession could help secure access to 
these resources and their safe transportation into the EU single market. 
It would diversify possible EU supply lines offering alternative export 
outlets both for Russia, the Middle East and the countries around the 
Caspian. Turkey is expected to develop further as a major oil transit 
country as, in addition to the Bosphorus and the northern Iraq-Ceyhan 
pipeline, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline comes into operation. For gas, 
Turkey will become an increasingly important transit country between 
the enlarged EU and the Caspian producers as well as the Middle East” 
(European Commission, 2004, p. 9).  
 
Turkey is part of the regional energy cooperation schemes developed by the EU 
for enhancing its security of energy supplies such as the Euro-Med Partnership and the 
Black Sea Synergy. “Help Turkey to make full use of its potential to become a major 
energy transit hub” is one of the priorities of the Commission as stated in the 
Commission document titled “An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Energy Interests” 
(European Commission, 2006b, p.3).    
 
In the high-level conference “Turkey and the EU: Together for a European 
Energy Policy” held in Istanbul in June 2007, the role of Turkey for the energy security 
of the EU is emphasized. In the conference, it is underlined that both Turkey and the EU 
can gain from deeper cooperation in their energy strategies (EC Press Release 
IP/07/748, 2007). Main theme of the conference was the key role of Turkey in the 
diversification of energy supply routes for the EU (EC Press Release IP/07/748, 2007). 
Significance of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline 
and Turkey-Greece Interconnector for the energy security of the EU is underlined along 
with the statement that realization of the Nabucco gas pipeline would further enhance 
the EU security of energy supply. Energy Commissioner Piebalgs stated that Turkey 
and the EU have a great potential to gain from deeper cooperation in energy since 
Turkey can help the EU to secure its energy supplies, while Turkey’s integration to the 
single energy market of the EU would lead to Turkey to build its domestic energy 
market and the infrastructure, which would then precipitate its economic growth. 
Moreover, cooperation in the energy issues between Turkey and the EU would support 
Turkey for facing the challenges of its import dependency, which has a level of 70%, 
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even higher than the EU average that is approximately 50% by sharing experiences 
(Speech/07/368, 2007). Thus, mutual interdependence is the most appropriate term to 
describe the relationship between Turkey and the EU in the energy issues (N.Pamir, 
personal communication, 18/04/2008).  
 
Turkey is on the process of aligning its electricity and gas sectors with the EU 
acquis in the context of the accession negotiations with the EU. Turkey however has not 
signed the Energy Community Treaty that aims to integrate the South East European 
region with the internal market of the EU. Promoting Turkey’s integration into the 
Energy Community Treaty is one of the priorities of the external policy of the EU to 
serve the energy interests of the EU (European Commission, 2006b). Turkey is an 
observer to the Energy Community Treaty. Turkey has passed two framework laws on 
electricity and gas markets to align its internal energy market with the EU acquis 
concerning the rules on the internal energy market and established the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority for monitoring the energy sector in its process of harmonization 
with the EU energy acquis. Although the laws that have passed in 2001 foresee the 
liberalization and the privatization of the Turkish energy market, implementation of the 
legislation has been progressing slowly, thus leading the adoption with the EU acquis to 
be limited.  
 
As conclusion to analyzing the role of Turkey on the EU energy security, Turkey 
has significant potential to enhance the security of energy supply of the EU by relieving 
the heavy dependence of the EU on Russian energy resources. As the Caspian region 
resources provide a viable alternative for the EU to diversify its energy suppliers, 
Turkey has a key role as a transit country for transporting the Caspian resources to the 
EU. Growing interest of the EU companies for developing and transporting the Caspian 
energy resources illustrates the potential of the region as a key energy supplier. Major 
challenge to gain access to the energy resources of the region is that existing pipeline 
connections were originally designed to supply the internal market of the Soviet Union. 
Hence, majority of the Caspian energy resources are transported to the European market 
through Russia. Russian monopoly on the transportation of the Caspian energy 
resources hinders the EU to benefit from the diversification of its energy suppliers. 
Dependence of the EU on Russian gas is more severe, thus the EU favors alternative 
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routes that transport Caspian gas to the EU bypassing Russia. The BTC oil pipeline is 
the initial step for demonstrating the key role of Turkey for the energy security of the 
EU. Recently completed South Caucasus Pipeline and Turkey-Greece Interconnector 
are the first projects enhancing the transportation of the Caspian gas directly to the EU. 
Importance of Turkey for the energy security of the EU would be maximized when the 
Nabucco gas pipeline project would be completed. Nevertheless, there are various 
obstacles on the realization of the project stemming from the Russian policy of 
preventing alternative routes carrying the Caspian resources that bypass its territories. 
Italian company ENI’s agreement with Gazprom for the South Stream pipeline is an 
illustration of how individual interests can prevail over the collective interests in the EU 
policy-making. The South Stream pipeline is projected to undermine the potential 
benefits of the Nabucco pipeline that is supported by the EU for decreasing import 
dependency to Russian gas. However, this does not discourage Italy from pursuing its 
individual interests for the security of its energy supply and from being the major 
partner of Gazprom in the project that would increase import dependency of the EU on 
Russian gas.  Key role of Turkey for enhancing the EU energy security could reach to 
its full potential with the accession of Turkey to the EU. While accession negotiations 
are going on, the decision of the EU to start negotiations for the TEN chapter has 
indicated that energy is a strategic area in the relations between Turkey and the EU, 
both of which could gain from deeper cooperation.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Energy policy of the EU has its roots in the early years of the European 
integration process. However, the reason why the energy policy is not under the 
complete competence of the EU is that the Member States have regarded energy as a 
strategic area that must be under the national control. Even the repercussions of the 
OPEC oil crisis could not motivate the Member States to establish an effective 
mechanism to tackle with the challenges to the energy security. Reluctance of the 
Member States for delegating power to the supranational level in the energy policy had 
constrained the Commission that could only developed policies on the lowest common 
denominator of the Member States. However, attitudes of the Member States have 
modified in early 1990s acknowledging that the single European market would not 
function properly without the creation of a single energy market. Global trends for the 
liberalization of the energy markets and the ambitious steps taken by the UK to 
liberalize its energy sector had transformed the perspective of the Member States. The 
change in the national paradigms has created the ground for the Commission to take 
further steps for the establishment of the single energy market. Thus, in line with the 
hypothesis of the liberal intergovernmentalism, the Commission could act further for 
the creation of the single energy market following the change in national preferences of 
the Member States. Although the Commission had the initiation powers in the EU 
decision-making mechanisms, it is not the supranational leadership, but the national 
preferences that determine the policy outcomes.  
 
The role of the Commission in the evolution of the EU energy policy is most 
visible in the creation of the single energy market in electricity and gas. The 
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Commission regards the creation of a competitive and functioning single energy market 
as a prerequisite for the energy security. By including the Member States as well as the 
neighboring states through mechanism like the Energy Community Treaty and the 
Trans-European Networks, the EU aims to create a single energy market. However, it is 
not possible to argue that there is a functioning single energy market in the EU. 
National energy champions of the largest Member States like France and Germany are 
pressuring their countries in order them to react the Commission’s push for unbundling 
requirements of the large energy companies. In liberal intergovernmentalism theory, 
domestic economic actors are significant in the national preference formation. 
Moravcsik’s theory is chosen for the main analytical framework in the study since it 
combines the liberal theory of national preference formation with the intergovernmental 
concept of strategic bargaining. In the case of the energy sector in the EU, preferences 
of the Member States are shaped in accordance with the economic actors within the 
Member States, which are the vertically integrated energy companies. Moreover, the 
debate on unbundling requirements is an illustration of how integration in energy policy 
is threatened when the key interests of the leading Member States diverge in a specific 
issue area.     
 
Security of energy supply of the EU has been challenged by increasing import 
dependency on few suppliers. The dependence of the EU on imported oil is projected to 
increase to 95% whereas dependence on important natural gas is expected to increase to 
84% in 2030. The share of Russian natural gas in total imports in the EU is 33.6%, 
however projected to increase due to increasing demand for natural gas. The crisis 
between Russia and Ukraine has revealed the vulnerability of the EU energy security. 
Moreover, the strategy of Russia for using its energy resources for political leverage in 
the Central and Eastern European countries as well in the Central Asia has led the EU to 
question the reliability of Russia an energy partner. Thus, diversification of energy 
suppliers has been the central objective of the energy security policies developed at the 
EU level. Regional cooperation schemes as the Euro-Med Partnership and the Black Sea 
Synergy as well as mechanisms like the Trans-European Networks and the INOGATE 
Programme have the ultimate objective of developing relations with the energy 
producer and transit countries to relieve the heavy dependence on Russian energy 
resources. Moreover, the EU has also developed a cooperation mechanism with Russia 
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to manage the interdependency between the two sides efficiently. The ultimate aim of 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is to establish a unified front against Russia to pressure 
it for liberalizing its energy market.    
 
Despite of the diversification policy supported by the EU, the Member States 
have pursued their individual interests, thus undermining the policies developed at the 
EU level for diversification. The major illustration of the breaking point in integration 
in the energy policy of the EU is the agreement signed between Germany and Russia for 
the North European Gas Pipeline that would connect the two sides with a pipeline 
passing under the Baltic Sea thus bypassing the new members of the EU. The pipeline is 
projected to increase German import dependency on Russian energy resources as well 
as increase the dependency of the EU. The pipeline would be completed in 2012 despite 
the oppositions of Poland and Lithuania, energy security of which are threatened with 
the pipeline. In line with the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, relative power 
positions of the Member States determine the outcome of inter-state bargaining. 
Relative power positions of the small Member States are minor compared with the 
largest Member States, which led them to have minor positions as illustrated in the issue 
of Nord Stream pipeline. Central and Eastern European countries were not even invited 
to the negotiations of the pipeline. Moreover, final blow to the concerns of the Member 
States came from the Energy Commissioner Piebalgs, who state that the Nord Stream 
pipeline is in the interest of the EU since it would enhance the security of supply of the 
EU. In addition to the pipeline agreement, the so-called special relationship between 
Russia and Germany is reflected in the agreement between the two sides for long-term 
natural gas contract until 2030. Having bilateral deals with the Russian natural gas 
monopoly Gazprom is not limited to Germany since Italy and France also pursue 
bilateral deals with Gazprom to secure their gas supplies. The common feature of the 
agreements signed between the individual Member States is their long-term nature since 
contact between Italian ENI and Gazprom would last until 2035 while the termination 
date of the contract signed between the EU and Gaz de France is 2030. Having a share 
in the gas exports of Russia is a zero-sum game between the Member States since an 
increase in the share of a Member State would be equal to decrease in the share of 
another. Moreover, when the security of energy supply become uncertain for the 
Member States, they are more likely to pursue national energy policies.  
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The central argument of the thesis is that when key interests of the Member 
States in a specific issue area diverge, the divergence constitutes a breaking point in the 
process of European integration. The theoretical framework of the analysis has been the 
liberal intergovernmentalism that emphasizes the role of the Member States rather than 
the supranational institutions in the European integration process, in which the pace of 
the integration is depended upon the possible convergence of the Member States 
interests. In this thesis, individual interests of the Member States are analyzed versus the 
collective interests sponsored by the Commission in the security of energy supply area. 
Whereas policy framework drawn by the Commission foresees diversification of the 
energy suppliers of the EU in order to relieve the heavy dependence of the EU on 
Russian energy resources, the Member States sign bilateral deals with Russia either for 
construction of new pipelines connecting the Western Europe with Russia directly or for 
long-term gas contracts. In line with the hypothesis of liberal intergovernmentalism, 
independent action of the Commission do not constitute a counter-evidence to the view 
that the EU policy-making is built upon the national preferences of the Member States 
rather than the supranational leadership of the Commission. Lack of a unified front 
against Gazprom would also undermine the efforts of EU to pressure Gazprom for 
leaving aside its divide-and-rule tactics.  
 
In this thesis, the role of the Caspian region energy resources in the security of 
energy supply of the EU is also analyzed. Oil and natural gas production in the Caspian 
region is increasing thanks to the interests of the major energy companies of the EU in 
the extraction activities of the region. Although the Caspian region would be another 
Middle East, the reserves of the region are estimated to compensate the decrease in the 
North Sea production. The region is regarded as significant for the diversification 
strategies of the EU, which is reflected by the creation of the INOGATE Programme for 
supporting the construction of alternative pipeline routes. However, transportation of 
the Caspian energy resources to the EU is currently through Russia as the infrastructure 
of the region was constructed in accordance with the internal demand in the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, Russia develops policies to undermine alternative projects that would 
transport the Caspian resources to the EU bypassing the Russian territories. Interests of 
Russia for maintaining its monopoly on the transportation of the Caspian energy 
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resources clash with the interests of Turkey that wants to enhance its position of being 
an energy corridor between the Caspian resources and the energy thirsty EU.  
 
The BTC pipeline is significant since it connects the energy resources of the 
Caspian region with the international energy markets without crossing through Russian 
territories. Turkey’s position for the energy security of the EU is further enhanced with 
the Turkey-Greece Interconnector natural gas pipeline that has completed recently and 
will be connected with Italy when the construction of the Greece-Italy Interconnector 
pipeline would be completed. Moreover, the South Caucasus Pipeline, or the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, that is constructed in parallel with the BTC would be supplied 
with the natural gas produced in the Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan. Although Turkey 
has currently a strategic role for the EU energy security, its role would be maximized 
when the Nabucco pipeline would be operational. The pipeline is projected to be the 
milestone of the diversification strategy of the EU. The pipeline would increase the role 
of Turkey in the energy security by decreasing the heavy dependence of the EU on the 
Russian natural gas. The Nabucco is one of the priority projects of the EU, importance 
of which is underlined in various occasions and also by the financing of the feasibility 
studies of the project from the Trans-European Networks budget. However, Russia aims 
to challenge the increasing importance Turkey for the EU energy security through 
various mechanisms. First strategy of Russia is signing long-term contracts with the 
Caspian region countries in order to undermine their capability to supply resources for 
the Nabucco pipeline. Moreover, Russia has developed the South Stream pipeline 
project that would be constructed under the Black Sea and heading to Italy. Italian ENI 
is the major contractor with Gazprom for the construction of the South Stream, which 
also illustrates that individual interests rather than the collective interests prevail in the 
energy security policies of the Member States. The Nabucco pipeline project is a unique 
opportunity both for the EU and Turkey for decreasing the dependency rates on Russian 
gas, however the project is undermined by the South Stream that would make the EU 
more dependent on the Russian gas. The thesis argues that the energy strategies that 
would entail Turkey have significant potential to contribute to the security of supply of 
the EU. When energy relations between Turkey and the EU are analyzed within the 
context of the accession negotiations with Turkey, opening negotiations in the Trans-
European Networks chapter is the indication of the importance attributed Turkey for the 
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energy security of the EU. Moreover, the latest European Parliament report suggested 
that opening negotiations in the energy chapter would contribute further to the role of 
Turkey for the EU energy security.  
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